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L Introduction
Among the Rehnquist Court's more striking accomplishments are the
invigorated takings and state sovereign immunity doctrines. At first glance,
these developments might be characterized as conservative jurisprudence in
line with other recent decisions. Expanded takings doctrine, after all,
champions property rights and restrains government from burdening
landowners with the cost of regulation. Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity,' like the Court's other federalism decisions, protects the states'
dignity and curtails the federal government's power. From a broad level of
generality, these doctrines seem part of a common judicial project.
And yet, though they are products of the same Court, there is reason to
think that takings and state sovereign immunity cases are fundamentally
incompatible with each other. On the one hand, the Court's recent takings
cases often expand the instances in which a property owner can sue the
government to recover just compensation for a taking of property. On the other
hand, the state sovereign immunity cases make it easier for state governments to
rely on sovereign immunity to shield them from suit. Of course, this rough
characterization misses terrific doctrinal complexities but, at their core, these
two doctrines do not mesh easily.
Curiously, despite the Court's recent attention to these areas, little has
been made of the seeming incompatibility of such robust takings and sovereign
immunity precedents. In recent memory, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the paradox rarely, most famously in 1987, in a footnote in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,2 in which
the Court offhandedly asserted that the Just Compensation Clause trumps
1. My references to "Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity" refer generally to state
sovereign immunity. However, as discussed in Parts 1m, V, and VI, the Court's recent decisions
in Seminole Tribe and Alden seem to root state sovereign immunity in pre-constitutional
common law grounded in the structure of the Constitution, thus expanding the doctrine far
beyond the Eleventh Amendment's textual confines.
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
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sovereign immunity. 3 This First English footnote might, in fact, have it right,
but the issue requires greater exploration. First, the footnote is dictum, because
the plaintiffs in First English sued the county, not the state. Second, state and
lower federal courts are split on the question, and many decisions have
neglected to cite, let alone follow, the footnote.4 Third, both areas of law have
3. Footnote nine reads:
The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment,
combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment
itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government to act, not a remedial
provision. The cases cited in the text, we think, refute the argument of the United
States that "the Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to
award money damages against the government." Though arising in various factual
and jurisdictional settings, these cases make clear that it is the Constitution that
dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking.
Id. at 316 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
4. The most thorough state judicial treatment of this problem is the Oregon Court of
Appeals's decision in Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). The
court there concluded that "Alden should not be read so broadly as to dictate that states may not
be sued in state courts on federal takings claims unless they have specifically waived their
sovereign immunity." Id. at 569; see also Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div., 90 P.3d 506,
509 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (declining to follow Boise Cascade and finding sovereign immunity
to bar takings claim), cert. granted, Manning v. N.M. Energy & Minerals, 92 P.3d 11 (N.M.
2004); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1, 9 (S.D. 2002) (following Boise Cascade).
Federal appellate courts have generally ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does bar
takings suits, but they have not engaged with the issue carefully. Indeed, most fail to even cite
First English. See, e.g., Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277-79 (1 th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars takings claims in federal court, in part because state
courts provide means for redress, but failing to cite First English); John G. & Marie Stella
Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation suits brought in federal district court,
but failing to cite First English); Robinson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th
Cir. 1992) (same); Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 975 F.2d 616,
618-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding that inverse condemnation suits are barred in federal district
court, without citing First English); Citadel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 33-34
n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding the same before the Supreme Court had decided First English);
Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding a takings claim against the
state barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Esposito v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 939 F.2d
165, 173 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991) (Hall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment must yield
to takings claim, even though majority notes that plaintiffs did not challenge on appeal district
court's ruling that Eleventh Amendment barred damages). The only federal appellate case to
deal with these issues in any depth is the Sixth Circuit's recent decision, DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky,
381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1733 (2005), which rules that the
Eleventh Amendment bars takings suits against the state in federal court, but would not do so in
state court. Id. at 526-28. Unlike most other federal appellate decisions in this area, DLX does
cite First English, id. at 527, but nevertheless finds that state sovereign immunity bars takings
actions for damages against the state in federal court. Id. at 528. It is noteworthy that state and
federal courts have tended to go in opposite directions on this issue, especially in light of Alden
v. Maine, which arguably might require symmetrical immunity rules between the state and
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changed significantly since 1987. Fourth, even if correct, the footnote is terse
and does not wrestle with the issue's real complexities. Indeed, the conflict
exposes deep tensions in our constitutional framework worthy of sustained
analysis. Fifth, the doctrinal collision raises important, if more abstract,
methodological questions about how to arbitrate between competing
constitutional provisions.
It is interesting that the problem has received so little attention. The Court
itself might have addressed it as recently as 2001 in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,5
but it declined to answer an amicus briefs argument that Rhode Island was a
sovereign state immune from suit even in takings cases. 6 Admittedly, the Court
is understandably reluctant to address newly presented arguments appearing
only in amicus briefs. But quite possibly, the Court also recognized that
squaring the two doctrines would be no small task, so it chose not to expose a
snag in its case law. After all, addressing the doctrinal train wreck might have
encouraged the Court to scale back one area to make room for the other, an
outcome that, though perhaps logically more sound, was not required, given
that both doctrinal lines had consistently commanded five votes.7 Whatever the
reason, the current Court has avoided the issue to date. 8
federal judicial systems. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Alden and the implication that state
sovereign immunity applies equally in state and federal courts).
5. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
6. Brief for the Board of County Commissioners of the County of La Plata, Colorado et
al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondents State of Rhode Island, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047), 2001 WL 15620, at 20-21. The Court opted not to
address the collision, proceeding as though it accepted First English's assumption that the
Takings Clause does trump sovereign immunity. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18 (addressing
petitioner's takings claim against the state and stating that "the two threshold considerations"
were ripeness and that the deprivation preceded petitioner's ownership).
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas quite
consistently supported the expansion of both takings and state sovereign immunity law. These
five again comprised the majority in Palazzolo. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 610.
8. Scholars have given slightly more attention to the problem, noting the paradox on
occasion, though usually just in a short paragraph or in a footnote. See, e.g., RICHARD H.
FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 379, 1002-03
(4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (discussing the role of sovereign immunity with
respect to the Takings Clause); RICHARD H. FALION Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM: 2002 SUPPLEMENT 181-82 (2002) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER, 2002 SuPPLEMENT] (discussing cases that preceded Alden v. Maine and their
implications for state sovereign immunity in cases involving constitutional rights); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1273 n. 18 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the Court's stance in
regards to the Takings Clause); Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings
Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 328 (1988)
(discussing federalization of state tort law in context of Takings Clause prior to recent Eleventh
Amendment decisions); Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial
Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 57, 138
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This Article explores the paradoxes arising from the collision of the
Court's recent takings and state sovereign immunity doctrines. More
n.344 (1999) (referencing First English footnote nine); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's
Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?: The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity
Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 243-44 (2006) (noting the collision and arguing that
Congress could override sovereign immunity when a state takes property); Richard H. Fallon,
The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
429, 485 (2002) (noting the apparent First English exception to state sovereign immunity and
suggesting that it is not coincidental that it protects "old property rights generally looked on
with more solicitude by conservatives than by liberals"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 115 nn.453-54 (1988)
(noting the First English footnote and discussing "self-executing nature" of Takings Clause);
Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561,
1564 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)); Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing
Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 861-64 (2002) (noting the
collision course between takings and state sovereign immunity); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial
Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAw. L. REV. 623,623
n.2 (2002) (remarking on the disparity between takings clause doctrine and state sovereign
immunity); Catherine T. Struve, Turf Struggles: Land, Sovereignty, and Sovereign Immunity,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 574 (2003) (citing First English and noting that Just Compensation
Clause appears to be an exception to state sovereign immunity bar on damages claims against
states); Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-BasedArgumentfor Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 145-46 (2004) (noting the collision in
context of compensating the wrongfully convicted). However, though these critics' recognition
of the issue has been thoughtful, it has not been thorough, for those articles do not focus on the
tension I identify. Moreover, the recent expansion of both doctrines have highlighted the
tension and presented yet more doctrinal knots.
The one article that has focused on these two issues together is Richard H. Seamon, The
Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067 (2001). Professor Seamon
argues that although states are immune from just compensation suits brought in federal court,
due process concerns can subject nonconsenting states to just-compensation suits in state court
(hence, the asymmetry). Id. at 1068-70. Thus, if a state fails to create an adequate remedy, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to hear just
compensation suits notwithstanding state sovereign immunity. Id. at 1069.
Seamon's discussion is very intelligent, but ultimately I disagree both with his conclusion
and his methodology, particularly his reliance on century-old cases to support his argument that
states are immune from just compensation suits in federal court. Because those cases mostly
assert a vigorous state sovereign immunity (some before the Takings Clause even applied to the
states), their holdings add less to the analysis of this constitutional conflict than one might
initially think. Indeed, his decision to make one doctrine "fit" with the other one obstructs a
more thorough analysis weighing the relative merits of the competing doctrines. Moreover, in
light of Alden, it seems strange to assume, as he does, that the rules between federal and state
court would be so different. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Alden and the symmetry of state
sovereign immunity in state and federal courts). This Article not only arrives at a different
conclusion, but seeks to wrestle more with the Court's recent case law, to consider more
carefully the structural relationship between the two provisions, and, more abstractly, to explore
methodological approaches for arbitrating between conflicting constitutional doctrines. This
Article also relies more on the nature of constitutional remedies and the force of the Takings
Clause, whereas Professor Seamon roots his argument in due process requirements.
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specifically, it examines whether the Takings Clause is self-executing 9 and
therefore can, by its own force, abrogate-or strip-the state of the sovereign
immunity it would otherwise enjoy in actions for damages. If not, states
would retain their sovereign immunity in takings cases unless Congress
abrogated that immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
power.' O Either outcome jars current case law. If the Takings Clause only
applies to the states when Congress abrogates the states' sovereign immunity
(or, alternatively, if a state itself waives its sovereign immunity), then takings
cases applied against the states rest on an illegitimate assumption." To be
sure, as sovereign immunity does not extend to state subdivisions or officers,
the takings suits brought against counties, municipalities, or officers are not
implicated, but there remain takings cases, like Palazzolo and Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,1 2 in which the defendants were the state or a state
agency. Similarly, concluding that the Takings Clause, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, abrogates state sovereign immunity by its own force,
effectively ignores the Court's recent vigorous defense of state sovereign
immunity principles.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the Takings Clause does trump state
sovereign immunity by automatically abrogating-or stripping-the
immunity that states usually enjoy in actions at law. An action to recover
damages for a temporary taking therefore arises directly out of the
Constitution and requires no statutory authorization, either to provide a cause
of action or to abrogate state sovereign immunity.1 3 The arguments on both
9. This Article uses the term "self-executing" to mean that the Takings Clause abrogates
state sovereign immunity by its own force and thereby provides a cause of action for damages
against the state without further legislation. It is worth noting that the concept of a "self-
executing" provision is somewhat woolly. In some contexts, for instance, it might mean merely
that the provision has force without statutory authorization (so that, for instance, a plaintiff
could sue a state official for an injunction to force him to return his taken property). Unless
indicated otherwise, this Article uses it to refer more broadly to a provision that automatically
abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity.
10. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress can
abrogate state sovereign immunity when enforcing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-46
(1999) (indicating that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity for deprivations of
property without due process provided that constitutional violation is manifest).
11. Because the Tucker Act waived the federal government's sovereign immunity for,
inter alia, takings claims, such suits are permitted against the federal government. See infra
notes 409-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Tucker Act and waiver of federal
sovereign immunity).
12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
13. A direct constitutional action against the state is not only theoretically sound but also
practically necessary, as no such statutory action exists. The statute that most frequently is the
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
sides of this debate, however, are complex and, in places, persuasive. 14 The
competing goals of individual rights and a workable structure of government
reflect a constitutional system that, quite appropriately, seeks multiple
objectives. Accordingly, the tension between the notion that rights deserve
adequate protections and remedies, on the one hand, and the competing idea
that the judiciary should be reluctant to control the legislature's budget, on
the other, runs throughout this Article.
The judiciary plays but one part in the grand constitutional enterprise,
and one danger with this Article's thesis is that it grants too much power to
courts. This Article's theory of automatic abrogation must therefore be
justified not merely with narrow legal arguments, but with broader arguments
regarding judges' roles in our government structure. In particular, this
Article focuses on the issue of constitutional remedies because, though
money damages are seemingly the most appropriate remedy for a temporary
taking, clearly our system does not provide the full ambit of remedies for
every cognizable injury. The curious and fascinating interplay between
remedy and injury-combined with the unique text of the Takings Clause-
weaves through all the different arguments presented here.
In addition to the doctrinal details, a study like this must also consider
the appropriate methodology for resolving incompatible lines of
constitutional case law. How should the constitutional jurist address a
basis for suits in federal court against local governments and state officials who have allegedly
violated a party's federal rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not override state sovereign immunity.
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (finding no basis to conclude that Congress
intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity). Section 1983's use of the word "person"
has been found to apply to state officers sued in an individual capacity, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21,31 (1991), and state subdivisions, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 628,688-89
(1978) (finding that "person" includes "local government bodies"), but not states themselves.
See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (finding that "a State is not a
'person' within the meaning of § 1983"). Accordingly, § 1983 creates no remedy against the
state itself. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (finding that
"§ 1983 actions do not lie against a State"); see also infra note 111 (discussing further this line
of cases).
14. Upon first glance, some might view this collision as easily resolved. One school of
thought might argue that the Takings Clause promises a damages remedy and that as
incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, it necessarily trumps any
immunity emanating from the Eleventh Amendment. An opposing school would view state
sovereign immunity as a bedrock principle that nothing in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments
would purport to override. As the Court stated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), "a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the
state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 663. Indeed, in the nineteenth
century, just compensation clauses did not give rise to a damages remedy but instead invalidated
legislation effecting takings without just compensation. This spectrum of reactions makes clear
that this is not only an unanswered question but also a difficult one.
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conflict between doctrines that rest on large bodies of precedent? It has been
common in recent decades for American courts to make one doctrine fit with
the other, to find exceptions within a body of law, and to claim that the
apparent collision does not exist. Sometimes this approach is not only
acceptable but correct; it nicely averts a messy collision and recognizes that
only one doctrine is at the heart of the matter. But this approach has also
gone too far, for real doctrinal conflicts sometimes do exist and in such cases
the judge should address those conflicts directly. This is such a case.
Though there may be ways of reconciling state sovereign immunity and
temporary takings, it is healthier and more honest to acknowledge the
paradox. Indeed, many other judicial systems around the world-for
instance, in Europe, in Canada, and in South Africa-are far more
comfortable recognizing conflicts within their own bodies of law, and have
far less difficulty balancing the relative interests of both in determining
which body should prevail in a given context.' 5 Such weighing is not without
its problems, but it does provide the opportunity for rigorous and honest
assessment of a doctrine's place in a particular situation.
Part II of this Article frames the problem, providing a hypothetical suit
in which this question would be central to the outcome. Given the doctrinal
complexities of these areas, only a suit with certain characteristics would
actually pose the collision this Article addresses. However, this collision is
by no means hypothetical; suits like this do arise and, in fact, have been made
more likely by recent decisions. Part III surveys the doctrinal train wreck and
summarizes the Court's takings and tax refund due process cases, on the one
hand, and state sovereign immunity cases, on the other. It also reviews
quickly the Court's brief-and vague-statements about the instant conflict.
Parts IV, V, and VI argue that the Takings Clause automatically
abrogates state sovereign immunity, focusing respectively on textual,
structural, and historical arguments.' 6  Though no single argument is
necessarily dispositive, collectively these factors point strongly towards
automatic abrogation. The Article concludes by considering what
implications these findings might have for the courts' role in our democracy,
for the judicial vindication of other constitutional rights, and for
methodological approaches to the collision of constitutional doctrines.
15. See infra note 532 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal balancing that
sometimes occurs in foreign courts).
16. Because these categories are not rigid, each section borrows from others' reasoning,
though this Article cabins some arguments in given sections for ease of presentation.
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I. Framing the Problem
Given the variety of ways in which takings claims arise, it is easy to
imagine a takings case in which it would be impossible to raise an Eleventh
Amendment defense. Only particular circumstances invite the potential "train
wreck" between takings and sovereign immunity doctrines. Similarly, many
scenarios pose procedural complications that, while significant to many takings
litigants, are complicated enough to merit entire articles themselves. This
Article briefly introduces the procedural complexities facing takings litigants; it
focuses, however, on the potential conflict between immunity and just
compensation issues.
Assume that a state government or agency enacts a regulation that deprives
a landowner of the use of her land and that the owner sues the state government
in state court to recover just compensation for this regulatory taking.17 After
appealing to the state or filing a lawsuit, the plaintiff successfully forces the
state to stop the regulation, thus eliminating the condition that deprived her of
the use of her property. Although her land has been effectively "returned," the
landowner lost the use of her land for the duration of the regulatory taking. The
state has ended the regulatory scheme that took her land in the first place but
has refused to compensate her for the period she was deprived of her land. She
sues the state to recover for the temporary taking, and the state raises an
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense.
The details of this hypothetical are important to set up the collision
because slight variations would avoid it. For instance, it must be the state's
regulation that effects the temporary taking; municipalities and counties are
never entitled to raise a sovereign immunity defense. 18 The suit must also be
one to collect damages, such as for an interim taking, for which injunctive relief
17. A variety of regulations might deprive a landowner use of her land. Many
environmental regulations, for instance, might accomplish such deprivation, especially under the
Court's current robust takings doctrine. In Palazzolo, for instance, the Rhode Island Coastal
Commission denied plaintiff's application to construct a beach club on eighteen acres of coastal
wetlands. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611-16 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar an individual's suit in federal court against a county for
nonpayment of debt). One wonders, though, given the current Supreme Court's willingness to
extend state sovereign immunity far beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment, whether the
Court might also choose to extend that immunity to state subdivisions as well. But see
generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 577 (1994) (arguing that Lincoln County distinction
between states and counties for immunities purposes is not anomalous on either historical or
functional grounds).
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is effectively unavailable.' 9 If the contested state behavior were, by contrast, a
physical taking that had not yet ceased, then the plaintiff might sue a state
officer for injunctive relief to force the state to return the property. Because Ex
parte Young 2° permits suits against state officers for injunctive relief," a state
sovereign immunity defense could not arise. However, in the above
hypothetical, a Young injunction does the plaintiff no good; the state has
already returned her property, and so the only relief she seeks is money to
compensate her for the loss of use of her land.22 Given that the damages sought
could be large, this hypothetical illustrates well why the officer suit alternative
23is not always adequate.
The forum is also important. Though it is not clear that state and federal
court lawsuits would necessarily require different results, a plaintiff can sue in
state court to try to avoid substantial procedural obstacles. Most notably,
takings plaintiffs in federal court must avoid the notorious "Williamson trap.',
24
Under Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank,25 a plaintiff may need to seek
compensation on federal takings claims in state court to meet Supreme Court
ripeness requirements. 26 The combination of these fairly rigorous ripeness
requirements often forces litigants to bring state inverse condemnation
19. Temporary takings are not necessarily the only scenario in which this can arise, but
they pose the collision most succinctly.
20. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. See id. at 159 (reasoning that a state official who attempts to enforce an
unconstitutional law may be subjected to a suit for injunctive relief because the official is
"stripped of his official or representative character").
22. Under the Court's decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687
(1999), a § 1983 suit to recover for a taking constitutes a suit for damages. Id. at 710. Whether
one characterizes this relief as damages, restitution, just compensation, or something else,
however, is not significant for sovereign immunity purposes, given Edelman's rule that Exparte
Young relief applies only to prospective, not retrospective, remedies. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 664 (1974). Because money compensating a plaintiff for an already terminated
regulatory taking is certainly retrospective, even if it is characterized as equitable restitution,
Edelman applies and an Exparte Young remedy is unavailable. See id. at 666-67 (finding that
Ex parte Young may be unavailable even though plaintiff characterized the relief sought as
equitable restitution). But see infra Part IH.A.2 (noting that due process tax cases might avoid
sovereign immunity in part because the remedy resembles restitution).
23. But see Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 919, 920 (2000) (placing herself "squarely among the no-big-deal camp").
24. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 264 (2002)
(discussing the "Williamson trap").
25. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
26. See id. at 186 (finding the respondent's taking claim to be "premature, whether it is
analyzed as deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as
a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
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proceedings before they can even get into federal court. The "trap," though, is
that once they get into federal court, those same plaintiffs might be unable to
raise the same claim they did in state court due to preclusion rules.27
Interestingly, these ripeness requirements sometimes make interim takings
more likely to happen, thus, in the long run, increasing the number of possible
takings claims. Because ripeness requirements tend to be strict, plaintiffs are
likely to spend significant time seeking remedies outside the federal court
system. If the plaintiff is complaining about an interim taking, the duration of
that taking will increase as she works her way through the state agency's
dispute procedures. Petitioning a state agency takes time, and, even if she
ultimately succeeds in forcing the agency to return the property, either by
physically returning it or halting the regulation diminishing its value, she has
lost use of the land for the added time it took her to exhaust the state's
administrative remedies. Even if the state ultimately returns her property, either
as a result of the administrative procedures or because the state loses takings
litigation in court, the landowner will have lost the use of her land for a longer
period of time. Under First English, the property owner can recover for this
interim violation whether it arises out of a physical or regulatory taking.28
Ripeness requirements, therefore, make it more likely that the interim taking
will have been for long enough to merit litigation.29 The great irony, then, is
27. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 264 (discussing the "Williamson trap"). The
unfathomable brilliance of this trap calls to mind Yossarian's respectful whistle upon first
hearing about "catch-22." JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 52 (1961).
In a case ostensibly challenging the procedural pitfalls resulting from Williamson, the
Supreme Court recently held that even though federal claims are not ripe until after state court
proceedings, the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, precludes plaintiffs from
relitigating in federal court § 1983 claims that state courts adjudicated. See San Remo Hotel,
L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2507 (2005) (affirming the Court of Appeals'
decision that found no exception to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738). In a short
concurrence, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by three other justices, expressed
skepticism about the Williamson doctrine. See id. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (writing
that Williamson "may have been mistaken" in part). Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
that he was not sure "why federal takings claims in particular should be singled out to be
confined to state court, in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional directive."
Id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). It is unclear, of course, whether the remaining justices
opted not to join the Chief s concurrence because they disagreed with him or because the
wisdom of Williamson was not squarely presented in San Remo. Either way, for the time being
Williamson remains good law and might have been further entrenched by the Court's suggestion
that "it is entirely unclear why... [a] preference for a federal forum should matter for
constitutional or statutory purposes." Id. at 2505.
28. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 319 (1987) (noting that converting a taking "into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient
remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause").
29. Of course, in many takings suits, a key issue is what constitutes "just compensation."
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that just as ripeness requirements make it harder for property owners to litigate
takings claims, they also make the damages component of such claims more
significant. And, given the Supreme Court's increasingly robust sovereign
immunity doctrine, they also increase the instances in which a state might raise
an Eleventh Amendment defense to protect itself from a suit seeking to recover
damages for a protracted interim taking.
III. The Doctrinal Collision Course
To understand how and why takings and sovereign immunity doctrines
collide, it is important first to understand the two areas independently. They
are both complex bodies of jurisprudence, and the paradoxes this Article seeks
to explore arise out of those complexities. Because others have explored each
doctrine at length elsewhere, this Part will summarize each area very briefly,
focusing on the Court's recent cases that most directly affect the "collision."
The last section of this Part addresses the Court's brief attention to the
collision.
A. Takings Doctrine and Tax Refund Cases
1. Takings Cases
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 3 0 Initially, the
clause applied only to the federal government, although the Court later
incorporated it through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
apply to the states as well.31 Much of the case law has focused on exactly what
constitutes a taking: Precisely how must government regulation interfere with
the private property owner's rights for that regulation to constitute a taking,
thereby requiring the state to offer the property owner just compensation?
In the case of physical takings, the Court has articulated a bright line
rule.32 The problem of defining a taking, however, becomes more complicated
Though obviously significant, this issue is beyond the focus of this Article.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241
(1897) (finding that a taking by a state violates Fourteenth Amendment due process rights).
32. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,441 (1982) (requiring
compensation for a physical occupation). When the "'character of the governmental action' ...
[is] permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the
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in the area of regulatory takings, when the regulation does not cause private
property to be physically occupied, but rather deprives the owner of the full
value of her property in some other way. When these restrictions deprive
the owner of all "economically beneficial use of land, ', 33 the Court will find
a taking.34 But when the restriction merely deprives a landowner of some
economic value, the Court engages in an ad hoc, fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether it constitutes a taking.35 In recent years, the Court has
tended to favor property owners in ad hoc inquiries, as in the exaction
cases. 36 This trend in favor of property rights is perhaps most apparent in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, itself a regulatory takings case, in which the
Court held that a landowner can assert that a particular exercise of the
State's regulatory power is onerous enough to compel compensation, even
if that regulation went into effect prior to the owner's purchase of the
land.37 The Court found that "a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title.
3 8
Collectively, these cases from the past fifteen years have expanded the
range of regulatory activity and conditions that constitute a taking. Though
this phenomenon is certainly important by itself, First English renders them
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Id. at 434-35 (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
34. See, e.g., id. at 1030 (finding that a taking occurs when a property owner is deprived
of all economically viable use). Lucas's rule might be complicated somewhat by Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), which suggested that
Lucas might apply only to regulations effecting complete deprivations of all market value, as
opposed to regulation that prohibits all building. See id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(dissenting because in Lucas the Court found that under circumstances such as those presented
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the government must pay just compensation).
35. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating that "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking"); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(describing the factors the Court considers when engaging in "essentially ad hoc factual
inquiries").
36. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough
proportionality" between the exaction imposed and the harm created by the requested
construction); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987) (requiring an "essential
nexus" between the condition imposed and the government interest furthered by the condition).
37. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,616 (2001) (rejecting the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's finding that the petitioner could not seek compensation based on a regulation
enacted before he came into possession of the disputed property).
38. Id. at 629-30.
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particularly significant for our purposes. First English establishes that the
government must provide compensation for the period during which the
government deprived the property owner of the use of his land for not only
physical but also regulatory takings. 39 In this way, First English extended
the line of precedent that already held that property owners suffering
temporary physical takings were entitled to just compensation. 40 Stopping
the regulation and returning the property to the owner is not enough; the
government must also pay money damages to compensate for the owner's
"lost time." 41 A property owner then may have already resumed complete
use of his land but can still sue for "just compensation. ,
42
The doctrinal collision occurs when the State raises a sovereign
immunity defense to the plaintiff's takings claim for damages. It is
important to note that doctrinal developments since First English do not
themselves create this "collision"; the apparent incompatibility of takings
and state sovereign immunity doctrine already existed, notwithstanding
First English's attempt to brush aside those complexities in a footnote.43
However, while First English did not create the tension, it did heighten the
paradox by holding that property owners subjected to a temporary taking
are entitled to compensation beyond the invalidation of the ordinance
effecting the taking."4 Because injunctive relief-invalidating the law and
forcing the government to return the taken property-is therefore
inadequate to make such a property owner whole, the owner can sue under
First English to recover damages for the period during which she was
denied use of the land. However, when the defendant is a state, it
theoretically can raise sovereign immunity as a defense against suits for
money damages.
39. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
319 (1987).
40. See id. at 318 (describing prior cases in which the Court had required just
compensation for temporary physical occupations); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1, 14 (1949) (requiring just compensation for a temporary physical
occupation); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,381 (1946) (same); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 384 (1945) (same).
41. First English, 482 U.S. at 319.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 316 n.9 (discussing briefly the "prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment...
combined with principles of sovereign immunity").
44. See id. at 321 ("We merely hold that where the government's activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.").
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2. Due Process Tax Refund Cases
The tax refund cases are roughly analogous to takings cases; both involve
plaintiffs suing a government for the return of property unjustly taken from
them. Like regulatory takings cases, in particular, these are instances in which
the plaintiff seeks monetary relief and in which the state presumably could raise
an Eleventh Amendment defense.45 In Ward v. Love County,4 the Supreme
Court reversed an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision that found that a state law
barring recovery of voluntarily paid taxes precluded the Choctaw Indian Tribe's
claim to recover taxes, which the Tribe alleged were coercively collected.47
Contrary to the Oklahoma court's findings, the Supreme Court found that the
taxes had been "obtained by coercive means-by compulsion," and held that
"money got through imposition may be recovered back." 48 Because the suit
here was against the county and not the state itself,49 sovereign immunity issues
would not have come up, but Ward nevertheless laid the foundation for a due
process right to recover from government unfairly coerced taxes.
The Court has returned to this line more recently in McKesson
Corporation v. Division of ABT50 and Reich v. Collins.5' In McKesson, the
plaintiffs demanded a refund of Florida state taxes paid under a discriminatory
tax that had been held unconstitutional.52 Although it struck down the tax
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the state court did not refund the taxes
plaintiffs had already paid.53 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
unanimously that when a state requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before
challenging its legality, the Due Process Clause requires the state to afford a
meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief.54  Thus, McKesson
45. One could argue that tax refunds do not constitute damages, because an injunction is
theoretically all that is needed to force a government to return taxes to an individual. The Court
in Edelman v. Jordan, however, did not see the issue that way. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974) (ruling that Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945), compelled the decision that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action to recover unpaid
welfare benefits, notwithstanding plaintiffs effort to characterize relief sought as "equitable
restitution").
46. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
47. See id. at 25 (noting the Oklahoma Supreme Court's position that "if the payment was
voluntary, the moneys could not be recovered back in the absence of a permissive statute").
48. Id. at 23-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 17.
50. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
51. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
52. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 22; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, 851-52 (discussing McKesson).
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suggests that state and local governments might have certain constitutional due
process obligations to their citizens, even though no applicable statute enforces
the obligation and traditional immunities might otherwise bar a suit against the
state.55
What is most striking about McKesson is not that the Court required a
post-deprivation remedy, but that it determined that in some instances only a
monetary refund would suffice.56 This is particularly significant for our
purposes because sovereign immunity usually does not bar suits entirely but
rather bars suits against the state for money damages. As Professors Fallon and
Meltzer note, McKesson therefore "poses something of a puzzle when
compared with doctrines applicable to other suits seeking monetary relief
against the government. In the vast majority of cases, sovereign immunity and
related doctrines bar uncontested suits for payment of funds directly out of state
and federal treasuries."57 So the question remains: "why does the Constitution
mandate a damages remedy against the government for unlawful exactions of
taxes (and for takings) but not for other constitutional violations?
58
Reich addressed the implications of this due process right, confronting the
issue of sovereign immunity more directly and stating the constitutional
obligation more forcefully. While again unanimously affirming that due
process requires a state to provide "clear and certain" remedy for taxes collected
in violation of federal law, the Court also emphasized that the obligation exists
55. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26-31 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
appellate review by the Supreme Court). One should not, however, overstate McKesson's
implications on state sovereign immunity doctrine. The Court did place some emphasis on
Florida's willingness to open its courts to refund actions, in essence waiving any sovereign
immunity defense they might have had. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 852; see also
McKesson, 496 U.S. at 30-31 (noting that when a state court takes "cognizance of a case, the
state assents to appellate review" by the Supreme Court).
56. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31-35 (requiring a monetary refund in certain
circumstances).
57. Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 1825 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see also
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1993) (requiring the state to
provide a remedy for a tax that violated federal law).
58. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1826 n.537 (citing First English in footnote to
support the proposition that the Constitution mandates damages remedies for takings). One
possible answer, of course, is that the tax refund cases are straight due process cases. See id. at
1826-29 (suggesting various answers to the question). Note that, whatever the answer,
Professors Fallon and Meltzer's question assumes that First English's footnote nine is binding.
They might be correct, but not necessarily, particularly given the Court's most recent sovereign
immunity cases, all of which were decided after their excellent article was published. See infra
notes 92-109 (discussing the recent sovereign immunity cases).
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notwithstanding "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own
courts.
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Though significant, cases like McKesson and Reich must be read in light
of other doctrinal limitations. Perhaps most importantly, these decisions, both
handed down prior to Alden v. Maine,6° arose out of state court cases.6' In
other words, these cases were decided before Alden extended state sovereign
immunity to state courts,62 so the Court's due process requirements did not
trump active sovereign immunity barriers. Moreover, in federal court actions
for due process tax refunds, the Supreme Court has upheld state sovereign
immunity.63 But while it is important not to require too much of McKesson and
Reich, these cases, like takings cases, do seem to collide with sovereign
immunity decisions.64
B. State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
State sovereign immunity doctrine may have expanded even more than
takings doctrine during the past decade. It was not always such an important
part of American constitutional landscape. In 1793, the Court in Chisholm v.
Georgia6 5 rejected Georgia's claim that an unconsenting state was immune
59. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note
8, at 852 (quoting Reich).
60. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
61. See McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 22 (arising out of a Florida state court); Reich, 513
U.S. at 106 (arising out of a Georgia state court).
62. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (affirming the dismissal of the suit against Maine on
grounds of state sovereign immunity).
63. See, e.g., Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 55 (1944) (finding that the
"legislature of Oklahoma was consenting to suit in its own courts only").
64. There are, of course, significant differences between takings and tax refund cases.
One potential difference is that because the tax cases provide a "refund" equal to the tax unjustly
exacted, the remedy in such cases resembles "restitution" more than money damages in a
regulatory takings case, where the initial harm was not cash actually taken from the property
owner, but a regulation impairing that owner from reaping the full benefit of her land's value.
As restitution at common law usually fell under equity and not law, Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.,
508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993), one can view Reich and McKesson as providing injunctive relief
more in line with Ex parte Young's and Edelman's requirements. See infra Part III.B
(discussing Exparte Young and Edelman). But see supra note 45 (noting that the Court rejected
this argument in Edelman v. Jordan). Another potential difference between tax refund and
takings cases is that tax cases are more likely to affect large classes, making it potentially
difficult for the government to provide full remediation. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57,
at 1828-29 (noting that "tax cases, unlike constitutional tort suits and just compensation claims,
typically affect large classes").
65. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419 (1793).
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from suit by a citizen of another state.66 Article II, Section 2, after all, extends
the federal judicial power to "Controversies... between a State and Citizens of
another State."67 However, in a famous lone dissent, Justice Iredell argued that
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be interpreted with reference
to common law principles and assumed that the Court could exercise only
jurisdiction that Congress had conferred.68 He asserted that English common
law would only have permitted a suit for damages against the government with
the king's consent, and that, therefore, in the absence of sovereign consent,
Congress had to affirmatively waive state immunity for such a suit to proceed.69
Justice Iredell might have lost the battle, but he won the war. According
to some, the Chisholm decision "fell upon the country with a profound
shock. 70 Just five years later, in 1798, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified,
overruling Chisholm.71 The Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. ' 72 Some have
argued that the quick passage of the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates the
"shock of surprise" Chishom created,73 though many scholars dispute that
74interpretation.
4
66. See id. at 480 (finding that the suit could be brought against the state of Georgia).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
68. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 432-35 ("[A]II the Courts of the United States must
receive... all their authority.., from the legislature only."); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 8, at 1047 (discussing Chisholm).
69. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 445-47 (analogizing the instant case to the common law of
England).
70. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926).
71. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473 (1987)
(stating that the passage of the Eleventh Amendment "was undeniably designed to repudiate the
majority analysis in Chisholm and overrule its holding").
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
73. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
74. See, e.g., JoHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1987) (stating that "speedy adoption [of the Eleventh
Amendment] is not significant"); Amar, supra note 71, at 1481-84 (arguing that, given its
current interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment's passage did not necessarily vindicate Justice
Iredell's views); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1926 (1983) (arguing that "Congress's initial
reaction to the Chisholm decision hardly demonstrates the sort of outrage so central to the
profound shock thesis"); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1048 (summarizing
literature on "shock of surprise" theory).
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Hans v. Louisiana75 in 1890 marks the crucial turn in Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. While the express language of the amendment
applies only to suits against one state "by Citizens of another State,, 76 Justice
Bradley's Hans opinion reads the Amendment more broadly to prohibit suits
against a state by citizens of the same state." Although Justice Iredell's
primary objection in Chisholm was statutory-the jurisdiction granted by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, he argued, did not extend to unheard-of remedies like a
suit against a state78-Justice Bradley emphasized Justice Iredell's doubts that
Congress could constitutionally enact a statute subjecting the states to federal
court suit.79  Phrasing his originalist argument in a series of rhetorical
questions, Justice Bradley asks:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that
nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its
own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States?80
Justice Bradley, with little historical evidence, scoffs at the notion,
dismissing it as "almost an absurdity on its face,"8' and Hans's interpretation,
which found the state immune from suit on a claim for damages arising under
the Constitution's Contracts Clause, remains controlling over a century later.
82
75. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
77. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
78. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 436-37 (1793) (concluding that the
Court "[could] exercise no authority ... consistently with the clear intention of the act, but such
as a proper State Court would have been at least [competent] to exercise at the time the act was
passed").
79. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 9 (discussing Justice Bradley's treatment of Justice Iredell's Chisholm dissent).
80. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
81. Id.
82. In a fascinating article, Professor Nelson argues that sovereign immunity originally
applied as a doctrine of personal jurisdiction, which could be waived, but that the Eleventh
Amendment created a second type of immunity sounding in subject matter jurisdiction, which
therefore could not be waived. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal
Jurisdiction, 115 HAIv. L. REv. 1559, 1566 (2002). Out of this two-track system of
jurisdictional immunities, however, the Court created a single doctrine of sovereign immunity
reflecting an odd cross between the two tracks. Id.
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The most important exception to Eleventh Amendment doctrine is Ex
pare Young, 83 which recognized suits against state officers for injunctive
relief.84 However, the Young exception hardly renders state sovereign
immunity meaningless. First, plaintiffs must allege that the officer is acting in
violation of federal law.85 Second, Ex parte Young actions are limited to
injunctive relief; a plaintiff cannot access the state treasury via a state official.
8 6
Moreover, Edelman v. Jordan87 halted any possibility that money remedies
could be attained by characterizing the money sought as restitution, and
therefore equitable, rather than legal, damages.88 In an opinion that
foreshadows his later victories in this area, then-Justice Rehnquist reminds us
that "the relief awarded in Ex Parte Young was prospective only. ' 89 By way of
contrast, the "retroactive" relief sought in Edelman "stands on quite a different
footing.,90
Edelman is generally significant because it restricted courts' ability to
offer plaintiffs money from the state treasury by characterizing the remedy as
"equitable restitution." For our purposes, it is especially important because, as
applied to takings cases, it requires that takings plaintiffs suing a state should
only receive a prospective injunction, rather than retrospective damages. In
other words, if a state regulation has burdened private property, Edelman
permits injunctive relief but seems to bar any suit for retrospective damages
compensating the landowner for the duration of the taking. Under this
reasoning, a property owner whose land was once burdened by a state
regulation could not receive money compensating him for this temporary
regulatory taking. But, as we have already seen, First English holds that
property owners are entitled to money damages for these exact cases. 9'
Notwithstanding cases like Hans and Edelman, Eleventh Amendment
immunity has its limits. States are free to consent to suit by waiving their
83. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
84. See id. at 155 ("The State has no power to impart to [its officer] any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.").
85. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (concluding
that Exparte Young is inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law).
86. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating that "a suit by private
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment").
87. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
88. See id. at 665-69 (rejecting the petitioner's "equitable restitution" argument).
89. Id. at 664.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing possible claims arising from a
temporary taking).
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sovereign immunity, and Congress in some circumstances may also abrogate
states' sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting unconsenting states to certain
kinds of lawsuits. Although it is not always clear what constitutes a valid
waiver, waiver is conceptually relatively straightforward. Congressional
abrogation-the process by which Congress legislates to remove state sovereign
immunity for certain types of cases-however, is more complicated and has
changed significantly in recent years.
Under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,92 Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 powers.93 The
Court recognized that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."94  Although
Fitzpatrick's holding is still not controversial, the Court has subsequently cut
back on Congress's ability to abrogate pursuant to its other powers. Indeed, as
it stands today, it seems that Congress may not abrogate pursuant to any of its
Article I powers. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,95 the Court,
overruling its 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,96 held that
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause.97 In so doing, the Court limited congressional power to
abrogate state immunity, so that Congress could do so only pursuant to its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the other
Reconstruction amendments. 98 And, under City of Boerne v. Flores,99 the
Court, not Congress, defines the scope of those Fourteenth Amendment
92. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
93. Id. at 456.
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
96. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
97. Id. at 72.
98. Though abrogation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is more
common, precedent suggests that Congress can also abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to the other Reconstruction amendments. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
179-80 (1980) (upholding Voting Rights Act as proper exercise of Fifteenth Amendment power
and explaining that "Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism that
might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation"'); United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 181 n.17 (2d Cir. 2002) (reasoning that Congress's Thirteenth
Amendment Section 2 powers seemingly do not fall under the scope of Seminole Tribe and its
progeny); see also Struve, supra note 8, at 573 n.8 (collecting cases indicating that Congress
can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendment powers).
99. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1999).
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powers. 1° Finally, merely suggesting abrogation is not enough; Congress must
provide a "clear statement" of its intent to abrogate immunity or the Court will
not view the abrogation as valid.101
Seminole Tribe and Boerne collectively scale back Congress's power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity,' 02 but Alden v. Maine is in some ways more
remarkable because it prevents Congress from subjecting states to suit in state
courts. By rooting state sovereign immunity in principles outside the Eleventh
Amendment itself, Alden reconceptualizes the entire doctrine.10 3 By its own
terms, the Eleventh Amendment applies to "[t]he Judicial power of the United
States."' °4 In holding that state sovereign immunity applies also in state
court-more specifically, by holding that Congress cannot abrogate in state
court where it cannot abrogate in federal courtl05-the Court significantly
100. See id. at 527-29 (finding that Congress cannot decide the scope of its own power
under the Fourteenth Amendment). Boerne requires that there be "a congruence or
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." Id. at 520. Following Boerne's lead, the Court has further narrowed Congress's power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Section 5 powers. See Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001) (holding unconstitutional Congress's attempt to use
Section 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity for damages actions brought to enforce the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63--64 (2000)
(holding that Section 5 could not furnish a basis for overcoming a state's immunity from private
suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding unconstitutional
provisions in Patent Remedy Act that abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity so that
"[a]ny State" and "any instrumentality of a State" could be sued for patent infringement). But
see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (holding that Title II of Americans with
Disabilities Act constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's substantive guarantees); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,737-40 (2003) (holding that state employees may recover
money damages in federal court in the event of the state's failure to comply with the family-care
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act because protection of equal employment
opportunity for women falls under the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).
101. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533,541-42 (2002) (requiring
a "clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity"); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (noting the requirement that "Congress unequivocally
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in
Federal court").
102. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh
Amendment's Illogical Impact on Congress' Power, 37 IND. L. REv. 345, 357 (2004) (arguing
that the new test in Boerne restricted Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers by essentially
removing Congress's power to deter potential constitutional violations).
103. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999) (noting that "sovereign immunity
derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution
itself").
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
105. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (finding that "the States retain an analogous constitutional
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expanded the immunity's scope and called into question previous assumptions
about the relatively limited scope of Eleventh Amendment doctrine."°6 Indeed,
there is no reason to think that the current Court is finished in this area. In
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority
(FMC),10 7 for instance, it held that state sovereign immunity also applies in
administrative agency adjudicatory hearings. 108 First English's footnote may
once have qualified as the final word on this issue, but, in light of these
developments, Eleventh Amendment bars might not falter against a takings
claim.'19 Of course, Seminole Tribe and the other cases do not create a new
immunity from private suits in their own courts").
106. See James E. Pfander, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship
and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 820 (2002) (noting that before Alden "a variety of
ways around the Eleventh Amendment were available").
107. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
108. Id. at 769 (concluding that applying sovereign immunity in administrative hearings is
likely consistent with the framers' intent).
109. Although state sovereign immunity has certainly become more robust in recent years,
the story of its growth is not without exceptions. The Court, for instance, recently suggested
that sovereign immunity's scope in some instances can be quite narrow. In Tennessee Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), the Court held that an undue hardship
determination sought by respondent in Bankruptcy Court did not constitute a suit against the
state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 451. However, while this does
suggest that litigation affecting state interests will not necessarily trigger the Eleventh
Amendment, the opinion is too specific to glean just how narrowly the Court views sovereign
immunity. Thus, while certain in rem actions enjoy an exception to usual state sovereign
immunity bars, this is not reason to think that such an exception extends more generally to all
suits involving property. Indeed, the Court in Tennessee Student Assistance carefully
circumscribed the scope of its holding. It stated that it was not claiming that "a bankruptcy
court's in rem jurisdiction overrides sovereign immunity but rather that the court's exercise of
its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a student loan debt is not an affront to the sovereignty of the
State." Id. at 451 n.5 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court subsequently took the additional step
of resolving what Tennessee Student Assistance had left unresolved. Specifically, the Court
held that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution does not contravene state sovereignty.
Central Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, No. 04-885, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 917 (2006). Accordingly,
under the Bankruptcy Clause, "Congress may, at is option, either treat States in the same way as
other creditors insofar as concerns 'Laws on the subject of the Bankruptcies' or exempt them
from operation of such laws." Id. at *39. As Tennessee Student Assistance had already
suggested, this is in part because of bankruptcy courts' in rem, rather than in personam,
jurisdiction. See id. at *23-29 (noting bankrutpcy's in rem jurisdiction). This distinction, of
course, is worthy of note, but it likely will have little impact on the takings context, since
inverse condemnation suits are generally regarded as not falling under courts' in rem
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 574-75 (2002) (finding that
plaintiffs' claim for just compensation does not constitute a suit for in rem relief). Indeed, given
the Court's careful analysis of the unique features of bankruptcy jurisdiction, Central Virginia is
probably best read as narrowly confined to the bankruptcy context.
Central Virginia's primary significance to the larger narrative of Eleventh Amendment
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conflict, but the new vigor of state sovereign immunity does raise questions
about First English's quick resolution of an old one.
C. The Unanswered Questions
As should now be clear, because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the Takings Clause against the states, Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity over takings claims pursuant to its Section 5 powers.°10 To this point,
however, it has not chosen to do so. 111 We must therefore ask if Congress must
abrogate that immunity or if the Takings Clause automatically abrogates any
immunity the state might have in other kinds of cases.
To the extent that past Courts have addressed this issue, the answers have
been terse and contradictory. In his well-known decision in Lynch v. United
States, 1 Justice Brandeis asserted that the government must always consent to
suit; sovereign immunity, then, is never automatically abrogated. He argued
that:
[C]onsent to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not the grant of a
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment.... The sovereign's
jurisprudence may be that the newly confirmed Chief Justice Roberts voted with the dissent
(written by Justice Thomas, and also joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy). Although it is
misleading to read too much into any single vote, Chief Justice Roberts's vote indicates that he,
like Chief Justice Rehnquist before him, will likely support a vigorous state sovereign immunity
doctrine. As a curious aside, Justice O'Connor, in one of her last actions on the Court, voted
with the majority (written by Justice Stevens, and joined also by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer). While this vote is somewhat explicable in light of the Court's attention to the unique
history and policy behind the Bankruptcy Clause, it is also surprising in light of her previous
votes in state sovereign immunity cases.
110. Because the Takings Clause applies to the states by incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity to enforce that clause
under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), which held that Congress can abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity when enforcing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
111. The statute most frequently invoked by plaintiffs seeking a private right of action
against state officials for the deprivation of constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not
abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (finding that
§ 1983 does not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity). The Court later held in Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), that state governments are not
persons under § 1983. Id. at 66-67; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79
(1951) (holding that state legislators sued in their personal capacity under § 1983 may use
immunity doctrines to shield themselves from damages liability if "acting in a field where
legislators traditionally have power to act"). Section 1983, therefore, creates no remedy against
the State. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) ("We have
held ... that § 1983 actions do not lie against a State.").
112. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the
source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of
action arising under acts of Congress... and to those arising from some
violation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution."1
3
Lynch's treatment of the issue is straightforward, but dictum. In that case,
Justice Brandeis found Congress's repeal of all laws pertaining to war
insurance policies unconstitutional and thus determined that Congress could not
take away the previously promised right and remedy (that is, the previous
consent to suit). 114
The most authoritative recent Supreme Court statement on the matter is in
the First English footnote where the Court takes a very different approach,
refuting the United States' argument that "the prohibitory nature of the Fifth
Amendment... combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes
that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government
to act, not a remedial provision."1t 5 There the Court asserted that "[t]hough
arising in various factual and jurisdictional settings, [takings] cases make clear
that it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for interference with property
rights amounting to a taking. ' 16  Some years later, the Court seemed to
backtrack when it noted in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes117 that "[e]ven
if the sovereign immunity rationale retains its vitality in cases where [the Fifth]
Amendment is applicable.., it is neither limited to nor coextensive with
takings claims."'"18 Del Monte then suggests the possibility that, given the
113. Id. at 581-82 (citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1894))
(suggesting that sovereign immunity applies as strongly when suit arises under Constitution as
when it arises under statutory law) (other citations omitted).
114. Id. at 581-88. Also, it is worth noting that the defendant in Lynch was the federal
government, not a state government. Although there might be reason to think that the sovereign
immunity laws are analogous-that if one must waive its immunity, then so too must the other,
e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)-that is not
necessarily the case. But see Seamon, supra note 8, at 1090-94 (arguing that there is symmetry
between federal and state sovereign immunity).
115. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987).
116. Id.
117. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
118. Id. at 714. The issue in Del Monte was whether the plaintiffs § 1983 takings claim
was properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 694. The Court determined that it had been properly
submitted, reasoning in part that just compensation is a monetary, compensatory remedy and
that the denial of just compensation amounted to a constitutional tort. Id. at 709-11. This kind
of action, therefore, falls squarely within the Seventh Amendment's promise of a jury trial for
actions at law. Id. As part of this discussion, the Court noted that sovereign immunity would
not have barred the suit in Del Monte because a city was the defendant, not the state. Id. at 714.
This analysis vaguely suggests that sovereign immunity might have barred the suit were the
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opportunity, the Court might revisit the First English footnote, but it offers
little guidance.
We, therefore, have nothing concrete to go on; indeed, neither First
English nor Del Monte presented the instant question directly. The government
in First English was the County of Los Angeles and thus was not entitled to a
straight sovereign immunity defense. 1 9 In Del Monte, the question was
whether the plaintiff had a right to jury trial in a federal court inverse
condemnation claim against a city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;120 the sovereign
immunity issue arose in response to the dissent's argument that government
power to shield itself from suit must include the lesser power to permit such
suits without providing a jury trial. 21 Given this sparse and inconclusive
precedent, we must explore the nature of the competing constitutional doctrines
more deeply. Indeed, the Court's cursory references to this problem highlight
its reluctance to arbitrate between competing constitutional provisions. Of
course, none of these cases presented directly the question at issue here, but the
Court's willingness to brush aside the problem quickly speaks to an
unwillingness to wrestle with paradoxes created by separate lines of precedent.
This Article, therefore, attempts both to address in detail the doctrinal conflict
and to identify a more thorough approach to such conflicts than the cryptic
statements offered by the Court.
IV. The Textual Argument
The simplest and most straightforward argument in favor of automatic
abrogation is textual. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is that rare
constitutional clause that dictates a particular remedy, 122 stipulating that privateproperty shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation."' 23
defendant the state, but the discussion is too brief to discern much about the Court's views on
the First English footnote.
119. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (noting that
there is no basis for concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability).
120. Del Monte, 526 U.S. at 721-22.
121. See id. at 742 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that some courts have rested on
sovereign immunity to allow legislatures to qualify and condition the right to brings suits
against the sovereign).
122. The Constitution refers explicitly to remedies only in the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause and in safeguarding the remedy of habeas corpus against "Suspension" by
Congress. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 849; see also infra Part V.A (discussing the
unique nature of the remedially oriented Takings Clause and Suspension Clause).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Unlike many rights for which the Constitution merely curtails government
power to act, this provision expressly dictates a particular remedy.
"Just compensation" traditionally has been thought to amount to money
damages equal to the fair market value of the property taken by the condemning
government. 24 Presumably, in eminent domain cases, the state could choose to
return the property rather than pay the fair market value. Unless the
government mis-estimated the court's determination of "fair value," however,
this seems unlikely-the condemning authority has taken the property knowing,
most likely, that it will have to pay fair market value for it.1 25 Extending this
principle to regulatory takings cases, once the regulation has ceased, under
First English, the government must pay actual money to compensate the
landowner for the period of the taking. There is, of course, the possibility that
the Court could overrule First English, but that chance seems extremely
remote, especially given the robust nature of contemporary takings
jurisprudence.
Given that the Constitution requires "just compensation," the straight
textual argument seems to require the government to provide money damages,
notwithstanding otherwise applicable sovereign immunity bars.126 This is so
not just because the Fifth Amendment commands it, but also because there is
no Eleventh Amendment language that would require a different outcome. The
term "just compensation" must mean money damages; there is no other remedy
that could possibly constitute "just compensation" in a temporary takings
case. 127
Of course, there is a potential state sovereign immunity bar to recovering
this money from the state. The doctrines limiting the available relief might be
wise, but, as a strict textual matter, the Constitution itself does not require this
immunity in any federal question case, let alone takings cases brought under the
Fifth Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of
124. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 169.
125. Of course, a state that knowingly takes property can initiate condemnation
proceedings for a determination of how much compensation is due. Such proceedings derive
from the same Fifth Amendment right to money damages, but concede the landowner's right to
receive just compensation. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 711-12 (1999) (distinguishing condemnation proceedings from § 1983 actions).
126. See, e.g., SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (S.D. 2002) (finding that
sovereign immunity is not a bar to money damages and that "the remedy does not depend on
statutory facilitation").
127. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710-11 ("[Jlust compensation is, like ordinary
money damages, a compensatory remedy... [and therefore] legal relief," so that a suit alleging
a taking seeks "not just compensation per se but rather damages for the unconstitutional denial
of such compensation").
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the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' ' 128 Nothing in
this language would seem to extend state sovereign immunity to cases in which
a state citizen sues his own state to recover "just compensation" for property
that the state has taken.'
29
Indeed, state sovereign immunity doctrine strays far from the
Constitution's text. Hans marked the most significant departure from the
Eleventh Amendment's text, extending the states' immunity to suits in which a
citizen sues her own state,' 3 1 even though Article II authorizes such suits and
the language of the Eleventh Amendment includes only suits by citizens of one
state against the government of a different state. As Professor Nelson explains,
the Court since Hans "has been holding that federal courts cannot entertain
suits against states in a variety of contexts that apparently are covered by
Article l11's grants of subject matter jurisdiction and are not covered by any
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
129. Indeed, nothing in the Eleventh Amendment's language would support much of
today's sovereign immunity doctrine, even though Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court's two
most ardent textualists, are both strong proponents of vigorous state sovereign immunity.
Professor Ernest Young emphasized how unmoored state sovereign immunity has become from
the Eleventh Amendment text when he titled a section in his article "A Tough Day for
Textualists, or, Did Justice Scalia Really Sign This Thing?" Ernest Young, Alden v. Maine and
the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1617 (2000); see also John F.
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE
L.J. 1663, 1667 (2004) (noting that the text of the Eleventh Amendment cannot bear the Court's
interpretations).
130. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 74, at 1895 ("[F]rom a textual standpoint, the
suggestion that states were immune from suit in federal court seems preposterous on its face.");
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1342, 1351-71 (1989) (arguing that there is no rational justification for departing from the plain
meaning of the text); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 61, 97-142 (1989) (providing the historical development of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and reasons why the Court departed from the text).
131. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) (invoking historical practices and
precedent to support the statement that a state may not be sued without its consent). See
generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An
Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2003) (arguing that
Hans gave voice not to the intent of the 1790s but to the compromise of the 1890s in which
white Americans, driven in part by racism, allowed the South limited independence in imposing
white rule and repudiating its state debts in exchange for national reconciliation and unity);
Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: On Justification,
Rationalization, and Sovereign Immunity, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 251 (2001) (arguing that
Hans makes sense in light of precedent precluding federal courts from taking control of state
treasuries and in light of the fact that any other decision would have been unenforceable).
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plausible reading of the Eleventh Amendment."' 32 This detextualization of the
Eleventh Amendment, itself central to more than a century of state sovereign
immunity doctrine, has become even more pronounced in the Court's recent
decisions, especially Alden, where the Court announced that "the scope of the
States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment
alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design."
133
Of course, relying on history is not necessarily contrary to a textualist
reading. Originalist-textualists seek to reconcile their approaches to
constitutional interpretation by searching for the commonly understood
meaning of the text at the time of ratification. 134 But in this instance, the Alden
majority's controversial view of original understanding of the Eleventh
Amendment 135 is so at odds with the plain meaning of the text, that the Court's
approach, faithfully characterized, simply abandons textualism. Indeed, the
Court's opinion does not even attempt to determine what the words of the
Eleventh Amendment would have meant in the 1790s, 136 focusing instead on
the Founders' "intent to preserve the States' immunity from suit in their own
courts., 137 The Court even admits that the phrase "Eleventh Amendment
immunity" is:
[C]onvenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of
the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its
history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which
the States enjoyed before ratification of the Constitution, and which they
retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union
upon an equal footing with the other States) ....138
However persuasive the historical and structural arguments might be, they are
decidedly unmoored from the Constitution's text.
132. Nelson, supra note 82, at 1563 (emphasis in original).
133. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
134. See Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1132 (1998) (describing the rationale behind originalist interpretation);
see also Young, supra note 129, at 1620 (discussing potential overlaps between textualist and
originalist arguments).
135. See infra Part VI.B (discussing the original understanding of state sovereign
immunity).
136. See Young, supra note 129, at 1622 ("There is no effort ... to use historical evidence
to determine what the words of the Eleventh Amendment would have been understood to mean
at the time that the Amendment was adopted.").
137. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
138. Id. at 713.
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Although doctrines of statutory interpretation are rarely applied to the
Constitution, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius139 is helpful here.
In fact, it is probably even more appropriate than in the statutory context. One
drawback to expressio unius in statutory interpretation is that the doctrine
assumes a kind of legislative omniscience; it is unfair and unrealistic to expect
a legislature to include statutory language dealing with every scenario that it
might intend to fall under a law's ambit. 4° By way of contrast, Chisholm
brought the issue of state immunity to the forefront of the nation's
constitutional consciousness. In amending the Constitution, the framers of the
Eleventh Amendment must have been aware that states might try to raise
sovereign immunity defenses in other kinds of cases. Indeed, the Pennsylvania
ratification debates make clear that some Founders did not expect immunity to
necessarily extend to federal question cases.' 4' And though one need not
assume that the Eleventh Amendment's framers considered every possible
variation (for example, whether sovereign immunity should not extend to
constitutional claims or to all federal claims), one can assume they understood
the basic divide between federal question and diversity suits well enough (and
implicit enough in the federalist system) that it is unrealistic to think that they
would not have considered those distinctions.
That the response to Chisholm was to codify state sovereign immunity
only for suits brought by citizens of another state or foreign citizens cuts
strongly against the current Court. Of course, Chisholm was a diversity case, so
one could argue that the Eleventh Amendment addressed only the mischief
caused by that case and left undisturbed sovereign immunity in federal question
cases, upon which Chisholm had not intruded. But this response is a weak one
because the framers of the Eleventh Amendment surely anticipated that
sovereign immunity issues would have arisen in contexts other than diversity
cases and recognized that the Eleventh Amendment would figure significantly
in future generations' views of that immunity.
Professor Manning similarly contends that the specificity canon, itself a
close relation of expressio unius, has at least as much force for precise
constitutional provisions as for precise statutory ones. 14 2  The rigorous
processes of constitutional amendment set forth in Article V of the Constitution
139. The Latin translates into "inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of the other."
WuiIM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBIC PoLicY 824 (3d ed. 2001).
140. See id. (describing inherent flaws in the maxim).
141. See infra note 430 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennsylvania debate in
further detail); see also infra Parts V.B. 1 & VI.B (providing additional historical perspective).
142. Manning, supra note 129, at 1671.
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require judges to carefully respect any amendment's lines of compromise.
143
The fact that Article V's requirements are more stringent than those
necessary to enact mere legislation should militate towards an especially
close reading of the relevant text; a broader reading might permit an
interpretation that the necessary super-majorities could not have ratified.
44
Confronted with a specific, rule-like amendment, courts thus can reasonably
infer a negative implication from the text's specificity. 45 Applied to the
Eleventh Amendment, this interpretive approach would read the text to mean
what it says and only what it says: states enjoy sovereign immunity in suits
brought by citizens of another state or a foreign state. Because the text
reflects the compromise necessary to ratify the amendment, it should not
apply to other kinds of suits, such as federal question actions brought by
citizens of the same state. States, therefore, would not be protected against
taking suits, except, arguably, those brought by citizens of another state.
46
Of course, even though the textual hook for the Eleventh Amendment is
especially weak, the takings textual argument has its weaknesses as well.
While the Just Compensation Clause does provide for an explicit remedy, its
language does not promise compensation for temporary (or, for that matter,
regulatory) takings. Nor does it, by its own terms, apply against the states.
47
To be sure, the extension to temporary and regulatory takings seems to be a
logical outgrowth of the Just Compensation Clause in the sense that the
purpose inherent in the Clause's language cannot be satisfied without
extending it to such takings. And because the Takings Clause
incontrovertibly applies against the states through the Fourteenth
143. See id. at 1672, 1692-1720 (arguing that the text of amendments is entitled to great
deference because of the nature of the amendment process).
144. Id. at 1702, 1719-20 (arguing that, given the constitutional protections Article V
gives to political minorities, a strict reading of the amendments is necessary to ensure that
judges do not enforce a provision that was not properly ratified); see also Henry P. Monaghan,
We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLuM. L. REV.
121, 125-26 (1996) (discussing Article V's design, which permits a very small number of states
to prevent constitutional amendment and requires super-majorities of both houses of Congress).
145. See Manning, supra note 129, at 1671, 1702 (noting that, in regard to rule-like
amendments such as the Eleventh Amendment, "textual precision should be understood to
reflect the adopters' willingness or ability to go so far and no farther in pursuit of the desired
constitutional objective").
146. If the narrower reading of the Eleventh Amendment were to ever win the day, an
interesting question would be whether it would extend only to diversity suits against a state or
also to federal question suits that happened to be brought by out-of-state individuals.
147. Of course, in many areas of constitutional law settled doctrine does not rest on
constitutional text. See infra Part VH (arguing that many constitutional principles are products
of judicial interpretation due, in large part, to the brevity of the Constitution).
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Amendment, 48 this extension satisfies the Just Compensation Clause's
purpose within the context of the new post-Civil War federalism. 149 But one
must concede that both of these significant developments are judge-made.
The difference, however, is that while First English purports to interpret
the Takings Clause, Alden does not claim to interpret the Eleventh
Amendment at all.' 50 The requirement that the government compensate
property owners for temporary takings closes a potential loophole in the
Takings Clause and effectuates its purpose more fully; without it, the
government could repeatedly take property temporarily and then return it
without having to compensate the owners. By way of contrast, it is
impossible to see how the extension of Eleventh Amendment immunity to
suits by states' own citizens furthers the achievement of the Amendment's
language, which gives the states' protection against suits brought by citizens
of other states. From a textualist perspective then, it would be very strange
for the essentially common law sovereign immunity to prevent damages
actions for violations of the Takings Clause.
V. The Structural Arguments
Of course, although it is wise to begin with the text, the inquiry cannot
end there. Indeed, were it to end there, the vast majority of our sovereign
immunity jurisprudence would not exist, for the Court has found its roots in
structural and originalist arguments. We should not forget the Constitution's
text-and it is in fact perhaps worth emphasizing to demonstrate that our
absurdly complicated Eleventh Amendment doctrine was far from
inevitable 5 '-but we must place it aside both because there are other
arguments to be made and because we must address the arguments in favor of
sovereign immunity on the Court's own terms.
148. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897)
(finding that Fourteenth Amendment due process requires just compensation when a state
government takes private land for public use).
149. Admittedly, as the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly incorporate the Bill of
Rights, the force of the textualist argument is somewhat diminished.
150. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); see also supra note 133 and
accompanying text (discussing Alden).
151. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 41-85 (2002) (critiquing the elaborate complexities of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine).
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A. Which Reading Does Less Damage?
Any resolution will damage one line of case law or the other. The Court
could keep silent and ignore the incompatibility, but even that approach would
probably prioritize takings over sovereign immunity because refusing to
address the issue in a case would side step immunity altogether. This is
essentially what happened in Palazzolo.152 Judicial politics might encourage
this result, but it leaves in place significant doctrinal contradictions.
One way to resolve the collision is to ask which outcome damages an
existing doctrine least. Although unorthodox, this approach admits that one
constitutional doctrine will necessarily be pruned back, so it seeks to arrive at
the solution that requires the least pruning. Of course, there are other factors
one might use to decide what to "prune,"'15 3 but an advantage of this approach is
that it seeks neutrality.
From this perspective, the Takings Clause should be automatically
abrogating. The main point of the Takings Clause is to limit the government's
power of eminent domain, 54 frequently by forcing the government to pay for
private property it takes, even when it would prefer not to. If the government
could bar suits for just compensation, the Takings Clause would be stripped of
much meaning. State governments could take property whenever it wanted to
without providing any compensation to landowners. The state could, of course,
choose to waive its immunity, but the whole purpose of the Takings Clause is
to require just compensation and give the government no decision in the
matter. 55 Requiring formal congressional abrogation would give the legislature
the very power that the Constitution seeks to deny it. One could argue that it
looks bad for a government to take private property and then block itself from
suit by invoking sovereign immunity (and that, therefore, it would have
incentives to abrogate its immunity). But because takings affect potentially
only a small minority, it is unrealistic to think that political safeguards would
necessarily lead to abrogation or waiver.
156
152. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (failing to discuss
sovereign immunity in finding a taking); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text
(discussing Palazzolo).
153. Of course, normatively some might prefer an outcome that does the most damage to
one or both doctrines.
154. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 2-3.
155. But see Brauneis, supra note 8, at 60 (arguing that takings clauses in state
constitutions did not always require just con - nsation but rather nullified legislation that
effected a taking); infra Part VI.A (discussing the development of the "Just Compensation"
requirement).
156. One must not overstate the potential failures of the political marketplace for property
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This, of course, is a rather extreme reading, depicting sovereign immunity
as necessarily draining the Takings Clause of all its content. A more charitable
reading is that sovereign immunity really only kills First English's judicially
imposed requirement that the government compensate landowners for
temporary takings. Even if a state uses state sovereign immunity to shield itself
from suit in a physical takings case, a plaintiff can still sue a state official for
injunctive relief forcing the return of her property. Such a plaintiff cannot
recover money for the duration of the taking, whether regulatory or physical,
but if the state refuses to compensate her, she can still get her property back.
Given the availability of Ex parte Young injunctive relief and suits against
officers in their personal capacities, sovereign immunity's interference is
minimal, affecting mostly temporary takings.
This rejoinder is significant, but it underestimates how central First
English is to just compensation doctrine and values. First English itself
recognizes this, stating "that 'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."'157 Just
compensation principles thus rest not on the duration or permanence of a
taking, but rather on the idea that the Takings Clause is "designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 158 Because
the value of using land for a fixed period of time "can be great indeed,"' 59 it
owners. As a class, they surely have more political clout than many groups seeking protection
under the Constitution, such as criminal defendants. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice
and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 282 (1992) (stating that a citizen with voting
rights has less reason than a nonconstituent to fear uncompensated takings). But because
takings can affect property owners scattered over a large area, affected property owners will
frequently be unable to act as a political unit. Government failure is, then, a distinct possibility,
potentially resulting in a compensation system that is neither efficient nor just. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CAL. L. REv. 569, 620-23 (1984) (discussing political fiscal illusion, which occurs when the
governmental body discounts the cost of its action because it does not explicitly appear as a
budgetary expense); William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI-KENT L. REv. 865, 887-88 (1991)
(discussing the Takings Clause as a means of protecting individuals from bearing burdens that
should be borne by the public as a whole); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics,
22 CoNm. L. REv. 285, 306 (1990) (noting that the legal system regards organized interest
groups differently than it does an individual citizen or a collection of citizens, who but once in
lifetime face a common burden).
157. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
158. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
159. Id. at 319.
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would not make sense for the Takings Clause to cover permanent takings but
not temporary ones that could last years and deprive a property owner of
millions of dollars. Indeed, even Justice Stevens, who dissented in First
English, admits that "[t]here may be some situations in which even the
temporary existence of a regulation has such severe consequences that
invalidation or repeal will not mitigate the damage enough to remove the
'taking' label."' 6
Permitting sovereign immunity doctrine to trump the Takings Clause
would accomplish just this, effectively overruling First English, at least as
applied to the states. 161 Without the obligations created by First English, a state
could render private property unusable indefinitely and return it without
compensating the landowner at all for the period of its use. Because the state
would have no incentive to minimize the duration of a taking, government
possession could last for the duration of the plaintiff's lawsuit; the state would
thus have incentives to draw out the case, filing motions and appeals to make
sure the process takes as long as possible. 162 This scenario, of course, assumes
the worst behavior and might not accurately reflect the way most states would
behave most of the time. But to the extent that the very existence of the
Takings Clause presupposes a distrust of government, it would be odd to design
a jurisprudence that left so much to the good will of the state and did not force
government to internalize the costs of its takings.1 63 This result might tempt
160. Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. First English does not actually find that a regulatory taking had occurred; rather, it
holds that the government must pay just compensation to a landowner if a regulatory taking
occurs. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1176 (4th ed. 1998).
162. That Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to a state but not its subdivisions poses
not only doctrinal complications but also curious policy incentives. To the extent that the
Constitution, particularly as interpreted by the Rehnquist Court, represents a laissez-faire model
of governance (though, granted, not nearly as emphatically capitalist as during the Lochner
Court), this constitutional baseline discouraging regulation makes sense, even if it is
normatively controversial. To the extent, though, that it encourages state regulation and
discourages equivalent locality regulation, the result seems odd. For an originalist who opposes
big government, our original federal structure existed not merely to protect sovereign states, but
also to localize decisionmaking, preserving a kind of small town, Jeffersonian democracy. This
might be a controversial-or idealized, or nave--conception of our constitutional heritage, but
it is an important part of the anti-federalist tradition. (By "anti-federalist," I refer not so much to
the Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution, but rather to the supporters of the
Constitution who nevertheless wanted to protect local rule from a large centralized
government.). Sovereign immunity doctrine theoretically encourages state rather than local
regulation, a policy trend that is not necessarily desirable (though, admittedly, the politicians
creating policy might not be thinking at all about the Eleventh Amendment when drafting their
policies). But see Roberts, supra note 8, at 623 n.2 (noting that many takings claims are filed
against local governments).
163. See, e.g., RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSISOFLAw 64(5th ed. 1998) (providing
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policy makers to believe the "fiscal illusion" that the resources they take have
no opportunity cost, thus leading to overzealous regulators with no concern for
the misallocation of resources.164
Allowing state sovereign immunity to bar recovery in First English suits
would thus undermine the very principles upon which just compensation rests.
By way of contrast, the opposite outcome, privileging Fifth Amendment takings
over Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, leaves most of current
sovereign immunity doctrine intact. Were the Court to hold that a state cannot
raise a sovereign immunity defense against a takings claim, the rest of
sovereign immunity doctrine could still stand. A takings exception to sovereign
immunity doctrine could rest on various theories, such as the Fifth
Amendment's remedial command. Under this reading, current state sovereign
immunity case law would only be disturbed with regards to interim takings;
Seminole Tribe, Alden, and FMC would remain unaffected. Sovereign
immunity would still have bite against other constitutional rights, statutory
rights, and state law. A narrow exception for takings therefore would not
defang sovereign immunity nearly as much as the alternative approach would
nullify the Takings Clause.
B. The Marbury Principle and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies
1. Just Compensation and the Remedial Promise
As suggested at the end of the last section, one can also make a broader
argument that, as a structural matter, it does not make sense to bar suits against
a state for federal constitutional violations because removing the remedy often
constrains the right. Under this theory, state sovereign immunity should apply
to federal statutes and state laws, but not to the federal Constitution, because
the very purpose of enshrining these rights in the Constitution is to protect them
regardless of the political whims of the state. The Takings Clause would then
provide a kind of Bivens 65 action against the states, creating a cause of action
for damages out of a constitutional violation.166 Of course, Bivens itself applies
examples of the perverse economic decisions the government might make were it able to obtain
land freely).
164. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997, 999-1001 (1999) (discussing the deterrence function served
by the just compensation requirement).
165. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
166. See id. at 397 (holding that when a federal agent acting under color of his authority
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to federal officials, not state governments, so it provides no direct doctrinal
support for this position.' 67  Instead, it suggests that the violation of
constitutional rights can itself give rise to an action for damages; a crucial role
of the judiciary in this model, therefore, is to protect individuals against
government incursions on their constitutional rights. Though one could make
the broader argument that any federal constitutional right should always
automatically abrogate a state's immunity, this section seeks more modestly to
apply such arguments only to just compensation cases.
Underlying this argument is the famous aphorism, traced back to
Blackstone, that for every right there must be a remedy.1 68 Chief Justice
Marshall articulated this principle in Marbury v. Madison,'69 stating that "[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."' 7 ° Thus,
"where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon
the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy." 7 ' As the Court later stated, "Adjudication is of no value as a remedy
unless enforcement follows."'172  Given this reasoning and the tremendous
importance assigned to Chief Justice Marshall's Marbury opinion, it would
follow that the Takings Clause assigns a specific duty by law, so that its
violation-if the government takes property without providing just
compensation-gives the injured property owner the right to seek that
compensation in the judicial system.
Marbury's principle is fundamental and persuasive, but, as might be
expected, the matter is not so simple. Although an injured property owner
clearly has a constitutional right, that right alone does not entitle her to the
remedy of her choice. Our judiciary considers distinct such concepts as cause
of action, jurisdiction (both personal and subject matter), justiciability, remedy,
and sovereign immunity, and satisfying judicial requirements in one category
violates the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages if he can show a
resulting injury).
167. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (finding that the Eleventh
Amendment precludes Bivens-type actions against state governments in federal court unless the
states consent to such suits).
168. See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2537, 2554 (1998) (discussing Blackstone and constitutional remedies).
169. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
170. Id. at 163.
171. Id. at 166.
172. R.R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 339 (1879).
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often will have no effect on another.1 73 Merely having a cause of action,
therefore, is not enough to guarantee judicial review on its own, nor is it
sufficient to guarantee an appropriate remedy, 174 even if there is review. 175 As
Professors Meltzer and Fallon point out, "Marbury's apparent promise of
effective redress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an
ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained." 176 Indeed, claims against the
government implicate two competing interests: the individual's interest in
receiving compensation for a meritorious claim and society's interest in
maintaining democratic control over the allocation of limited public funds.
77
Keeping in mind these traditional bars on Marbury's principle that every
right deserves a remedy, it becomes much easier to see why sovereign
immunity is an obstacle at all. And yet, there is good reason to think that
sovereign immunity doctrine should not apply to the Takings Clause. There is
something deeply contradictory about including a right in the Constitution and
then constructing a sovereign immunity barrier to prevent injured parties from
enforcing it. For some constitutional rights, this phenomenon is troubling but
explicable. In a First Amendment setting, for instance, a state might pass a law
banning a particular protest. Sovereign immunity will bar the protesters from
suing for damages, but if they file their action early enough, the plaintiffs can
receive injunctive relief forcing the state officer to permit the protest. Eleventh
Amendment immunity here limits the range of possible remedies, but in many
instances an equitable remedy will in fact be what the protesters want.' 78 By
173. Even though these categories are usually thought of as analytically distinct, judicial
analysis sometimes blurs them together. As I shall demonstrate, the issues of remedy and
sovereign immunity are especially intertwined in the context of takings.
174. Traditional remedies for constitutional violations include "damages, restitution,
injunctions, mandamus, ejectment, declaratory judgments, exclusion of evidence, remand for
retrial or reconsideration untainted by constitutional error, and writs of habeas corpus." Fallon
& Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1778.
175. But see Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 289, 292 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution should be self-executing and that
"enforcement of the Constitution is not dependent on the assent of the political branches or of
the states").
176. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1778.
177. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REv. 625, 626
(1985).
178. Of course, the scenario becomes more complicated if, for instance, the protesters do
not have time to file an action in time to strike down the law before the protest. Presumably, the
state could play its cards so that the law prevents a protest, and then sovereign immunity would
block plaintiffs' ability to receive money damages. If the protest were a one-time event (so that
a future protest on the same issue would be worthless), then the injunctive relief afforded to
plaintiffs through an Ex parte Young suit would do the protesters no good. In this instance,
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way of contrast, in temporary takings cases, damages are the only remedy that
will protect the plaintiff's rights. A sovereign immunity bar thus eviscerates the
property right. Congressional abrogation, of course, can restore the right and
the remedy, but requiring abrogation essentially demotes the Takings Clause as
applied to the states to the status of a statute.
While this argument could apply to other constitutional rights, it is
strongest for takings cases. The Takings Clause is not merely "another
protection of the few against the many,"' 79 but one of only two constitutional
provisions that are remedially oriented. The other is the Suspension Clause,
which provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."180 The original Constitution and Bill of Rights thus offered its
most vigorous protections for liberty and property. Indeed, the Constitution
emerged partially out of a recognition that the Articles of Confederation had
failed to protect these two rights. At the beginning of the American
Revolution, Americans did not think that democracy could threaten such
property and liberty rights. 8' The experience of the 1780s under the Articles of
Confederation, however, taught them otherwise; America, as it turned out, was
not that different from other societies, and these rights needed special
protection. I1 2 After all, liberty was central to the American project and, as
Madison pointed out, only a minority (those with property) would be interested
in protecting property rights.
8 3
Takings, like habeas, then would seem to be an area where the Eleventh
Amendment has little traction. As the nineteenth century Court explained in
United States v. Lee:'
84
If this constitutional provision [protecting the writ of habeas corpus] is a
sufficient authority for the court to interfere to rescue a prisoner from the
sovereign immunity permits some remedies, but not the only meaningful one.
179. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97
(1980).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
181. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERIcAN REPUBuC, 1776-87, at 410
(1998) (describing early American political theory).
182. Id.at410-11.
183. Id. at 411. There may be normative arguments today to prefer other rights over
property rights, but the Constitution's scarcity of remedial provisions would suggest that
property and liberty are prioritized in our constitutional system. Though problematic in ways,
this result at least avoids the danger of letting constitutional rights hinge on judges' own values.
See ELY, supra note 179, at 43 (discussing the perils of judges' prejudices influencing their
constitutional jurisprudence).
184. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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hands of those holding him under the asserted authority of the government,
what reason is there that the same courts shall not give remedy to the citizen
whose property has been seized without due process of law and devoted to
public use without just compensation?
85
To an extent, the analogy is inexact because habeas claims are directed to
state officers18 6 and, therefore, do not implicate the core of state sovereign
immunity. 187 Nevertheless, they necessarily intrude upon the prerogative of the
state, and no one would suggest that Congress must abrogate the state's
sovereign immunity for those habeas statutes to be functional.18 8 As Justice
Souter has pointed out, habeas statutes are directed against "the State."189 One
provision of the habeas corpus statute, for instance, requires that "the State shall
produce part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so
by order directed to an appropriate State official."' 9 To be sure, the statute
provides that the court shall direct the order to the "appropriate State official."
But the language of the statute-and, indeed, the nature of the habeas
remedy--comprehends that the remedy is one that intrudes upon the state's
sovereignty. And yet, though Congress may impose various restrictions on
habeas actions, it may not entirely bar them under the Constitution except "in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require it.''
191
Habeas, then, is an example of an action that intrudes greatly on the state but
cannot be blocked by sovereign immunity.
Of course, another important distinction is that habeas claims, unlike
temporary takings claims, do not seek a monetary remedy; in this way, they
more closely resemble Ex parte Young actions. 192 But to the extent that Young
185. Id. at 218.
186. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2004) ("The writ.., shall be directed to the person
having custody of the person detained.").
187. Moreover, Lee was decided about a century before First English, so the damages
remedy in temporary regulatory takings cases was not yet required. Rather, the condemning
authority could choose instead to return the property.
188. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 312 n.10 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that habeas statutes were not "intended to abrogate an immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment").
189. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 181 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f) (2004) (emphasis added).
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
192. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 312 & n.10 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing a habeas case while discussing the "intrusiveness" of Ex parte Young
actions); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 178 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that "when a habeas corpus petitioner sues a state official alleging detention in
violation of federal law and seeking the prospective remedy of release from custody, it is the
doctrine identified in Exparte Young that allows the petitioner to evade the jurisdictional bar of
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itself is a recognition that courts must offer an appropriate remedy to protect
constitutional rights, its doctrine also stands for the proposition that the
Constitution can be used as a sword to vindicate remedies explicitly protected
in the Constitution. If we accept this principle at such a general level of
abstraction, it would seem to follow that using the Takings Clause as a sword
would necessarily command the damages remedy implicit in "just
compensation."
Indeed, a damages remedy arising from the Constitution is itself not alien
to our case law; Bivens already decided that the Constitution-in that case the
Fourth Amendment-could give rise to a cause of action for damages against
federal agents for unconstitutional conduct. 93 It did so, in fact, with specific
reference to liberty interests, arguing that "[h]istorically, damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in
liberty." 194 And the Court has more than once noted specifically that property
and liberty are uniquely important interests. In addition to Lee, the Supreme
Court in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago
95
noted that:
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital
principle of republican institutions. Next in degree to the right of personal
liberty... is that of enjoying private property without undue interference or
molestation. The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation is but an affirmance of a great doctrine
established by the common law for the protection of private property. It is
founded in natural equity, and is laid down as a principle of universal law.
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become
worthless if the government possessed an uncontrollable power over the
private fortune of every citzen [sic]). 96
The notion that Fifth Amendment just compensation is different from
other constitutional remedies has surfaced in other Supreme Court decisions as
well. In Jacobs v. United States,197 for instance, the Court argues with regards
to a federal partial regulatory takings claim that:
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for property
taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its power of
the Eleventh Amendment (or, more properly, the Hans doctrine)").
193. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
194. Id. at 395.
195. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
196. Id. at 235-36 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
197. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact
that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was
asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the
Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. Such a
promise was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the
Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon the Constitution of the
United States.'
98
Significantly, even the Court's most recent sovereign immunity decisions
agree that sovereign immunity does not attach as vigorously to claims arising
from the Constitution itself. In Alden, the Court admits that Reich v. Collins
arose in the context of tax-refund litigation, where a State may deprive a
taxpayer of all other means of challenging the validity of its tax laws by
holding out what appears to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation
remedy. In this context, due process requires the State to provide the
remedy it has promised. The obligation arises from the Constitution
itself....199
This language is admittedly somewhat cryptic, but the idea that certain
rights emanating from the Constitution enjoy special protections is not wholly
anomalous. Over a century earlier, the Court in Lee opined that the principle of
immunity was "as applicable to each of the states as it is to the United States,
except in those cases where by the constitution a state of the Union may be




These statements are potentially of great significance, but it is important to
admit that their exact meanings are unclear. In Reich, Georgia had legislatively
altered the remedy against officers, substituting traditional trespass or assumpsit
198. Id. at 16. In addition to Jacobs, the Court has several times explained that the
Constitution requires the compensation remedy for takings. See First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (finding a
constitutional requirement that condemnations be compensated); United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (noting that the Constitution provides a landowner with a self-executing
claim to compensation after condemnation); see also Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the
Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 144, 200 (1996)
(claiming that courts regularly abrogate sovereign immunity when requiring compensation for
takings). But see Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1962) (finding that sovereign
immunity barred an action to eject a federal forest service officer from land to which both
plaintiffs and the federal government claimed title). Note, however, that because the actions in
Jacobs were brought under the Tucker Act, there was no sovereign immunity to hurdle.
199. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Reich v.
Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108 (1994) (noting the long line of cases establishing the constitutional
requirement of remedies for unconstitutional taxes); supra Part IIl.A.2 (discussing due process
tax refund cases).
200. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206-07 (1882).
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actions with a direct action against the state. The state supreme court, however,
found the refund remedy unavailable when the tax-collection statute was
declared unconstitutional. 0 ' In citing Reich, Alden may simply be asserting
that a state cannot withdraw its promise for a remedy for unlawful taxes. From
this perspective, Reich might be a narrow due process case rather than a novel
application of constitutional remedies. 202 Indeed, keeping in mind that Alden
argues that sovereign immunity barred a suit arising under the Constitution in
Hans,20 3 it becomes clear that its treatment of Reich does not endorse a theory
of automatic abrogation for suits to enforce constitutional rights. To the
contrary, it explicitly rejects "any contention that substantive federal law by its
own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the States. "204 And
yet, the inclusion of the word "necessarily" seems to give the Court some
wiggle room: federal law may not, as a general rule, override Eleventh
Amendment immunity, but in some instances it may. Given Alden's
subsequent suggestion that obligations arising from the Constitution itself
might deserve special treatment-and given that the Fifth Amendment's
remedial promise grants takings a special place even among constitutional
rights-this "necessarily" might hint that takings would trump the Eleventh
Amendment. In other words, if some federal actions can override the sovereign
immunity of the states, then surely suits sounding in inverse condemnation
should be such an action. Indeed, even if Reich is a narrow due process case
that depends on the state's denial of the remedy it has promised, it still might
apply to takings cases because just compensation clauses-either in the federal
or state constitution-can be read as making such a remedial promise.
Reich thus suggests that sovereign immunity concerns might be
diminished in certain cases alleging unconstitutional state action. And Alden's
treatment of Reich helps highlight, albeit obscurely, ways in which takings of
property might be treated differently in our jurisprudence. Moreover, given
that Alden addresses Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
(as opposed to automatic abrogation), the Court's discussion of Hans is
inapposite to the present problem.
20 5
201. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110.
202. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing further Alden's treatment of Reich); see also DLX,
Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Reich as a reaffirmation
that a remedy for unconstitutional taxes does not trump the sovereign immunity that states enjoy
in federal court).
203. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (viewing the Hans Court's decision as a bar to federal
question suits against states absent a waiver).
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. The dispute in Alden focused on "new property," namely Maine's refusal to pay
petitioners overtime payments required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (Maine
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493 (2006)
Other cases rejecting constitutionally implied remedies are also not wholly
analogous. In Parratt v. Taylor,206 for instance, the Court provided no due
process remedy for a prisoner plaintiff seeking to recover for the loss of his
hobby kit by prison officials.2 °7 This rule was extended to intentional losses of
property in Hudson v. Palmer.208 Both these cases, however, hinged on the
state's provision of a post-deprivation remedy, namely the state's tort system.2°9
A pre-deprivation remedy in those cases was "simply 'impracticable,' ,210 but
the state could satisfy its constitutional obligations by providing adequate post-
deprivation remedies through the tort system.
Parratt and Hudson suggest, once again, that rights do not require the full
spectrum of remedies, but these cases are significantly different from a takings
case. First, by characterizing these as procedural due process cases, the Court
permits the state to cure the injury by providing an adequate hearing. In a
straightforward takings case, the government's constitutional obligations to the
plaintiff exist regardless of post-deprivation procedures; whereas the tax cases
hinge on the availability of an adequate procedure, the Takings Clause itself
had paid straight overtime as back pay; the dispute arose over the FLSA's enhanced overtime
protections.) See generally Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551 (D. Me. 1994) (calculating past
overtime and damages owed), dismissed No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D. Me. July 3,
1996), affd 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997). In Reich, however, the state wrongfully required the
payment of taxes, so that the property involved was actual cash money. Reich, 513 at 108.
Alden and Reich can thus be distinguished in a number of ways. First, as the Court suggests, the
right in Alden was statutory whereas the right in Reich is constitutional. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740.
Second, to the extent that both involved "property," Alden only addressed "new property,"
which would seem entitled to fewer constitutional protections. Third, as a practical matter,
providing the plaintiff with relief would have burdened the state far more in Alden than in
Reich. In Alden, Maine still paid its labor under state law; it only failed to pay the additional
money under the FLSA. Had the Court required payment under the FLSA, Maine would have
needed to pay plaintiffs a fair sum of money, thus resembling the retrospective relief against
which the states are protected under Edelman's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In
Reich, by way of contrast, the state had already illegally collected money from the plaintiff.
This remedy seems more in line with straight due process-providing the post-deprivation
remedy promised by the state-and hints of an injunction merely forcing the state to keep its
promise. It is therefore more realistic to expect it to be able to repay that money than to comply
with the FLSA's accrued statutory obligation in Alden.
206. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
207. See id. at 545 (finding that the state had not denied respondent due process because it
made available a state remedy for the prisoner's claim).
208. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,536 (1984) (finding no due process violation for
an intentional "shakedown search" where the state law provided an adequate remedy).
209. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44 (finding that the state tort system provided the
appropriate means of redress); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (same).
210. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
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requires actual compensation, not mere procedural safeguards.2 ' Moreover,
the Court in Parratt and Hudson did not invoke sovereign immunity principles.
Plaintiffs were denied their remedy not because the Eleventh Amendment
barred suit, but rather because § 1983 is not so broad a cause of action as to
encompass a tort against a state official.21 2 Accordingly, even though Parratt
and Hudson resemble takings cases, the Court treats them like tort cases so that
the post-deprivation remedy available is not a § 1983 claim, but rather a state
tort law claim. By way of contrast, the state's taking of real property must
trigger the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause so that the claim is clearly
constitutional and the state's tort system clearly irrelevant. Thus, the calculus is
different when the injury arises from a constitutional violation for which there
is no realistic remedy other than judicial vindication of the constitutional right.
Our legal system might not promise the full spectrum of remedies for every
injury, but straight constitutional violations deserve some degree of special
treatment.
It makes sense that the relevant case law does not foreclose the possibility
of a self-executing and automatically abrogating constitutional property right.
Immediately prior to the Constitutional Convention, people began to realize that
the judiciary needed to play a bigger role in government. Before the 1780s,
judicial review was hardly taken for granted; legislative supremacy was the
norm.213 But the legislatures' increased interference in judicial and other
matters during the 1780s convinced many that a strongerjudiciary was essential
to healthy democracy.214 Many state courts, for instance, gingerly began to
impose previously unthinkable restraints on the legislatures. 21 Thus were
211. But see Seamon, supra note 8, at 1116 (arguing that due process creates an obligation
on a state to make reasonable procedures for addressing taking in state, not federal, court).
Professor Seamon argues that due process obligates states to meet their remedial obligations in
state courts, but that courts of another sovereign cannot meet this obligation. Id. Such
significant differences between state and federal court remedies seem odd in light of Alden.
212. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (finding that, in cases of intentional deprivations of
property, there is no due process violation if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy); Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537 (finding that plaintiffs claim hinged on "whether the tort
remedies which the State of Nebraska provides as a means of redress for property deprivations
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process").
213. See WOOD, supra note 181, at 453-63 (describing the period of legislative ascendancy
over the judiciary).
214. See id. at 454 ("[O]nce legislative interference in judicial matters had intensified as
never before in the eighteenth century, a new appreciation of the role of the judiciary in
American politics could begin to emerge.").
215. See id. at 454-55 (referring to the New Jersey, Virginia, New York, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina judiciaries). Professor Wood also cites to Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. 1784)
for a more detailed example of the challenge to the theory of legislative sovereignty. Id. at 457-
59.
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Americans becoming more concerned with using the judiciary as a check on the
other branches; for the first time, declaring unconstitutional laws void was seen
not as usurping the legislature's power but rather as vindicating "fundamental
law. ,
216
Consistent with this history, early defenses of the Constitution also
recognized that the judiciary existed to safeguard individual rights against the
states.217 Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 80:
The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a
variety of things .... No man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the
government to restrain or correct the infractions of them. This power must
either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal
courts to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the
articles of the Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The
latter appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the
former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.
218
Elsewhere in The Federalist, Hamilton also argues that "the courts of
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments., 21 9 Madison too saw courts playing this protective
role, noting in a speech proposing the Bill of Rights that "[i]ndependent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights." 220 Those tribunals were especially suited for such a function,
partially because judges with life tenure are less subject to the political
temptations. Only courts could operate as a sufficient
check upon the legislative body.., who, perceiving that obstacles to the
success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the
courts, are... compelled ... to qualify their attempts. This is circumstance
216. Id. at 461.
217. As Professor Wood notes, the American Founders, in enhancing the power of the
judiciary, "rejected the conventional British theory of the necessity of the legislature being
absolute in all cases." WOOD, supra note 181, at 462 (internal quotations omitted).
218. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000)
(emphasis added).
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 500; see also James
E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to
Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 899, 946 (1997) (arguing
that the framers expected courts to have a special role in enforcing constitutional limits on
government action).
220. JAMES MADISON, SPEECH PROPOSING THE BIL OF RIGHTS (1789), reprinted in 12
JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197, 207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
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calculated to have more influence upon the character of our governments,
than but few many imagine.
221
With this backdrop, it becomes clear that the "state sovereign immunity"
the Framers discuss might have been more limited than the current Court reads
it. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton actually addresses the sovereign immunity
issue directly, admitting that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."222 However,
Hamilton raises these concerns to assuage fears that "an assignment of the
public securities of one State to the citizens of another would enable them to
prosecute that State in the federal courts for the amount of those securities. ,
223
This focus on diversity suits between citizens of one state and the government
of another is a narrower view of sovereign immunity than that embraced since
Hans, more akin to the immunity ultimately codified in the Eleventh
Amendment. Extending that immunity to protect states from suits by their own
citizens for the vindication of constitutional rights would eliminate the very
judicial check on the states that Hamilton considers central to the protection of
federal individual rights.
Of course, given our expansive federal government today, Congress can
also check the states' power by, among other things, preempting state law with
federal law. But national legislation does not always sufficiently protect
individual rights because (among many other reasons) rights can slip beneath
Congress's radar screen. Infractions of such rights are especially likely to go
unnoticed if they occur in small numbers in a few states. Property owners as a
class may have more political clout than many groups, but because takings
generally affect a small portion of that class, it is rare that they would act
together as a coherent political unit.224 If the federal judiciary were intended, as
221. Id. at 501.
222. THE FEDERAuST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 521 (emphasis in
original).
223. Id.
224. There are, of course, exceptions to this general proposition. For instance, 60 Minutes
recently featured a story about attorneys at the Institute for Justice, a libertarian group, who
were filing suit against cities seeking to take private homes through eminent domain. See 60
Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast Sept. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.cbsnews.conistories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml. These
cases were noteworthy in that the cities were trying to use eminent domain to force people off
their land so that private developers could build more expensive homes and offices, thus
increasing the cities' tax bases. Such a case eventually made its way up to the Supreme Court,
which recently held that the particular development plan at issue did not offend the Takings
Clause's "public use" requirement. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668
(2005) (holding that use of property in the city's development plan, which a private entity
developed and was to carry out, constituted a public use). (In cases where that requirement was
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Hamilton argues, to check not only the federal government but also the states, it
would be deeply contradictory to then let those same states circumvent federal
judicial review through sovereign immunity, essentially leaving the legislature
to decide whether or not to protect the right. To be sure, Hamilton's views are
not the only ones from the founding period, but to the extent that The
Federalist is seminal in our constitutional jurisprudence, his theory of the
judiciary cuts against the Supreme Court's current interpretation that a
sovereign immunity extending to federal question jurisdiction was hardwired
into the Constitution in 1787.225
Another counter-argument to Marshall and Hamilton's theory of federal
courts is that the Eleventh Amendment was added after the passage of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which included the Takings Clause. Even
if one were to accept Hamilton's original vision of the federal judiciary as a
check upon the states, the Eleventh Amendment, as a rejection of Chisholm,
changed that. But note that this is not the current Court's sovereign immunity
argument. Indeed, for that argument, one must confine oneself to the narrower
text of the Eleventh Amendment, which relates only to certain diversity cases
and would not include a property owner suing her own state to recover just
compensation for a taking. Even if today's vigorous sovereign immunity had
been part of the common law at the time of the founding, as the Alden majority
asserts (so that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a placeholder for the
concept), then one can read the Fifth Amendment's requirement of a monetary
remedy to overrule that immunity with regards to takings claims, just as a
statute can overrule common law. (Common law, of course, can be changed by
226statute, so surely it can be changed by the Constitution.) Alternatively, one
offended, the takings plaintiffs would arguably have an even stronger claim for a temporary
takings damages action against the state, as the state action at issue would appear to be even
more illegitimate than in a garden-variety temporary takings scenario.) The lawyers'
involvement, the national publicity, and the grant of certiorari all suggest that property owners,
more so than other groups at least, can protect themselves in the judicial and political systems.
225. General federal question jurisdiction did not exist until 1875, see Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, but it is convenient to separate out what has become federal question and
diversity jurisdiction because state sovereign immunity does not necessarily apply to both.
Moreover, because Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States
to "all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made," U.S. CONST. art. II, the concept of federal question jurisdiction would have
been understood during the ratifying debates and the first years of the early republic.
226. And if Eleventh Amendment immunity is in fact common law, then we might think of
Fitzpatrick's authorization of Section 5 abrogation as an example of a statute changing common
law. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1975) (putting forward theory of constitutional
common law which, unlike "pure" constitutional law, Congress can overturn).
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can read it to consent to suits for just compensation.227 If, on the other hand,
sovereign immunity were actually part of the Constitution, as the Alden
majority seems to argue, then that constitutional immunity for takings claims
might have been amended out of the Constitution when the Court incorporated
the Fifth Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
any of these theories, it seems strange that a pre-constitutional doctrine of
sovereign immunity barring money damages would have survived the Just
Compensation Clause's promise of such damages. And, assuming it does not,
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment would resurrect such a bar.
None of this should be surprising, because sovereign immunity is
notoriously difficult to square with other features of our constitutional
democracy. As Professor Hart argued:
[N]o democratic government can be immune to the claims of justice and
legal right. The force of those claims of course varies in different
situations. If private property is taken, for example, the claim for just
compensation has the moral sanction of an express constitutional
guarantee .... And where constitutional rights are at stake the courts are
properly astute, in construing statutes, to avoid the conclusion that
Congress intended to use the privilege of immunity, or of withdrawing
jurisdiction, in order to defeat them.
228
The Court at times, even in the Hans era, has also articulated an ill regard
for immunity, especially in constitutional property cases, all but admitting that
the very notion of immunity rests upon a fiction. For example, in an action to
recover one office desk seized following plaintiff s failure to pay taxes to the
State of Virginia,229 the Court recognized the "distinction between the
government of a State and the State itself," finding that "whatever wrong is
attempted in [the State's] name is imputable to its government, and not to the
State . The fiction seems almost identical to the officer-suit fiction that
227. Another theory, put forward by Justice Stevens, is that Article III's general grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts can be treated as adequate indication of the sovereign's consent to
suits against itself. See John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1121, 1126
(1993) (discrediting the argument that immunity springs from "nothing more mysterious than
the sovereign's right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own court").
See also infra Part V.C (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Takings
Clause against the states, which bolsters the argument for automatic abrogation); infra note 320
and accompanying text (listing state court cases in which the court read the state's just
compensation clause as state consent to suits).
228. Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1371 (1953).
229. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270,273-74 (1885) (describing the underlying
facts).
230. Id. at 290.
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is so central to current sovereign immunity law, and yet it suggests a broader
incursion into the immunities the state enjoys because "both government and
State are subject to the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States, and
of the laws made in pursuance thereof., 23' This would suggest that the fiction
has its limits, and that the state-whatever one chooses to call it-is subject to
certain kinds of suits, particularly those arising out of the Constitution.
Even more remarkable is the discussion of sovereign immunity in Lee, an
ejectment action to recover possession of an estate owned once by the family of
General Robert E. Lee that the government had taken and turned into a military
fort and later Arlington National Cemetery.232 The Court explained that when
the rights of the citizen collide with acts of the government, "there is no safety
for the citizen, except in the protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which
have been invaded by the officers of the government, professing to act in its
name. 1233 The Court denounced, at times emphatically, immunity bars to suits
against the government, particularly suits regarding the liberty and property
interests most firmly secured in the Constitution. 234 Indeed, both the executive
and legislative branches are "absolutely prohibited" from depriving anyone of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or [taking] private
property without just compensation." 235 Central to this proposition was the
understanding that "[c]ourts of justice are established... to decide upon...
rights in controversy between [citizens] and the government. ,236 The contrary
notion-"that courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of
his property by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the
government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and
without any compensation" 237 -was not only wrong, but deeply opposed to our
system's most cherished values:
If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no
existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which
has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal
rights.
231. Id.
232. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 197-200,219 (1882) (describing the facts of
the case and discussing the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case).
233. Id. at 218-19.
234. See id. at 219-23 (arguing that government officers should not be placed above the
law).
235. Id. at 220.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 221.
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It cannot be, then, that .... though the nature of the controversy is one
peculiarly appropriate to the judicial function... though one of the three
great branches of the government to which by the Constitution this duty has
been assigned has declared its judgment after a fair trial, the [government]
can interpose an absolute veto upon that judgment .... 238
And to the extent that sovereign immunity had roots in English common
law, Lee explained that the English legal system made available "the petition of
right" to "subjects" involved in property disputes against the crown; 239 in such
disputes "the petition of right presented a judicial remedy,-a remedy which
this court... held to be practical and efficient. ''240 Thus, even the English
system-from which our immunity sprang-provided means for plaintiffs to
protect their property rights against an encroaching state. Coming from the
Court just a few years before Hans, this proclamation is all the more striking.
Lee is not anomalous. Drawing heavily on it, the Court in Tindal v.
Wesley 24' explained that "the Eleventh Amendment gives no immunity to
officers or agents of a State in withholding the property of a citizen without
authority of law. '242 To be fair, some of this conclusion rested on the
proposition that suits protecting a plaintiffs property from state-inflicted injury
were deemed suits against the officer seeking to enforce an unconstitutional
statute; they did not proceed against the state itself.243 But the Tindal Court
also noted that the opposing view would leave the plaintiff "remediless so long
as the State, by its agent, chooses to hold his property."244 Ruling in an era long
before temporary takings became part of our legal landscape, the Tindal Court
appears to have guarded against precisely that mischief. To be sure, Tindal
offers no direct doctrinal support for an action for damages against the state
itself, but its conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the action in
that case emphasized that if the state had improperly taken private property, the
government actor should not be able to shield itself from suit.245
238. Id. Of course, Lee is a federal takings case, but the concerns regarding sovereign
immunity closely mirror those in state takings cases. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1090-94
(arguing that there is symmetry between federal and state sovereign immunity).
239. Id. at 208.
240. Id.; see also infra note 440 and accompanying text (quoting United States v. Lee on
the petition of right).
241. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897).
242. Id. at 222.
243. Id. at 220-21.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 222 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment does not impart to officers
immunity from suit for actions taken under unconstitutional laws); see also Fla. Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 686-87 (1982) (discussing this aspect of Tindal).
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The counters to these views-defenses of sovereign immunity-are not
wholly persuasive. Of course, scholars have long criticized state sovereign
immunity and, for the most part, these attacks have not carried the day in the
Supreme Court. This Article, therefore, will offer only a summary of the main
arguments. It is worth noting, though, that these familiar arguments have their
greatest traction here in the takings context. In other words, one might view
statutory claims against the state, non-Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
claims, Fourteenth Amendment claims, and Takings claims as concentric
circles in which arguments against immunity grow increasingly strong. That
the attacks on the Eleventh Amendment have failed-in say, the statutory
context then-does not necessarily mean that those same arguments should not
prevail in the takings context.
Moreover, although attacks on sovereign immunity have obvious doctrinal
limitations in that they do not confront Eleventh Amendment doctrine on its
own terms, they also suggest that, unlike takings, state sovereign immunity rests
on somewhat shaky footing. Though this analytic approach is unusual in
American law, it bears asking in the case of a direct constitutional collision:
which doctrine is more certainly right?246 From this perspective, too, the
familiar attacks on state sovereign immunity doctrine are very relevant to the
instant collision.
Sovereign immunity originally derived from the English law assumption
that "the King can do no wrong;, 247 one could not sue the Crown of England
without its consent.248 This reasoning had a logical place in the monarchical
system, but to rely on it still today is not only anachronistic but clearly contrary
to our own history and democratic principles. 249 As the Court argued in Lee,
unlike the English monarchy, "[u]nder our system the people, who are there
called subjects, are the sovereign., 250 The United States, in fact, became a
country largely through its rejection of the English monarchy. 251 The Alden
Court is certainly correct that the Founders absorbed some English common
246. See infra notes 520-23 and accompanying text (discussing this approach to resolving
doctrinal conflicts).
247. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1201
(2001).
248. Id.
249. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-06 (1882) (arguing that reasons
protecting king from suit in his own court do not exist in our government).
250. Id. at 208.
251. See Chemerinsky, supra note 247, at 1202 ("The United States was founded on a
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives.").
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law into our own fledgling legal system, 252 but surely royal prerogatives are a
common law remnant incompatible with our nation's revolutionary heritage. 53
Another defense of sovereign immunity more closely tethered to the
254American experience is that it protects states' dignity. In FMC, for instance,
Justice Thomas noted that the doctrine's "central purpose is to accord the States
the respect owed them as joint sovereigns. ,255 In our federal structure, the issue
of what powers to reserve to the states is a crucial one, and the Court's recent
decisions instruct us that one should not disregard these principles lightly.
However, it is not clear exactly how protecting a state from suit preserves its
dignity. One might disagree with the Court's decisions in cases like New York
v. United States256 and Printz v. United States,257 but at least there is some logic
to holding that the federal government cannot order state officials to carry out a
federal plan.258 But why should those same principles necessarily shield a state
from suits by private parties? If dignity were in fact such a real concern, then
the Exparte Young suit against state officers would also seem untenable, but no
one would suggest eviscerating that line of precedent.259 Indeed, if one believes
the reasoning of recent commandeering cases, one might think that injunctive
relief ordering the state to act or not act is more intrusive than merely requiring
252. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (noting that, despite the fact the
United States had abandoned some English practices, it absorbed the idea that a sovereign could
not be sued unless it consented).
253. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1992) (arguing that the American Revolution was a fundamentally radical social event that
rejected social and political values of English monarchy to establish, first, a republic and,
ultimately, a democracy). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 247, at 1202-03 (arguing that
sovereign immunity "is inconsistent with a central maxim of American government: no one, not
even the government, is above the law").
254. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (linking state sovereign immunity with concerns
about the dignity of the state); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,268 (1997)
(citing states' dignity as a reason for state sovereign immunity).
255. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,765 (2002) (internal quotations
omitted).
256. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
257. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
258. See id. at 925 ("[L]ater opinions of ours have made clear that the Federal Government
may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs."); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 ("[T]he Federal Government may not compel the States
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.").
259. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635,645-48 (2002) (finding
that the core of Young doctrine is alive even in federal statutory rights cases). Verizon
Maryland reaffirmed Exparte Young notwithstanding the exception for submerged tribal lands
articulated in Coeur d'Alene. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(concurring that Court should not apply the Ex parte Young doctrine to the case because its
application would effectively grant the Tribe title to the land at issue).
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it to pay money to compensate for damages it has inflicted.260 Additionally, a
state that avoids suits against it seems far less "dignified" than one that meets
its challengers directly; legitimate government, one would hope, would be
accountable government.26' Moreover, because states appear in both state and
federal courts frequently as plaintiffs or prosecutors, one cannot say that
allowing a court to determine its rights in suits against citizens is degrading.262
Professor Lee offers a more historically grounded presentation of this
sovereign dignity argument. According to Lee, Justice Iredell and other early
supporters of state sovereign immunity understood state dignity to entitle states
to similar treatment due foreign nations in the Supreme Court.263 Under this
theory, "[d]eference was due... because sovereignty itself was the most
fundamental law [so that] .... [t]o acknowledge that [one] who had no claim to
that sovereignty could seek relief in the general courts... would contradict that
most fundamental law and cast the fate of the system into jeopardy. "264 Thus,
260. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1311 (2001) (arguing that expanded scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity will encourage more suits for injunctive relief, which may be
more intrusive because they may involve "more invasive judicial supervision of state entities
and because some of the defenses that would be available in after-the-fact litigation, [such as]
qualified immunity, are unavailable in cases seeking prospective relief"). Injunctive relief, in
fact, is typically available only if another adequate remedy at law is not. See 13 JAMES WM.
MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06[ 1 ] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005)
(noting that an injunction remedy is usually one of last resort). The Eleventh Amendment, then,
is one of the rare areas where injunctive relief is the baseline, rather than the exception.
261. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SuP.
CT. REv. 1, 54 (remarking that trust in our system derives from government accountability); see
also Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1921, 1927-28 (2003) ("[B]ecause of
revised understandings of the import of human dignity, law ought not to rely on institutional
role-dignity to permit an entity to avoid accounting for its behavior towards individuals.");
Katherine H. Ku, Comment, Reimagining the Eleventh Amendment, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1031,
1063 (2003) (noting that the dignity rationale does not adequately justify current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine). For a thorough and fascinating discussion of dignity's role in
conceptions of sovereignty, see generally Resnik & Suk, supra.
262. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882) ("Nor can it be said that the
government is degraded by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it
is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its rights as against the citizen
to their judgment."); see also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANN.
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 81, 83-91 (2001) (concluding that dignity rationale is "flimsy
foundation" for state sovereign immunity doctrine).
263. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law
and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1095 (2002) (noting that the Constitution
sometimes speaks of the States as nations and explaining how this parallel to foreign nations
related to Justice Iredell's and others' understanding of the Constitution).
264. Id.
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sovereign immunity derives exclusively from the state's inherent sovereignty so
that "[s]overeign liability is a matter of sovereign grace, not of republican right,
and therefore indistinguishable in scope as between, say, an absolute monarchy
and a republic.
265
While these ideas surely animate theories of state sovereign immunity,
they carry more force in the abstract than the concrete. In particular, this
approach ignores the courts' role as a check upon the other branches. If the
Constitution did in fact grow partially out of a desire for an enhanced judiciary
capable of suppressing legislatures' supremacy,266 then an unconquerable
immunity would have defeated that purpose. Moreover, Justice Iredell and
others necessarily rooted notions of sovereignty in the experiences of nations
long observed, namely monarchies. Though they might not have seen a
difference in this regard between an absolute monarchy and a republic, this
does not mean that no difference existed. To the contrary, in the American
267 ilnodtrepublic, sovereignty resides with the people, so it will not do to assert
merely that the government's sovereign grace protects it from suit by all entities
except other sovereigns. That one as erudite as Justice Iredell might not have
fully comprehended this does not suggest that he willfully imposed an
anachronistic view, but rather that it took a long time for many to grasp the full
import and radicalism of the American Revolution.268 From this perspective,
the Court should determine the scope of sovereign immunity by reference to the
values of our own constitutional system, rather than by an abstract hierarchy of
foreign and domestic governments.
269
A more persuasive argument in favor of sovereign immunity is that state
treasuries need to be protected. Unlike the "king can't be sued" and the
"sovereign dignity" arguments, this one addresses current and practical
concerns. The Court invoked this rationale in Alden, arguing:
265. Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits
by Foreign States Against States, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 1765, 1836 (2004); see also Peter J.
Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REv. 1, 51 (2003)
(arguing that Court's use of dignity argument draws on concept of foreign state dignity).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16 (describing the judiciary's growth as a
check upon the legislative branch).
267. See infra text accompanying notes 278-82 (noting that individual sovereignty should
take precedence over that of the government).
268. See generally WOOD, supra note 253.
269. See Lee, supra note 265, at 1837-38 (using a mathematical approach in which the
foreign sovereign "quantum of sovereignty" exceeds the sovereignty of semi-sovereign
American state, which exceeds the sovereignty of non-sovereign mere citizen).
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Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect of
being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status of
a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers
on the public's behalf.
270
This is a legitimate argument, and it helps explain why the full spectrum of
judicial remedies are not and should not always be available.
Indeed, unlike the other justifications, this one genuinely appreciates
separation-of-powers principles for it hesitates to give courts control over the
legislatures' and executives' budgets. But it seems to overstate the danger, at
least with regard to takings cases, because opening the judiciary to one kind of
cause of action and thus authorizing one particular remedy would not
significantly increase the courts' control over the legislatures' purse strings.
Moreover, this argument does not account for the multiple ways in which the
judiciary does influence spending decisions. 271 The desegregation of our
schools, 272 the indigent defendant's right to counsel 273 and on appeal a free trial
transcript, 27 4 and the requirement that detainees in the war on terror receive
some amount of judicial process 275 are all rights recognized in Supreme Court
decisions that cost significant government resources, even though the stated
remedy was not money damages. From this perspective, relief other than
damages can affect the budget as significantly as a monetary remedy.
The "purse strings" argument also cannot explain why state budgets are
necessarily more important than those of state subdivisions. To be sure, state
governments have a special place in our federalist system, but if the protection
of the legislature's budget was such an overriding concern, then the absence of
county and city immunity would have proven disastrous. But it has not done
so. Finally, the budget argument does not account for the fact that states
270. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999).
271. See William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability,
and Alden v. Maine, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1069, 1082 (2000) ("There are simply too many
ways remaining after Alden through which the state fisc may be invaded to suggest that
budgetary accountability is the governing rationale.").
272. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
273. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (finding "counsel must be
provided for defendant unable to employ counsel").
274. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (denouncing policies that give the
well-to-do a larger chance at justice than poor defendants).
275. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,538 (2004) (noting that Hamdi "is entitled [to
process] under the Due Process Clause"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004) ("United
States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals capture abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay.").
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themselves should be able to limit how frequently they are sued by not
encroaching on their citizens' rights. Indeed, the concern for state resources
might cut against sovereign immunity, because that immunity fails to provide
incentives for the state not to violate citizens' rights.276 Current law thus
prioritizes the state treasury over governmental accountability, 277 an outcome
that seems both normatively suspect and contrary to our constitutional goals for
a healthy democracy.
More generally, sovereign immunity prioritizes the states over the people
for no discernible reason. As Professor Monaghan asks, "Should not
accountability to the people-both to the majority at the polls and to wronged
individuals in the courts-be 'inherent in the nature of sovereignty?' 278 The
Court, in other words, has it backwards, prioritizing the state governments'
sovereignty rather than the people.279
Whatever the benefits of "sovereignty" might be, they should be enjoyed
by the people, not the governments. State power and sovereignty should be
subject to federal constitutional limits on state violations of individual rights.
280
Indeed, the states owe their very existence and their plenary power to the
Founders' desire to create a political system that would protect individuals from
too powerful a government. 281 The Court, itself a champion of states' rights,
has articulated this view in one of its recent well-known federalism decisions:
[T]he Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of the States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or
even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals.
282
276. See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to Enforce
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 688 (2000) (arguing that "states might abuse freedom the
Court has preserved for them" and that they might take advantage of Eleventh Amendment
immunity by depriving citizens of their legal rights, for example "by not paying workers
overtime to which federal law entitles them, flouting valid patents and trademarks, [and]
polluting the environment").
277. Chemerinksy, supra note 247, at 1217.
278. Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV.
L. REV. 102, 123 (1996) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
279. See generally Amar, supra note 71.
280. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 294 ("[A]s far as the
sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every
good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.").
281. See Amar, supra note 71, at 1426 (noting that the Founders created a limited
government).
282. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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Current sovereign immunity doctrine is very hard to square with a
federalism premised on "the protection of individuals. '" 283 Marbury' s
principle-that for every right there is a remedy-is certainly descriptively, and
arguably normatively, over-simplistic. Clearly there are other values at play in
our legal system. But if the Court's vigorous defense of states' rights in fact
rests on a theory of individual rights, then there should be no place in that
jurisprudence for a sovereign immunity doctrine so robust that it protects the
states from suits, even in cases where the Constitution prescribes a specific
remedy.
2. Alden and the Symmetry of State Sovereign Immunity
Even if we agree that sovereign immunity is incompatible with our
Constitution's defense of certain individual rights, we must briefly address the
argument that state sovereign immunity applies differently in federal court than
it does in state court. In other words, even if state sovereign immunity cannot
bar all takings suits, might it nevertheless bar federal court suits but permit state
court actions? The Eleventh Amendment's language, after all, seems to apply
only to the "Judicial power of the United States, 284 and not to state courts.
Though this interpretation of the amendment was long assumed-and is still
accepted by some 285-it seems to be no longer correct after Alden v. Maine.
286
Unlike prior precedents, Alden explicitly discusses the symmetry of state
sovereign immunity, linking the state's immunity in federal court to its
287immunity in state court. Thus, the same preconstitutional common law
283. Id.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
285. See, e.g., DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511,527 (6th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that
state sovereign immunity does not apply symmetrically in state and federal court); Seamon,
supra note 8, at 1116 (same).
286. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that "the States retain
immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to
abrogate by Article I legislation").
287. See id. at 713-54 (discussing the history of states' sovereign immunity); see also
Seamon, supra note 8, at 1096-97 (examining the Alden Court's approach to sovereign
immunity). The Alden Court also linked the immunity of the state to the immunity of the United
States. It asserted:
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own immunity from suit
not only in state tribunals but also in its own courts. In light of our constitutional
system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to
conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 749-50; see also Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 213 (1897) ("[lIt cannot be
doubted that the question whether a particular suit is one against the State, within the meaning
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underlying the state's sovereign immunity in federal courts applied with equal
strength in state courts, and the Court found there was no "compelling
evidence" that states ratifying the Constitution understood themselves to be
empowering Congress to subject states to suits in their own courts. 288 As the
Court argued, the fact that some state statutory and constitutional provisions
specifically authorized suits against the states in their own courts suggests "the
prevalence of the traditional understanding that a State could not be sued [in
state court] in the absence of an express waiver. ' 28 9 To the extent that the
Eleventh Amendment, according to the Alden Court, sought only to restore the
pre-Chisholm state of the law, 29° the amendment's failure to mention state
courts is inapposite. Because sovereign immunity applied in state courts under
our original constitutional understanding-and because the immunity question
in Chisholm did not arise out of state court proceedings 291-there was no reason
to believe that the states' immunity in state courts had ever been disrupted.
Indeed, the state's immunity from suit in its own court was a compelling reason
for the Exparte Young decision; were states not to retain immunity from suit in
their own courts, the need for Young would have been less pressing.292 Thus,
as the Alden Court summarized, the rationale behind not subjecting states to
suit in federal court "applies with even greater force in the context of a suit
prosecuted against a sovereign in its own courts, for in this setting, more than
any other, sovereign immunity was long established and unquestioned.,
293
There is a logic to the Alden decision, but the "shock of surprise" it
provoked may well have been comparable to that caused two centuries earlier
by Chisholm. Prior to Alden, a state's sovereign immunity applied only in
of the Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine whether a particular
suit is one against the United States."); Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670,
687 n.21 (1982) (quoting Tindal); Seamon, supra note 8, at 1097-98 (drawing connections
between sovereign immunity in state court and state sovereign immunity in federal court).
288. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-31.
289. Id. at 724.
290. See id. (noting that the swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicated that the
Chisholm Court might have misinterpreted the Constitution).
291. The question posed in Chisholm was:
Can the State of Georgia, being one of the United States of America, be made a
party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme Court of the United States, at the suit
of a private citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of
the State of South Carolina?
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
292. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
293. Id. at 742; see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 1097 (discussing the "preservation"
rationale).
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federal court, so that the Eleventh Amendment functioned mostly as a forum
selection clause.2 94 Thus, before Alden, a takings plaintiff could have brought
her claim in state court. As Alden's holding addresses only Congress's
authority to use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
state courts, it is not necessarily broad enough to change the rules of the game
entirely in state court. But given Justice Kennedy's rhetoric of symmetry,
sovereign immunity might apply with equal force in state and federal courts.
Interestingly, not all commentators and courts agree that Alden necessarily
requires identical sovereign immunity rules in state and federal court for certain
kinds of claims. As this Article has already noted, Professor Seamon argues
that, while sovereign immunity would bar an inverse condemnation claim
against the state in federal court, due process requires that the state provide
some kind of procedural remedy, including, potentially, state court suits.2 95 But
Professor Seamon's argument relies on the strength of the Due Process Clause
and does not address whether the Just Compensation Clause might, by its own
force, also require a particular remedy beyond mere procedural safeguards.
The Sixth Circuit in DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky 96 recently followed reasoning
similar to Professor Seamon's. There the court held that state sovereign
immunity barred a federal takings claim in federal court but continued to
explain that no such bar existed in state court, notwithstanding Alden.
297
Relying on Reich, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that, because the Constitution
requires effective remedies for takings and the coercive collection of taxes, it
must also require state courts to provide such remedies notwithstanding
traditional immunity bars.298 But the Sixth Circuit, reasoning that both Reich
and the First English footnote applies only to state court suits,299 found that no
such requirement exists in federal court.3°
294. Monaghan, supra note 278, at 125.
295. Seamon, supra note 8, at 1116; see also supra note 8 (summarizing Professor
Seamon's argument).
296. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004).
297. Id. at 527-28.
298. Id. at 527; see also Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110 (1994) (noting that the
requirement of a remedy for unconstitutional taxes does not trump the state's sovereign
immunity in federal court); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563, 568 (Or. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that states can be sued in state court for takings claims); SDDS, Inc. v. South
Dakota, 650 N.W.2d 1, 9 (S.D. 2002) (following Boise Cascade).
299. First English began as a state court suit in the California court system. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306-09
(1987).
300. DLX, 381 F.3d at 527.
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 553
Turning to Alden, the Sixth Circuit continued that, although it "might
seem to foreclose the requirement that states be susceptible to suit in their own
courts. . . , a close reading of Alden reveals that it would present no bar to such
a claim. ' 30 1 Alden, argued the Sixth Circuit, "specifically preserved Reich's
promise of a state-court remedy, noting, 'The obligation arises from the
Constitution itself; Reich does not speak to the power of Congress to subject
States to suits in their own courts.'" 30 2 DLX concluded by asserting that where
the Constitution requires a particular remedy, such as through the Takings
Clause or the Due Process Clause, "the state is required to provide that remedy
in its own courts, notwithstanding sovereign immunity."
30 3
The Sixth Circuit, like Professor Seamon, makes its point well, but it is not
clear that Alden ought to be construed this way. Alden and Reich could be read,
as apparently DLX reads them, as granting a broad right to seek constitutional
remedies against the state in state courts; under this theory, state sovereign
immunity could never bar a state court action seeking a remedy required by the
Constitution. Given Alden's aforementioned attention to the symmetry of state
and federal court sovereign immunity, however, this conclusion seems odd,
particularly in light of the current Court's willingness to expand the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity and its insistence that that immunity was part
of our original constitutional fabric. Another reading of Alden's treatment of
Reich, more in keeping with the remainder of the Alden opinion, is that when
the state promises a particular remedy, as it did in Reich, due process prevents it
from welching on that promise. Under this reading, state and federal court
immunity rules in a takings case would not necessarily be different, because the
cause of action would be rooted in the Just Compensation Clause, rather than
the Due Process Clause.3°
Along these lines, it is important to remember that Reich itself makes clear
that Georgia's chief failing was to "hold out what plainly appeared to be a
'clear and certain' postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the
disputed taxes have been paid, that no such remedy exists. 30 5 Reich's
holding-and Alden's preservation of Reich-then are not directly on point for
the takings claimant who objects not to state procedural inadequacies but to the
lack of compensation; a landowner could have a takings claim against the state
without being able to point to the kind of egregious procedural deprivation
301. Id. at 528.
302. Id. at 528 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999)).
303. Id.
304. Of course, a due process action might also be possible, particularly if the state, like
Georgia in Reich, offered and then removed a postdeprivation remedy.
305. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 108 (1994).
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committed by Georgia in Reich.306 Alden's own language seems to bolster
this interpretation. The Court emphasized that in Reich, "due process
requires the State to provide the remedy it has promised. '30 7 Contrary to
DLX's reasoning, then, Alden and Alden's treatment of Reich do not compel
the conclusion that state sovereign immunity cannot bar takings claims in
state court. Nor do they support an asymmetrical immunity for takings
claims. Instead, those cases dealt with a related but different problem,
sounding in due process, not takings. And because Alden and Reich are not
exactly on point, the Court's most direct statement on the matter remains the
First English footnote, which finds that takings trumps sovereign immunity,
without regard to whether the action is brought in state or federal court. First
English began as a state court action, 308 to be sure, but nothing in its language
suggests that the immunity rules for takings claims would differ between state
and federal court. In suggesting otherwise, the Sixth Circuit is relying on
distinctions the Supreme Court itself has not recognized.
It is interesting that the Sixth Circuit uses the ostensible availability of a
state court action to help justify its dismissal of the federal court suit. After
determining that the Eleventh Amendment required dismissal of the case
before it, the DLX court need not have reached the question of whether the
same action could have overcome an immunity claim in state court. And yet,
the Sixth Circuit apparently felt that an appropriate remedy had to lie
somewhere in the judicial system; given the Constitution's promise of a just
compensation remedy, sovereign immunity could not absolutely bar such a
case. Therefore, in a curious and indirect way, it assumed what this Article
argues explicitly: given the remedial nature of the Fifth Amendment Just
Compensation Clause, plaintiffs must be able to bring their takings actions
somewhere in the judicial system. Ironically, to the extent Alden suggests
that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies symmetrically in state and
federal court, it can also be used to argue in favor of a Takings Clause that
automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity in both state and federal
court. Any other result would leave the takings plaintiff unable to protect her
property rights in any judicial forum, an outcome virtually impossible to
square with our constitutional structure.
306. Alden can also be read more narrowly to address only Congress's power to abrogate
state immunity in state courts, though as mentioned above, its reasoning has far wider
implications in state sovereign immunity law.
307. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999).
308. Supra note 299.
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3. The Availability of Alternative Remedies
Though the theoretical arguments are strongly in favor of a self-executing
Takings Clause that automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity in both
state and federal court, it is less clear that this outcome is a practical necessity.
Even if the Takings Clause did not provide a damages remedy that
automatically abrogates state sovereign immunity, many takings litigants would
still have judicial recourse. In Marbury terms, while the system does not
provide the full spectrum of remedies, it does provide a good amount, even
accounting for sovereign immunity. First, property owners can protect their
rights to a significant extent through traditional suits against the offending state
official in both his official and personal capacities. Second, many states have
consented to suits sounding in inverse condemnation, either by statute or
judicial decision. Though these existing legal structures might not offer the
perfect remedy in every case, they often do a decent enough job.
The officer suit, long a part of our legal tradition though not formally
canonized until Ex parte Young, frequently provides adequate remedies for
those seeking to sue a state. Because its legal fiction permits suits in equity
against state officials, the Young line provides judicial relief for ongoing
constitutional violations. What it does not offer is money damages for past
violations, such as interim takings. It can, though, get the government off a
person's land, not only returning the property to its owner but also, at least
theoretically, shortening the duration of the interim taking.
The plaintiff who successfully wins back her land in this way is not wholly
without further remediation: She can sue the officer in his personal capacity for
damages to recover for the duration of the taking. Two obstacles remain. First,
most state officials enjoy qualified immunity.3°9 To win damages, the plaintiff
would need to demonstrate that such immunity should not apply. Second, the
officer is unlikely to have deep pockets, so even if the plaintiff does win a
judgment at law, she may not be fully compensated.310
309. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 529 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that
executive branch officials are normally entitled to qualified immunity from suit).
310. Some states, in certain situations, do indemnify their employees to a certain extent, but
that indemnification is neither widespread nor complete enough to consistently make the takings
plaintiff whole. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Damages in
Land Use Cases, SD14 ALI-ABA 213, 434 (1998) (noting that "because indemnification is
frequently available to government employees, a judgment against an employee in his or her
personal capacity may be paid sometimes by the government"); James D. Cole, Defense and
Indemnification of Local Officials: Constitutional and Other Concerns, 58 ALB. L. REv. 789,
789-90 (1995) (noting that New York common law does not relieve public employees,
including officers, of responsibility for torts committed during their public employment);
George C. Hanks, Jr., Contribution and Indemnity After HB4, 67 TEx. B.J. 288, 298 (2004)
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To surmount the qualified immunity hurdle, the landowner injured by an
interim takings violation would have to establish that the offending officer
knew or should have known that the taking-without just compensation-
clearly violated established federal takings doctrine.31' Though this immunity
certainly protects the officer to some degree, it is hardly as bulletproof as
absolute immunity and, realistically, might deter some state officers from taking
property that they know will lead to interim takings violations. Of course, this
incentive is not as strong as the direct suit against the state, because an officer
can hide behind a claim that the "taking" was not intentional and that the return
of the property demonstrated the officer's good faith. He similarly can claim
that he thought a particular regulatory scheme authorized the taking.
312
Nevertheless, coupled with the potential of injunctive relief, this remedy offers
property owners considerable protection.
It is also notable that many state laws offer protections that duplicate or
exceed those under the federal Constitution. The constitutions of most states
(noting Texas statutory provisions creating a right to indemnification, including the state's
statutory duty to indemnify its employees for actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees
when they have been sued in their official capacity); Jack M. Sabatino, Privitization and
Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the Sovereign's Immunities from Exemplary
Damages?, 58 01o ST. L.J. 175, 230-31 (1997) (noting that some states forbid and others
permit indemnification of public employees for punitive damages); Martin A. Schwartz, Should
Juries Be Informed That Municipality Will Indemnify Officer's § 1983 Liability for
Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1209, 1211 (2001) (noting that municipalities
and states "frequently indemnify their employees to protect them from liability for unlawful
conduct within the scope of their employment"); Sherman P. Willis, Note, Iowa School
Counselors Had Better Get It Right, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1093, 1119 n. 189 (2004) (noting that the
Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act "requires school districts and boards to 'defend, indemnify,
and hold harmless' any employee who is named in a civil suit for an act or omission arising out
of the employee's job"); see also Carlos Manual Vk.quez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process,
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1950 (2000) (noting that officer liability often
translates into de facto state liability and contending that "it may simply be easier for all
concerned for the state to establish an adequate remedy against itself'). See generally Cornelia
T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials' Individual
Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 76-79 (1999) (discussing indemnification and the
result of the Bivens system of liability for government officials).
311. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that "[g]overnment
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known"); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183, 194 n. 12 (1984) (finding that relevant inquiry under Harlow is whether officer violated
clearly established federal law rights).
312. See, e.g., Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting defendants'
argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they merely followed an executive
order which the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands senate had approved).
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 557
have versions of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause,31 3 and many states
also have statutes for inverse condemnation actions. 314 Many takings actions
could thus proceed without the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Indeed, in
many instances, the state constitution or statute provides more than the federal
Constitution does. For instance, some state statutes specifically provide not
only for just compensation suits but also for attorneys' fees for victorious
plaintiffs.315 Some also offer a separate administrative remedy for recovering
from the state.316 California even statutorily provides market-rate postjudgment
interest for condemnation awards.317
Even more important, many states have consented to suits sounding in
inverse condemnation, expressly authorizing suits for money damages. Some
have done so through express legislation.31 8 Others have done so through their
courts, so that even though sovereign immunity is theoretically sufficient to
defeat an action against a state's taking,319 the state's constitutional just
compensation clause constitutes consent to suit, thus waiving that immunity.32°
313. 1 JuLUs SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN]. North Carolina is the only state that lacks such a
provision. Id. at 1-95.
314. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-972(B) (West 2001) (providing for inverse
condemnation action); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1250.110, 1268.311 (West 2000) (same);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-116 (2002) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-17b (West 2000)
(same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 113-4 (1999) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51 (1999) (same); OR.
REV. STAT. § 20.085 (2003) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 512 (1999) (same); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-26-516 (2005) (same); see also Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign
Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 578 (2001) (noting that many states have enacted statutes for
inverse condemnation actions) Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign
Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1399, 1414 & n.60 (2000) (same).
315. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-972(B) (providing reasonable attorney's fees in an
inverse condemnation suit); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-116 (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-17b (same); HAw. REV. STAT. § 113-4 (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.085 (same).
316. See Menell, supra note 314, at 1414 & n.60 (providing a sample of state laws
authorizing a separate administrative remedy).
317. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1268.311 (West 2000).
318. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9(2) (McKinney 2001) (stating that a court of claims can
hear monetary actions "against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or
interest therein"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10.5(1) (1997) (repealed 2004) (providing that
"immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation
from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private
property for public uses without just compensation"); see also Seamon, supra note 8, at 1118
n.249 (noting that New York and Utah expressly waive immunity from just compensation suits).
319. See 6A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 313, § 30.01[2] (stating that a
state's sovereign immunity from suit is sufficient to defeat an eminent domain action).
320. See, e.g., Rose v. California, 123 P.2d 505, 510 (Cal. 1942) (finding that the
California takings clause is self-executing and therefore an action for damages is permissible);
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In short, "[t]he rigors of sovereign immunity are thus 'mitigated by a sense of
justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the
sovereign.' 021
However, though many states offer protections more robust than that
under the federal Constitution, not all do. Some state courts have yet to
overrule cases refusing to find the state liable for exercising its eminent domain
powers.322 Some states have also limited takings suits to either direct physical
invasion or damage to specific rights.323 And in some states, it is unclear
State ex rel. Smith v. 0.24148, 0.23831 & 0.12277 Acres of Land, 171 A.2d 228, 231 (Del.
1961) (finding that the Delaware constitutional provision stipulating that no person's property
shall be taken for public use without his consent and without compensation is a self-executing
waiver of sovereign immunity); Angelic v. State, 34 So. 2d 321,323 (La. 1948) (finding that the
Louisiana constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken or damaged except for
public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid is "self-executing" and, hence,
where private property has been appropriated by state for public purposes, the right of the owner
to recover adequate compensation will be entertained by courts as an exception to the general
principle that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent); Schmutte v. State, 22 N.W.2d
691,694 (Neb. 1946) (finding that the Nebraska constitutional provision that property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation protects property rights from invasion by the
state and is self-executing, so no further legislative consent is necessary); Cereghino v. State ex
rel. State Highway Comm'n, 370 P.2d 694, 696 (Or. 1962) (finding that where the state
exercises power of eminent domain without bringing a condemnation action, the owner may sue
to recover the value of the property and damages under the Oregon and United States
Constitutions); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 157 S.E. 842, 850 (S.C. 1931)
(finding no immunity from suit under the South Carolina Constitution where the act complained
of constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation); Dillard v. Austin Indep.
Sch. Dist., 806 S.W.2d 589, 596 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding that the eminent domain provision
of the Texas Constitution constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking or
damage of property for public use). Of course, along similar lines, one could read the states'
ratification of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as together consenting to just
compensation suits. Given that many states' own takings clauses are very similar to the clause
in the Fifth Amendment-and given that many states have construed their own clauses to satisfy
this consent requirement-this analysis seems correct, if roundabout. See infra Part VI.C
(tracing the development of claims under the Takings Clause); see also 6A NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 313, § 30.01[2], at 30-10 & n.12 (noting that states'
compensation clauses constitute consent to suit).
321. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)).
322. See, e.g., Zoll v. St. Louis County, 124 S.W.2d 1168, 1173 (Mo. 1938) (concluding
that "[i]t is the prerogative of the state to determine when suit may be maintained against it");
Westmoreland Chem. & Color Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 144 A. 407,410 (Pa. 1928) (noting
that, absent legislation to the contrary, there could be no liability); Starrett v. Inhabitants of
Thomaston, 137 A. 67, 69 (Me. 1927) (pointing to a provision in the relevant act disclaiming
any state liability).
323. See, e.g., Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Mo. 1957)
(discussing the requirement that property be "directly affected"). See also Robert Keith
Johnston, Federal Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence and Missouri Inverse Condemnation
Proceedings, 58 UMKC L. REV. 421, 430 n.77 (1990) (noting that Missouri inverse
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whether immunity has been waived324 or even if a cause of action for inverse
condemnation exists.325 Moreover, in those states in which the courts, rather
than the legislature, have found sovereign immunity waived, the issue may not
be permanently settled; given recent Supreme Court developments, there is
reason to think some state courts might revisit their earlier decisions on the
matter.326  Indeed, because many state courts that have construed their
respective just compensation clauses to provide state consent to suit were
considering the issue prior to Alden, some of those courts might want to revisit
the issue in light of Alden's decision that state sovereign immunity in fact does
apply in state courts. This is not to say that the "consent" theory necessarily
rested on the absence of sovereign immunity in state courts; however, that
absence certainly facilitated such a conclusion. Thus, even though sovereign
immunity might not present an obstacle to such a suit under state law, the
protection provided by state law suits is limited and uncertain.
327
Indeed, some states that "consent" to suit do so not in traditional courts but
in quasi-judicial courts of claims. Illinois, for instance, requires that cases filed
against the state be filed in the Court of Claims, a fact-finding body that is not a
court in the constitutional sense.328 Illinois courts, thus, usually refuse to
condemnation law is far from clear).
324. See, e.g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 985 F.2d 1488, 1493 n.12 (1lth
Cir. 1993) (indicating that Florida law is uncertain regarding whether courts recognize a cause
of action for inverse condemnation temporary takings claims); Austin v. City of Honolulu, 840
F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that Hawaii case law is also unclear); see also
Seamon, supra note 8, at 1118-19 & n.250 (indicating that there are states where the law is still
unclear).
325. See Austin, 840 F.2d at 681 (stating that Hawaii case law is unclear as to whether
there exists an inverse condemnation cause of action); Johnston, supra note 323, at 430 (stating
that Missouri law is unclear as to whether such a cause of action exists); see also DANIEL R.
MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 4A.02[5] [D] (1998) (noting that the availability
of compensation remedies in land use cases remains muddy in many states).
326. As Professor Seamon argues, some of those state courts have blurred together takings
clauses' creation of a monetary cause of action with the waiver or abrogation of sovereign
immunity. Seamon, supra note 8, at 1120. In light of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
states might need to revisit that approach. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
687, 714-15 (1998) (discussing the distinction between a cause of action and waiver of
sovereign immunity).
327. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1335-37 (2001) (discussing the remedial gap
created by current Eleventh Amendment doctrine with particular attention to intellectual
property suits).
328. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 485 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ill. 1985)
(noting that the Court of Claims is not "a court within the meaning of the judicial article" of the
Illinois Constitution); 3 RICHARD A. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL § 2.3 (2004) ("Cases against the State of Illinois are also outside the jurisdiction of the
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assume jurisdiction over suits against the state. 329 But the Illinois Court of
Claims lacks the procedural protections afforded in "constitutional" courts, and
under Illinois law, the circuit courts can review only the administrative
procedures used by the Court of Claims, not the substance of the case.330 Were
the Takings Clause not to trump state sovereign immunity and permit an action
against the state in state or federal court, Illinois would then offer only limited
administrative review, not the full panoply of judicial protections for takings
plaintiffs.
Moreover, for those plaintiffs who seek to vindicate their rights in federal
courts, the Williamson doctrine already poses sizeable barriers to takings
litigants not faced by other constitutional rights plaintiffs.33' As one
commentator argues, the lower federal courts have an "overwhelming
predisposition to dismiss federal land use cases on jurisdictional grounds such
as abstention and ripeness. 3 32 The quintuple threat of sovereign immunity,
qualified immunity, and, under the Williamson trap, ripeness, abstention, and
preclusion then poses multiple pitfalls, some unique to the takings plaintiff.
333
Nevertheless, the general point is that state law in many instances fills
some of the gaps that might exist were the Court to hold that the Eleventh
Amendment does limit the remedies that plaintiffs can receive in takings suits
against the state. Such a holding would lead more plaintiffs to file their takings
suits in state court, but that often happens anyway because of Williamson's
ripeness requirements and (arguably) faulty reasoning about the asymmetry of
state sovereign immunity.334 Moreover, the combination of Ex parte Young
actions and suits against officers in their personal capacities can help to further
deter temporary regulatory takings. If the officer suit option and state laws
subject matter of the circuit courts and must be filed in the Court of Claims.").
329. See MICHAEL, supra note 328, at § 2.3 (listing arguments, rejected by the Illinois
courts, asserted by litigants in attempts to join the state as a party to litigation).
330. See id. (describing the circuit courts' subject matter jurisdiction).
331. John J. Delaney et al., Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness" Mess?: A Callfor Reform
so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 201 (1999)
(describing the Takings Clause as being marginalized in comparison with the other Bill of
Rights protections). These barriers seem particularly unfair (or, at the least, asymmetrical) given
that federal official defendants can easily remove federal takings actions to federal court while
plaintiffs in such cases usually are forced to go to state court first under Williamson.
332. Id. at 196.
333. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Fransisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2509 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Williamson trap creates burdens unique to takings
plaintiffs).
334. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing the symmetry of state sovereign immunity in state
and federal courts and citing some arguments against such symmetry for certain kinds of
claims).
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collectively provide adequate protection to property rights in many instances, is
this all much ado about nothing?
The answer from the property owner for whom an adequate remedy is not
otherwise available is, of course, certainly not. The foregoing discussion
demonstrates there will be gaps in the coverage, and to the extent that the
Constitution ought to protect everyone to the same degree, those gaps are
disquieting. After all, "[c]onstitutional provisions are based on the possibility
of extremes, 033 so the fact that the unprotected right is the exception rather
than the norm should count for little as a constitutional argument. This is even
more the case considering that the small property owner of modest means will
tend to have less political clout and be more vulnerable to the system's gaps.
On the federal law front, official immunity can be difficult to overcome, and an
injunction offers nothing to the victim of a temporary taking. Similarly, the suit
against the officer in his personal capacity might help deter uncompensated
takings on the margins, but it will offer little in the way of satisfying
compensation. Indeed, before we celebrate the existing safeguards, we should
keep in mind that the system currently functions mostly without state sovereign
immunity336 and poses litigation barriers serious enough to merit congressional
attention. The problem, in fact, has been perceived as so serious that a bill
addressing these concerns made it all the way through the House before falling
short in the Senate.337
The state law front might be rosier on the whole, but as noted above, some
states do better than others. If a state were intent on denying reasonable
procedures, it is plausible that that same state would neither waive its immunity
nor offer much in the way of state law remedies. The direct collision between
takings and state sovereign immunity, in fact, presupposes a state that is
unwilling to compensate an alleged taking, because a suit that has progressed to
that point must involve a state unwilling to provide certain compensation. State
335. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1908).
336. Because the Court suggested in First English that takings trumps the Eleventh
Amendment, and because it has not held to the contrary, takings cases in many instances can
proceed unmolested by sovereign immunity. Such was the case in Palazzolo, when the Court
ignored a potential sovereign immunity problem. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
(noting that the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the problem but declined to do
so). See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563, 568 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(concluding that "at least some constitutional claims are actionable against a state, even without
a waiver or congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity"); SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 650
N.W. 1, 9 (S.D. 2002) (finding that a sovereign immunity claim can not overcome the Takings
Clause's just compensation requirement). But see supra note 4 (citing federal appellate cases
finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred takings suit against the state).
337. See Delaney et al., supra note 331, at 195-98 (discussing the Private Property Rights
Implementation Act). I
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court protections in fact are frequently limited, as evidenced by the fact that
many takings plaintiffs try to get into federal court notwithstanding the
procedural complications.338 Thus, even though the law would offer some
protections were the Supreme Court to hold that state sovereign immunity
precluded just compensation suits, those remedies would not always protect
property owners as well as an automatically abrogating Takings Clause would.
Such a holding, then, would not be a policy disaster, but that does not mean it is
preferable. Given that some already see procedural hurdles as having rendered
the Takings Clause a "poor relation" compared to the other Bill of Rights
protections, 339 a clearly articulated state sovereign immunity hurdle would make
it that much more difficult for plaintiffs to protect their property rights.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment, Incorporation, and Automatic Abrogation
Another structural argument in favor of automatic abrogation relies on the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's incorporation of the Takings
Clause against the states. This reading reasons that, in its radical realignment
of the relationship between the federal and state governments, the Fourteenth
Amendment also reconfigured Eleventh Amendment immunity. To the extent
that the Eleventh Amendment was passed after the Bill of Rights, there are
problems in arguing that those rights automatically abrogate state sovereign
immunity-although not insurmountable ones, because current jurisprudence
treats the Eleventh Amendment as a placeholder for sovereign immunity, not as
an affirmative creator of the doctrine. However, because the Fourteenth
Amendment was passed after the Eleventh-and because those rights did not
previously apply against the states anyway-there is reason to think the
Fourteenth Amendment disrupted pre-Civil War immunity principles.
The current Court acknowledges that the Fourteenth Amendment
"fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the
Constitution.' 40 In theory, this fundamental alteration could automatically
abrogate state sovereign immunity for all rights incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly, the Court has never rejected this
principle, even suggesting that automatic abrogation might apply in some
instances. Even the Alden Court noted that, in adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the people required states to surrender a portion of sovereignty
338. See id. at 200 (discussing ripeness and preclusion doctrine as complicating factors in
federal litigation).
339. Id. at 201.
340. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,59 (1996).
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preserved to them in the original Constitution. 341 This is a view not terribly
different from that of many state courts, which read the states' ratification of
the Fifth Amendment and, later, the Fourteenth Amendment as collectively
consenting to takings suits.
342
Still, doctrinally it seems extreme to assert that incorporation did not
merely apply the Bill of Rights against the states but also abrogated state
immunity for those rights. Nevertheless, this theory does illustrate important
ways of thinking about the Fourteenth Amendment's impact on sovereign
immunity. As the Bill of Rights did not initially apply against the states, the
original discussions of state sovereign immunity-whether in the ratification
debates for the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Eleventh
Amendment--often did not focus on the issue of constitutional rights. 43
Indeed, those debates had in mind particular phenomena, such as war debts and
the connected debates on fiscal policy.
3" Though this historical backdrop
345
certainly does not foreclose the possibility that Eleventh Amendment or,
alternatively, common law state sovereign immunity applied to constitutional
suits, it also does not prove that a state's immunity was so powerful as to block
constitutional suits.
The Court's recent decisions permit Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers, while limiting its
ability to abrogate pursuant to other powers. 346 This focus suggests that the
Court might not see the Fourteenth Amendment as automatically abrogating
anything. And yet, though automatic abrogation has not been embraced by the
current Court, the Court's own precedent suggests at least some incorporated
rights should not be subject to Eleventh Amendment bars. Interestingly,
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, which establishes that Congress can abrogate Eleventh
341. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,756 (1999). Alden's discussion focuses on Congress's
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5, but its analysis does not foreclose
the possibility of some instances of automatic abrogation. Id.
342. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing state consent and waiver case law).
343. But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 421-25 (1793) (discussing
enforcement of the Constitution against the states in federal court).
344. See ORTH, supra note 74, at 18 (noting the pre-Chisholm "national debate on fiscal
policy"); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269, 1281-1313 (1998) (exploring the historical
backdrop behind state government amenability to suit).
345. See infra Part VI for historical arguments. For ease of presentation, I treat structural
arguments here and historical ones in Part VI, though, of course, there is substantial overlap
between the two.
346. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (discussing congressional intervention pursuant to Section
5); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (upholding Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
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Amendment immunity pursuant to its Section 5 powers,347 notes that the
Fourteenth Amendment's substance is not limited to Congress's action. It
explains that "the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment...
themselves embody significant limitations of state authority. 3 48 The fact of
congressional abrogation might militate against automatic abrogation, but the
Court does not address automatic abrogation because that question is not raised.
Fitzpatrick, then, unanimously addresses only the easier question of Section 5
abrogation, 349 not the harder "automatic abrogation" question. To the extent it
acknowledges that the substantive provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment themselves constrain state authority, Fitzpatrick might be a
relatively contemporary admission that some constitutional rights might be self-
executing in this sense.
Justice Brennan's concurrence embraces these principles more explicitly
than do his fellow Justices. Not only does Brennan read the Eleventh
Amendment only to mean what it says-that "only federal-court suits against
States by citizens of other States" are barred35° -but he also suggests that the
states waived their sovereign immunity for constitutional claims when they
351granted Congress specifically enumerated powers. Similarly, in his own
concurrence, Justice Stevens notes, "I am not sure that the 1972 Amendments
[to Title VII abrogating state sovereign immunity] were 'needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment' ... .,s Thus, when the right in
question emerges from the Constitution itself, the state's immunity, under this
theory, may be automatically surrendered.353
Curiously, the current Court might support this argument. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,354 the Court, in limiting Congress's powers under Section 5,
emphasized that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment has meaning
independent of Congress's actions. Section 5 thus merely gives Congress
"remedial powers." 355 Boerne has often been seen as part of the Rehnquist
347. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
348. Id. at 456.
349. No one dissented in Fitzpatrick. Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens each filed a
concurring opinion.
350. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring).
351. Id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
352. Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)).
353. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740
(1999) (distinguishing Reich v. Collins because in that case the state's obligation derived from
the Constitution rather than congressional action).
354. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
355. See id. at 531 (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
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Court's federalism movement, curtailing Congress's power to legislate. But in
retaining the final say over the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, the Boeme
Court explains that "[a]s enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers
substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, are self-executing. 3 56 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that
one can sue the state directly for damages; it might only mean that these rights
can be raised without statutory authorization as a defense or as a cause of action
in an officer suit for injunctive relief. But the suggestion is that these rights
must have real bite without congressional action.
As this Article acknowledged earlier, case law will not conclusively
determine the outcome of this doctrinal collision. Case law created the
collision, so to rely on it too heavily would be to beg the question. However,
case law can help illuminate the judiciary's primary concerns. Indeed, as
vigorous as the Court's defense of federalism has been over the past decade, the
focus has been mostly on limiting Congress's intrusions on the states, not on
shielding the states from its constitutional duties. The Court in recent years has
reined in Congress's power to legislate in cases involving the Commerce
357 358Clause,357  Tenth Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 359  Indeed, the Court's deep concern over congressional
overreaching has arisen in separation-of-powers cases as well.36 Collectively,
these decisions suggest that the recent Court's federalism is bothered more by
congressional aggrandizement-and more concerned with its own power vis-a-
vis the other branches-than by constitutional requirements that might attach
against the states.
"contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance").
356. Id. at 536.
357. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enact the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-68 (1995) (holding
that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enact the Gun-Free School Zones
Act).
358. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904-33 (1997) (rejecting congressional
authority to compel state law enforcement officers to enforce federal law); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (noting that congressional authority does not extend to
forcing state governments to implement federal legislation).
359. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1999) (holding that Section 5
does not empower Congress to enact RFRA).
360. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (noting that congressional
participation must end once legislation is enacted); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1982)
(explaining that further legislation is the proper means for Congress to affect the execution of
laws already in effect); see also Choper & Yoo, supra note 8, at 213 (suggesting that the Court's
real "lodestar" is separation of powers, not federalism).
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This is, of course, an oversimplification of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions. However, it is notable that the trend has been to limit
Congress, not to aggrandize the states in other ways. Indeed, though liberal
critics have been quick to disparage the contemporary Court, one could argue
that it has proven to be a willing defender of some constitutional rights. As this
Article has already noted, certainly its takings and due process cases defend an
individual against the state. In fact, the Court has recently vindicated a host of
constitutional individual rights, sometimes even at the expense of state
government. To mention just a few, it has held that the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial prohibits trial judges from imposing "exceptional" sentences
based on judicially determined facts;361 that due process requires that United
States citizens being held as enemy combatants be given meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for detention; 362 that foreign national
detainees held in the Guantanamo Bay facility may file habeas petitions in
United States courts;3 63 that the First Amendment likely protects adults' access
to some material banned by Child Online Protection Act;364 and that the Due
Process Clause prohibits states from making homosexual sodomy criminal.365
Of course, this is a very limited survey and does not help settle the doctrinal
issue here. However, if one is to search for a unifying theme to the past fifteen
years of constitutional jurisprudence, it would certainly be limitations on
Congress's power, not on individual rights. Indeed, this brief list of cases
suggests that the Court is deeply concerned with constitutionally protected
rights, arguably sometimes at the expense of workable government.366 To this
361. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding the judge's use, in
sentencing, of a fact neither admitted nor found by the jury to be a Sixth Amendment violation);
see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,288 (2005) (finding that the Sixth Amendment
was incompatible with the mandatory Federal Sentencing Act).
362. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that "due process
demands... a meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for detention").
363. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (allowing habeas corpus petitions by
Guantanamo Bay detainees).
364. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (finding COPA to be a likely
violation of the First Amendment).
365. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding consensual, adult
homosexual activity to be a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause).
366. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-08 (suggesting that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines might be unconstitutional and thereby arguably creating serious practical problems
for criminal attorneys and for courts all over the country); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 171-75 (1992) (striking down three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, which required states to provide for disposal of waste generated
within their borders, even though the Act resulted from efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-
based set of remedies for the waste problem).
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extent, the automatic abrogation thesis, though perhaps still controversial, is not
so out of line with the Court's current philosophy.
Indeed, recent sovereign immunity jurisprudence is consistent with this
view. Seminole Tribe and Alden, the two most important recent statements on
the Eleventh Amendment, focus on Congress's power to abrogate immunity.367
Keeping that in mind, it becomes apparent that congressional abrogation and
self-executing constitutional abrogation might be very different in this Court's
mind. There is a tendency to assume that if the Court has limited Congress's
power to abrogate, then the Constitution certainly would also limit any
automatic abrogation, because the latter would infringe on states' dignity more
than the former. But, given the aforementioned case law, this is not necessarily
the case.
This interpretation not only fits with recent case law's admittedly cryptic
remarks but makes sense given the Founders' initial intentions. To alleviate
fears that the federal government would swallow the smaller states, Alexander
Hamilton argued that "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act,
exclusively delegated to the United States. 3 68 Such delegations included cases
"where [the Constitution] granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and
in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority."
369
Significantly, even Justice Iredell, the lone dissenter in Chisholm and,
obviously, a supporter of state sovereign immunity, reasoned similarly, arguing
that each state is sovereign as to the powers reserved to the state but not for
those powers of which the Constitution deprives the state.37 ° Of course, the
Fourteenth Amendment would not exist for another eighty years, but
presumably the same founding principles would apply to constitutional
amendments. 37 1 Thus, once the Fourteenth Amendment limited state authority,
367. Of course, Alden in particular might have significant implications outside the
abrogation context. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing whether Alden requires state sovereign
immunity to apply symmetrically in state and federal court).
368. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 218, at 192.
369. Id.
370. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)
("Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the
United States, I consider to be as compleatly sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
powers surrendered.").
371. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 148 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Federalist No. 32 to include "subjects over which state authority is expressly
negated"). Justice Souter's interpretation, which this Article accepts here, might not fit with the
exact language of Hamilton's essay. However, it seems uncontroversial to assert that this
interpretation is implicit and applies to the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the relevant clause
grammatically separates authority "granted" to the union and authority "prohibited" in the states,
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the states' sovereignty in those areas must have disappeared. Although that
"sovereignty" would not necessarily include sovereign immunity, it would be
strange for it to not.372 In fact, because the Fourteenth Amendment contains
judicially enforceable restraints on the states independent of Congress's
Section 5 powers, it would be contradictory for sovereign immunity then to
bar suits seeking to enforce those rights against the states.
The predictable counter to all this is that we should let the political
safeguards of federalism work out these details. Because protection of the
states lies with Congress, Congress should decide if sovereign immunity is a
defense states need. Permitting abrogation is thus a way to remain respectful
of principles of federalism without insisting that the judiciary impose those
principles on the other branches.
While this theory makes sense for statutory rights, it seems less
appropriate for constitutional rights. After all, one main reason for
enshrining a right in the Constitution is to take the issue out of the political
branches' hands. Permitting the government to decide whether it wants to
subject itself to takings suits weakens the constitutional protection almost
into a statute; if a plaintiff cannot sue in the absence of a waiver or
abrogation of sovereign immunity, then the constitutional right has little bite.
Indeed, the complicated politics of these issues could result in a political
process failure that prevents or permits abrogation for the wrong reasons.
One could argue, of course, that congressional failure to abrogate
demonstrates insufficient support for abrogation, so the system works.
Political realities obstruct much legislation, yet surely such hurdles do not
justify judicial involvement. However, when the right is constitutional, we
should be more hesitant to leave the issues to the political branches. Dozens
of "veto-gates, 3 73 obstacles in the legislative process, might prevent
thus suggesting two discrete categories. Second, even if this is not the best reading of the
sentence, it would be odd to read the states' sovereignty as existing still in areas where the
Constitution expressly negates state authority. Third, one can argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment does grant power in one instance to Congress (in Section 5) and prohibits the states
from exercising similar authority (in Section 1).
372. As Professor Manning queries:
How should one understand sovereign immunity in a dual republic in which the
states seem to have ceded some measure of sovereignty to the federal government
on matters within a limited sphere of federal power and, beyond that, seem to have
agreed to certain express constitutional restrictions on their own sovereign powers?
Manning, supra note 129, at 1676; see also Amar, supra note 71, at 1426 (describing
"sovereign immunity" as an "oppressive" feature of state "sovereignty").
373. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 139 (referring to hostile or indifferent
committee leaders, filibusters, presidential vetoes and the host of other potential killers of
legislation as "veto-gates").
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legislators from enacting a desirable law or even from passing a law that
reflects the preferences of a majority. 374 Congress is also less likely to act on
a complicated issue underneath the media's radar, even if the majority of the
public and of legislators themselves might view abrogation favorably. This
baseline of inaction is, of course, typical of our legislative processes 375-
arguably one of the great strengths of our democracy-but it seems
particularly dangerous to entrust our constitutional rights to such arbitrary
political winds.
Federalism, then, has more resonance in the realm of congressional
legislation, where structural obstacles help prevent our government from
acting "tyrannically. '3 76 To the extent those same obstacles ensure state
power, they will help achieve some other goals commonly associated with
federalism: experimentation, individual choice, and democracy. 377 It is
entirely unclear how state sovereign immunity-especially as applied to
constitutional rights-might further any justifications for our federalism;
crucially, with or without immunity, the states "retain something to do.
3 7 8
State sovereign immunity not only prevents the vindication of individual
rights, but also does little actually to further principles of federalism. State
governments can in fact carry out their regulatory authority even if they are
subject to lawsuits.379 Considering that the framers of the original
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment saw our federalist system as
protecting individuals against the excesses of government, the Fourteenth
Amendment should be viewed as doing more than merely placing the
abrogation decision in Congress's hands for all constitutional rights.
374. See S. 2271, 105th Cong. (1998) (noting that Senate supporters of the property rights
bill were unable to overcome filibuster); see also Delaney et al., supra note 331, at 59
(describing how the property bill passed in the House but needed eight additional votes to defeat
an anticipated filibuster).
375. See generally JAMES MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH (1989) (arguing that Americans
are profoundly wary of government power and that our constitutional structure reflects that
wariness by making it difficult for government to act and change status quo).
376. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 294, 298
(arguing that state sovereignty exists to protect individual liberty); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV.
341, 385-99 (discussing federalism as a method of preventing tyranny).
377. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-54 (3d ed. 1996)
(presenting most of the common explanations and defenses for a federalist system).
378. Young, supra note 261, at 43.
379. See id. at 52-53 (arguing that sovereign immunity does little to advance genuine
federalism concerns).
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VI. The Historical Arguments
While it is frequently possible to garner significant historical evidence for
opposing sides of a constitutional debate, the fact remains that originalist
arguments are persuasive for the current Supreme Court. Some Justices might
take history more seriously than others, but most, or even all, of the current
Justices seem to consider history relevant to their task. This is particularly true
in sovereign immunity cases; Seminole Tribe and Alden both contained
scholarly, historically minded majority and dissenting opinions. The student of
the constitutional collision must therefore address the historical roots of the
competing doctrines.
A. Originalist Views of the Takings Clause and the Evolution of
"Just Compensation"
At common law, property rights were seen as absolute.38 0 According to
Blackstone, when the government took private property it was "considered as
an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. 3 81 Though the
sovereign's authority was usually unquestioned and unquestionable, when
Parliament took private property, it did so "not by absolutely stripping the
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. 3 82 To take
property, the sovereign would thus have to enter the marketplace as an ordinary
participant and pay the fair market value for the land in question.383 However,
though English common law certainly formed an important backdrop to the
nation's founding, theories of eminent domain were far from the framers' chief
concerns.
384
Evidence of the origins of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is scanty.
The idea seems to have been Madison's, and it encountered little opposition,
either in the Constitutional Convention or in the states. 385 Given that the
Clause was unremarkable and uncontroversial, it is probably safe to assume, as
do Professors Dana and Merrill, that the Constitution merely codified existing
380. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *134.
381. Id. at 135; see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 24, at 24 (describing Blackstone's
view of property rights).
382. BLACKSTONE, supra note 380, at *135.
383. DANA & MERRELL, supra note 24, at 24.
384. See id. at 25 (discussing the drafting of the Takings Clause).
385. Id. at 13-14.
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practices of providing just compensation when government appropriated land
for public use.386 This practice was to provide compensation when the
government forced a private property owner to surrender title to it.387 Of
course, the eighteenth century framer would have been concerned mostly with
physical takings, 388 but this establishes that regulatory takings were less likely
to have been on his radar screen, not that he would have been categorically
opposed to the extension of a takings clause to such cases in a future
regulation-heavy era. Indeed, the fact that many nineteenth century state
constitutional takings clauses included provisions requiring just compensation
when property was "taken or damaged 3 89 suggests that regulatory-type takings
were on people's minds by the time the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was
incorporated. Interestingly, even in Blackstone's era, road commissioners were
liable in tort and, according to Blackstone, subject to punitive damages for road
repairs that obstructed light or passage to nearby houses. 390 The notion of
compensating indirect damage to property owners, then, was not wholly foreign
to Anglo-American jurisprudence in the era of the founding.
From its conception, the Takings Clause was unique in its specific
provision of a monetary remedy. Such a view is consistent with historical
theories that the Constitution was written with an eye towards protecting the
386. Id. at 15-16; see also Farber, supra note 156, at 281 (noting that a takings clause was
included in Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to protect nonresident investors and alleviate fears
that state legislators would seize lands owned by outsiders); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
782, 785 n. 12 & n. 13 (1995) (citing Massachusetts Body of Liberties and 1669 Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina).
387. DANA & MERRIuL supra note 24, at 16. As one scholar notes:
When substantial parcels of land were taken for public facilities--courthouses,
prisons, churches, fortifications-statutes normally specified that the landowner
would receive compensation equivalent in value to the land taken. Compensation
was also generally provided when government took temporary possession of private
property, as in the compulsory lodging of troops.
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1283 (1996). Interestingly, Professor Hart's findings suggest that the
government provided just compensation not only for permanent takings, but for temporary
takings as well. First English, then, seems consistent with original practices and understanding.
388. See Treanor, supra note 386, at 798-801 (arguing that the originalist understanding of
the Takings Clause was that compensation was only mandated when the government physically
took property).
389. See Brauneis, supra note 8, at 64 (describing the addition of "taking or damages"
provisions in the nineteenth century).
390. See Leader v. Moxton, (1773)95 Eng. Rep. 1157, 1160 (K.B.) (Blackstone, J.) (ruling
that the road commissioners had acted "arbitrarily and tyrannically" and awarding damages); see
also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 86 (discussing Leader v. Moxton).
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wealth and property rights of the colonies' elite aristocrats. 391 Of course, this
broader Marxist reading of the constitutional convention need not dictate the
content of the Takings Clause, but it would help affirm that the Clause
provided a monetary remedy to property owners whose land was taken by the
government. Indeed, this understanding was apparently also dominant a
century later when judges understood that "[t]he fact that the just compensation
clause itself referred to payment for the appropriation of property made the
clause a special case even within the tradition of recognizing implied damages
action." 392 This reading would suggest that the Clause could trump sovereign
immunity (though admittedly not state sovereign immunity, because the
Takings Clause did not yet apply to the states) and that the Tucker Act's waiver
of immunity is redundant for takings actions. Given the eighteenth century
principle that "the burdens of the State should be borne equally by all, or in just
proportion' 393 and that Blackstone viewed property as an "absolute right, 394 it
seems that takings cases constituted that rare exception where the
government--or, in England, the king-could be sued. In fact, because just
compensation clauses and statutes, by definition, address only instances when
the sovereign effects a taking, to then require a plaintiff to surmount an
independent sovereign immunity hurdle would be paradoxical.
This argument, originally applicable only to federal takings, should also
extend to the states after 1868 395 To be sure, federal courts under the 1875
general federal question jurisdiction statute would not have considered a claim
that property had been taken as an issue of federal law. Rather, federal courts
entertained such suits only in diversity, where in that era they would be
circumscribed by the remedies available under state law.396 As Professor
391. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTrrUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES (1913) (reviewing the Founders' economic interests and
concluding, in part, that the Constitution was drafted with an eye towards protecting private
wealth). Interestingly, the American emphasis on constitutional property rights is not unique; in
European constitutions, for instance, property is the most widely recognized right, appearing in
every European constitution. Terence Daintith, The Constitutional Protection of Economic
Rights, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 56, 75 (2004).
392. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 113.
393. 3 E. DE VATirEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 96
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758), quoted in DANA & MERRILL,
supra note 24, at 22.
394. BLACKSTONE, supra note 380, at *134.
395. Whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to incorporate the Bill of
Rights is a matter of historical debate, but it is doctrinally clear today that many such rights,
including takings, do apply against the states.
396. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 151-52 (1997); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
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Woolhandler puts it, "a federal due process claim was not ordinarily presented
when the allegation was that the state had collected taxes (or taken property) in
violation of its own law. ' 3 97  But because the Takings Clause was not
incorporated against the states until 1897,398 it makes sense that federal courts
would have thought of takings claims against a state or state official as a state
law action prior to that date. The doctrine's limitations prior to incorporation
then should have little import on the application of the Clause today against the
states.
Another more serious counter is that takings clauses in the nineteenth
century did not promise damages to successful plaintiffs but rather invalidated
legislation effecting unlawful takings. According to Professor Brauneis, most
antebellum state courts did not initially award just compensation under their
state constitutions when determining whether an act amounted to a taking.39
Rather, they "asked whether the act purportedly authorized by the legislation
amounted to a taking, and if so, whether the legislation itself provided for just
compensation. ' 4  If not, the legislation was void: The legislature had
exceeded its competence, which the Constitution limited to the authorization of
"takings-with-just-compensation.'4°1 However, as Brauneis explains, as a
practical matter, the difference between antebellum interpretations of the
Takings Clause and contemporary ones is not quite so stark. Though just
compensation provisions were originally intended to limit legislative
competence, they nevertheless operated within a complicated common law
context that included damage remedies. A just compensation provision's
limitation on legislative competence, then, also limited the legislature's ability
to abolish damage remedies. A legislature could only bar damages if it offered
an alternative, constitutionally adequate remedy; monetary compensation was
thus always part of the takings equation.4°2
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954) (discussing the
intersection of federal and state law).
397. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 157.
398. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39
(1897) (discussing the incorporation of the Takings Clause).
399. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 60. To the extent that Brauneis's argument informs our
understanding of takings jurisprudence, it is important to remember that his focus is primarily
on takings clauses in state constitutions, which were amended frequently and, of course, are not
legally binding on federal courts construing the federal Constitution. Nevertheless, these
clauses were similar enough in language and purpose to the federal Takings Clause that his
analysis remains instructive for our purposes.
400. Id. at 60.
401. Id. at 60-61.
402. Id. at 61-62.
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In fact, not only were damages possible, but state courts sometimes held
individual officers in just compensation suits liable in money damages,
notwithstanding potential immunity bars.4°3 The special nature of just
compensation clauses is then highlighted by the fact that official immunity did
not always extend to actions for violations of property rights, either because
courts chose to make an explicit exception or because they refused to raise
immunity issues in opinions considering such actions.4°4 And though plaintiffs
formulated these suits against the offending officers, as opposed to directly
against the states, the fact that courts carved an exception for official
immunities at least suggests the possibility that the states' sovereign immunity
could also be pierced by just compensation clauses. 405 This possibility was not
always realized at once; some courts adopting a constitutional tort model of
takings actions did not immediately entertain suits that previously would have
been obstructed by sovereign immunity.4°6 But by the 1920s and 1930s, many
states did take that next step, finding that just compensation provisions in fact
abrogated state sovereign immunity.407 And today, many state courts, as noted
403. See McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336, 350 (1868) (Dillon, J., concurring) (finding that
the plaintiff must be given a remedy despite the highway supervisor's lack of malice); Cubit v.
O'Dett, 51 Mich. 347, 351 (1883) (holding the overseer of highways and his assistant liable for
the flooding of a landowner's property); see also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 82-83 (noting that
general doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity suggested property owner could recover from public
officer for injury to his property and that, after the Civil War, courts specifically held that those
officials could not use sovereign immunity to shield themselves from just compensation
litigation).
404. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 136.
405. Of course, the parallel is inexact. Unlike state sovereign immunity, which is rooted (at
least somewhat) in the Constitution, official immunities are determined with reference to the
"immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 421 (1976). Courts thus frequently look at the common law of immunities as it
existed when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was adopted to determine issues of official immunity.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 309, at 495. Accordingly, courts' willingness to narrow official
immunity does not necessarily bear on the scope of the Constitution's protection of state
sovereign immunity. But the willingness to narrow official immunity is not wholly irrelevant
either, for it demonstrates courts' willingness to seek appropriate remedies, notwithstanding
doctrinal limitations. Moreover, to the extent that state sovereign immunity is itself deeply
rooted in our common law heritage, see supra Part V.B. 1 (discussing case law on constitutional
remedies, the historical backdrop of the Eleventh Amendment, and the common law roots of
sovereign immunity), and infra Part VI.B (discussing Supreme Court's conflicting accounts of
the original understanding of state sovereign immunity), the judiciary's treatment of common
law official immunities is indicative of the inherent flexibility of these common law hurdles.
406. Brauneis, supra note 8, at 136.
407. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 194 P. 621,622 (Colo. 1920) (finding that the
state's just compensation clause was "a consent by the state to the bringing of suits against a
county"); see also Brauneis, supra note 8, at 138-40 (describing the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity).
574
COLLISION OF TAKINGS & STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 575
above, view just compensation clauses as either abrogating state sovereign
immunity or consenting to suit.
408
Supreme Court precedent hints at the same evolution but is less overt
about it. Some cases, such as Schillinger v. United States4°9 and Lynch v.
United States,41 ° suggest that the United States was immune from just
compensation suits except to the extent the Tucker Act waived that
immunity.41' Given that the Court often treated the United States's sovereign
immunity as symmetrical to the states' sovereign immunity,412 these cases
would suggest that the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause does not
automatically abrogate any immunity, whether federal or state. But precisely
because of the Tucker Act, this issue rarely arose in the federal context.
Schillinger was decided before the Court had determined that the Takings
Clause itself created a cause of action, so it would be dangerous to assume that
its treatment of sovereign immunity still applies.1 3 And although a cause of
action is certainly analytically distinct from sovereign immunity, the application
of sovereign immunity to a constitutional claim in an era when the Constitution
did not give rise to such a claim carries less weight in an era when the
Constitution does give rise to such a claim.
408. See supra notes 318 & 320 and accompanying text (discussing state consent to suit).
409. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
410. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
411. See id. at 581-82 (stating that "[tihe sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever
the character of the proceedings" and that "Itihe character of the cause of action... may be
important in determining (as under the Tucker Act) whether consent to sue was given");
Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 169-72 (finding that a just compensation claim was one "sounding in
tort" and that, as Congress had not consented to such suits in the Court of Claims, the court had
no jurisdiction to hear the case).
412. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,686 n.21 (1982)
(noting cases treating state sovereign immunity similarly to federal sovereign immunity); Great
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) ("The principle of immunity from litigation
assures the states and the nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of
government."); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) (noting that because
state officers can be sued for injunctive relief so too can federal officers); Tindal v. Wesley, 167
U.S. 204, 213 (1897) (stating that, in the sovereign immunity context, "the question whether a
particular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the Constitution, must depend
upon the same principles that determine whether a particular suit is one against the United
States"); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be
accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States can be
sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent."); see also Seamon, supra
note 8, at 1090-91 n. 115 (discussing symmetry and relevant cases).
413. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1092 (noting that "the predicate for the Court's
sovereign-immunity ruling in Schillinger is no longer valid").
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Even the Court's 1962 decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,4 14 which
affirmed the validity of sovereign immunity, does not speak to the contrary.
415
In sustaining the Article I status of Courts of Claims, Glidden echoed past
decisions finding that the United States could not be sued without its
consent.416  But by 1962, the federal government had long ago waived
immunity in most contract claims and common legal claims in the 1887 Tucker
Act.417 Contrary to Justice Scalia's view, the Tucker Act then can be read not
as evidence that Congress is required to abrogate sovereign immunity for
constitutional claims like takings,418 but rather as the reason why the Supreme
Court never overruled sovereign immunity doctrine. If the Tucker Act and
similar legislation waived most federal sovereign immunity-and if individuals
prior to Alden could circumvent state immunity by suing states in state court-
then the Supreme Court would have had little opportunity and no reason to
disrupt sovereign immunity principles, even if such principles were incorrect.
It is also possible that courts declined to address the issue because they agreed
with scholarship of the era arguing that sovereign immunity was obsolete.419
As Professor Shimomura argues, "Thus, the sovereign immunity doctrine
remained the federal rule in theory largely because immunity had become the
decided exception in practice., 420 Indeed, a similar point can be made about
whether the Takings Clause trumps the Eleventh Amendment: Because the
officer suit provided the most consistently reliable remedy, plaintiffs would
have been foolish to bring direct just compensation claims against the state.42'
414. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality opinion).
415. Id. at 584-85.
416. See id. 564-65 (invoking past decisions to conclude that the United States could not
be sued without its consent).
417. Id. at 565.
418. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "no
one would suggest that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, the courts would be able to
order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for property taken under lawful authority (and
subsequently destroyed) without just compensation"). But see United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) (suggesting that the sovereign must waive immunity before plaintiff
can seek compensation mandated by Constitution).
419. See Brauneis, supra note 8, at 139 & n.348 (citing, for instance, articles by Edwin
Borchard).
420. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 691. The Court itself has hinted that the Tucker Act
might not be necessary to abrogate federal sovereign immunity against takings claims, stating
that the Just Compensation Clause is "self-executing ... with respect to compensation." United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,257 (1980) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 6 P. NicHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d. rev. ed. 1972)).
421. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1083 (noting that "the Court never had a case that
required it squarely to decide whether the Just Compensation Clause overrode the state's
sovereign immunity").
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The fact that the ostensible immunity bar persisted after the Takings Clause was
applied to the states, then, does not suggest that the Court would have been
unwilling to find sovereign immunity automatically abrogated but rather that
litigants naturally were content to proceed under the existing framework, which
often provided adequate remedy.
422
More important, to the extent that we must take seriously doctrinal
complications, the evolution of takings clauses indicates that our constitutional
history has been in constant flux. Though we must recognize that just
compensation clauses did not always give rise to damages actions by their own
force (even if they did sometimes require such a remedy be made available in
the common law), that nineteenth century understanding need not bind us
today. If anything, courts' eventual decisions to view takings clauses as giving
rise to a cause of action for damages and, later, as waiving or abrogating state
sovereign immunity demonstrates that judges needed this added flexibility to
protect such clauses' core principles. From this perspective, the Bivens-type
action arising out of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is not so much an
abandonment of our constitutional heritage but an attempt to vindicate the
Constitution's original purpose.423 And although this approach might seem to
ring with the shrill call of judicial activism, the clause's evolution suggests that
it is in fact what courts have been doing for over a century-and-a-half.
B. Original Understandings of State Sovereign Immunity
The original understanding of state sovereign immunity is decidedly more
controversial than that of takings. A majority of the Rehnquist Supreme Court
believed that sovereign immunity was hard-wired into the original Constitution,
but, as Justice Souter's dissents demonstrate, it is debatable whether this is the
case and, even if it is, what that sovereign immunity included. Indeed,
notwithstanding the Court's recent case law, there is strong evidence to suggest
that state sovereign immunity, if it existed at all, applied only to diversity cases
in which a citizen of one state sued the government of another state. The stakes
422. Prior to First English, the availability of the temporary regulatory taking suit would
have been open to doubt, so there would have been far fewer instances when plaintiffs sought
damages in takings cases. And as the Court in First English obviously did not feel constrained
by the absence of temporary takings in the past, one might expect similar agnosticism on the
question of direct just compensation suits against the states.
423. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)
(arguing that readings of the Constitution, whether changed or consistent, standing alone are not
sufficient to establish fidelity or infidelity, rather the practice of interpretation, the translation of
the Constitution, permits fidelity when context changes constitutional meaning).
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in this debate are high. In arguing that "sovereign immunity derives not from
the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution
itself, 424 the Court is using historical arguments to extend state sovereign
immunity beyond the limited text of the Eleventh Amendment. However, as
Justice Souter counters, Justice Kennedy's arguments might well rest on faulty
425assumptions.
The Court's originalism argument contains two parts, what might be called
a common law and a natural law argument.426 The first contention is that
sovereign immunity was an integral part of the English common law inherited
by the Constitution and that the founding generation intended to preserve that
immunity. 427  The Court argues that the Founders' silence on the issue
"suggests the sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts
was a principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by
the new Constitution. ,428
The Court's common law argument is misleading in two fundamental
ways. First, it fails to acknowledge the extent to which sovereign immunity
was a controversial topic even in the 1780s. The Court might be right that a
majority of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers believed that such immunity
was, and should be, included in the new governmental structure, but it seems
undoubtedly wrong that the principle was uncontroversial, at least as applied to
federal question cases. The states themselves, at the time of the Constitutional
Convention, had different sovereign immunity practices, but none included that
immunity in their constitutional declarations of the inalienable and natural
rights of statehood.429 Indeed, to the extent that sovereign immunity was an
issue, some of the Founders seemed to assume it would apply only in diversity
cases. In the Pennsylvania ratification debate, for instance, James Wilson
424. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
425. Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's positions concerning the
Tenth Amendment, historical inherent sovereign immunity, and American federalism prompt a
suspicion of error).
426. See id. at 765-66 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining how common law conception
of sovereign immunity differed from natural law conception); Young, supra note 129, at 1667-
70 (separating out common law and natural law arguments and arguing that majority jumbles
the two together).
427. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (noting that the Constitution's silence on the issue
evidences that no one, even those opposed to the Constitution, considered that the document
would abolish such immunity); see also Hill, supra note 314, at 497 (arguing that when
Constitution was adopted, "it was generally assumed that the states were protected by sovereign
immunity if sued in their own courts" and that some Founders expected this immunity would
extend to federal court).
428. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
429. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the Pennsylvania Constitution).
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stated that federal judges could force states to pay back debt owed to English
merchants, thus implying that the states' immunity would apply in only some
cases.
430
The common law argument is also misleading because the supposedly
sovereign states had in fact possessed their sovereignty for a very short time.
As Justice Souter points out in his Alden dissent, "the American Colonies did
not enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege understood in English law
to be reserved for the Crown alone., 431 Thus, as Justice Story has argued,
"antecedent to the Declaration of Independence, none of the colonies were, or
pretended to be, sovereign states. , 432 Given that American states gained their
sovereignty so shortly before the ratification of the Constitution, the majority's
argument that the states' sovereignty was a "well-established" principle seems
to assume that American law would blindly incorporate English law without
adapting it to the new circumstances.433
This was not the case. The framers, in fact, were generally averse to the
federal reception of common law and drew from a variety of "reception"
doctrines to determine exactly how the English common law should and should
not be included in American law.434 The majority's finding of common law
sovereign immunity principles, then, should only be the first step of the
analysis. Even if the Court is right that those principles extended to federal
question suits-itself a controversial proposition-it has been sloppy in not
examining more closely just how the framers in the 1780s thought about
receiving English common law. Evidence suggests, in fact, that the framers
rejected the idea of incorporating the common law into the Constitution
because that incorporation would render it immune from legislative
alteration. 435  Moreover, anti-English hostility was such that many states
adopted only so much common law as they thought necessary for their local
430. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 105 n.4 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting 2 J. ELuOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTrrTmON 490 (2d ed. 1836)); see also
Jackson, supra note 8, at 55 (demonstrating that debates about sovereign immunity at time of
founding revolved around diversity cases, not federal question cases).
431. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
432. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 207, at 149 (5th ed. 1891),
quoted in Alden, 527 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
433. See Young, supra note 129, at 1666 n.298 (arguing that the "short-lived nature of
preconstitutional state sovereignty in America suggests caution in importing English sovereignty
concepts to the American Constitution, as the ways in which those concepts would have to be
adapted to the new American context had not had much time to settle out by 1789").
434. See id. at 1647 n.235 (noting the "reception" doctrines which questioned "how to treat
common law doctrines imported from the mother country").
435. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 104-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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conditions.436 As for the federal Constitution, it explicitly referenced a few
concepts from English common law, such as habeas and the distinction
between law and equity, thus reflecting, in Justice Souter's words, "widespread
agreement that ratification would not itself entail a general reception of the
common law of England. '437 Keeping this in mind, it would seem that the
current Court has assumed a more whole-hearted embrace of the common law
principle than in fact occurred. To the extent that the states did believe in
sovereign immunity, it appears not to have been the "indefeasible" sort
embraced by the Court today.438 And, even if the Court accurately
characterized 1780s common law, Congress should be able to amend it by
statute, unlike the common law that was explicitly included in the Constitution,
such as the right to a jury trial.
Interestingly, even in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the English justifications for sovereign immunity did not
translate well into the American context. The Court in United States v. Lee
noted that the king of England was not suable "in the courts of that country,
except where his consent had been given," but continued that "it is a matter of
great uncertainty whether prior to that time he was not suable in his own courts
and in his kingly character as other persons were. "439 The Court went on to
explain that the petition of right was established "as the appropriate manner of
seeking relief where the ascertainment of the parties' rights required a suit
against the King" and "has been as efficient in securing the rights of suitors
against the crown in all cases appropriate to judicial proceedings, as that which
the law affords to the subjects of the King in legal controversies among
themselves. '"440 Though the petition of right might be construed as the
monarch's consent to suit, Lee recognizes that even in the English judicial
system, "the rights of suitors against the crown" were secured.441
436. Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Letter from John Marshall to St. George
Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1326 app. A (1985) ("I do not believe one man can be found" who
maintains "that the common law of England has... been adopted as the common law of
America by the Constitution of the United States."), quoted in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 138 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
438. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,770 n.9 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that
the spectrum of state thought and practice allows for sovereign immunity but not to the extent
adopted by the Court).
439. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882).
440. Id.
441. Id.
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The other primary originalist argument in defense of sovereign immunity
more resembles natural law. Under this reading, law exists by the
sovereign's good graces, so it is paradoxical to let mere subjects use that law
as a sword against the sovereign without its consent. However, as Justice
Souter points out, that theory of sovereign immunity can only be asserted in
cases where it was the sovereign's own law that was sued upon." 2 In
Professor Young's words, "there is no warrant in a system of dual
sovereignty for state sovereign immunity vis-A-vis a claim based on federal
law. "443
Souter's argument is a clever one-and it might well be right-but one
important potential rejoinder is that the states ratified the Constitution, so
federal law comes from the states in a sense. Federal law, then, is not wholly
outside the states' purview, because it needed the states to approve it before
that law took effect. This counter is not insignificant, but it ignores the very
nature of our federal system. In ratifying the Constitution-and especially in
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment -the states accepted a federal system
in which their sovereignty was no longer absolute.
A final hole in the Court's originalist argument lies in Chisholm v.
Georgia4 5 and the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment. To be sure,
opponents of sovereign immunity today cannot rely much on Chisholm
because it was rejected so quickly by constitutional amendment. But what is
crucial-and what is extraordinary for the Court to ignore-is that the
Eleventh Amendment reaction against Chisholm expressly limited state
sovereign immunity to suits "against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State." 44 6 Far from supporting the Court's common law argument,
the Eleventh Amendment's language instead strongly suggests the country
decided to constitutionalize only a limited form of sovereign immunity.
While legal language does not always mean what it says, it creates a
presumption of meaning. The Court's originalist arguments do not overcome
that presumption and thus rest on shaky footing for federal question cases
and, even more so, takings cases.
442. Alden, 527 U.S. at 763-67 (Souter, J., dissenting).
443. Young, supra note 129, at 1671.
444. See supra Part V.C (discussing a theory of automatic abrogation based on the
Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Takings Clause).
445. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
446. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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C. The Evolution of Actions Against the Government and the Rise
of the Judiciary
Because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Takings Clause, we
must also consider the background understanding of constitutional remedies at
the time of its ratification. I have already argued that the Constitution's
structure following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment supports my
theory of automatic abrogation. That structural argument should, however, also
be viewed in light of the history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment.
The ratification debates lend little insight into the framers' views on
constitutional remedies." 7 Not surprisingly, the technicalities of constitutional
litigation were far from the center of the Reconstruction Congress's debates,
which dwelt more on issues such as pardons,448 the franchise, 449 taxing,45 ° and
frustration with President Johnson. 45 ' And although the structure of the
Fourteenth Amendment was certainly central to these debates, the framers'
focus was racial equality under the law in the wake of the abolition,45 2 not the
particulars of incorporation. Indeed, though today accepted as a constitutional
given, it is still a matter of debate whether incorporation was intended by the
1866 Congress.45 3
Given that there is no smoking gun in the legislative history, 54 we must
try to deduce the framers' probable understanding. This understanding was
likely based on some dominant features of mid-nineteenth century practices:
447. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2433-2545 (1866) (House
debates); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763-3042 (1866) (Senate debates); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3144-49 (1866) (House debates) [hereinafter CoNG. GLOBE];
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1955) (examining the legislative history of Fourteenth Amendment in light of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
448. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2462-64 (House debates).
449. See, e.g., id. at 2466-70 (House debates).
450. See, e.g., id. at 2474-78 (House debates).
451. See, e.g., id. at 2493 (Senate debates).
452. See, e.g., id. at 3037 (Senate debates).
453. See NATHAN NEWMAN & J.J. GASS, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFrEENTH AMENDMENTS 10-12 (2004)
(arguing that constitutional law treatises of the era read the amendment as not only applying but
also enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states).
454. See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1458 (1975) ("There is no discussion in the debates of the ability of
federal courts to entertain damage actions against state governments under the fourteenth
amendment without congressional authorization.").
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(1) officer suits based on claims of private right were the predominant form of
relief against unconstitutional action; (2) the Constitution's principal effect was
to nullify statutes, so that it was raised defensively as a shield, not offensively
as a sword; and, accordingly, (3) most constitutional litigation involved the
validity of statutes rather than the legitimacy of nonlegislative governmental
actions.455 Just as the Takings Clause, in particular, was seen as creating a
legislative disability rather than a remedial duty, so too were courts reluctant to
view constitutional rights as bestowing upon the litigant a broad range of
potential remedies.
The remedies available in most suits were therefore limited by preexisting
forms of action at common law. The Supreme Court tended to feel bound by
those common law limitations and therefore respected the state law out of
which its cases emerged. Thus, where states provided no remedy against
themselves, the Court typically did not compel an unwilling state court to
provide remedies.456  Indeed, the officer suit was limited to actions for
injunctive relief and damages out of the officer's own pocket; it was not a
means of accessing the state treasury.457 In short, the Court would not permit
the officer suit to "oust" the political power of its "jurisdiction" and set the
judiciary "in its place.
4 58
With this backdrop, the drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment (or the
informed member of the ratifying public) might well have found excessive any
implied damages constitutional remedy, even in the Takings Clause.
Constitutional rights might have been thought of as "self-executing," in the
sense that they could be raised defensively against the state-for example, in a
criminal prosecution or in an officer suit-but that did not mean that they
455. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2551; see also Pfander, supra note 219, at 966 (noting
that Marshall Court, faced with limited jurisdiction over claims against government, relied
extensively upon officer suits to secure government accountability).
456. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 151-52; see also Henry M. Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954) ("The general rule,
bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that
federal law takes the state court as it finds them."). As a result, state assertions of sovereign
immunity in state court were historically respected. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 152.
Interestingly, this history, though inconsistent with the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
supports the Supreme Court's decision in Alden.
457. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating that "a suit by private
parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment"); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883)
(holding that the Supreme Court is not "authorizing the courts, when a State cannot be sued, to
set up its jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the public moneys, so as to control them as
against the political power in their administration of the finances of the State").
458. Jumel, 107 U.S. at 727-28.
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automatically abrogated any sovereign immunity or created a monetary remedy.
Additional remedies, such as damages, would not have been forever barred but
would have required additional legislation by Congress under Section 5.459
A competing view contends that the debates make clear that both the
drafters and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment assumed that federal
courts would have an inherent power to enjoin state activities failing to conform
to the amendment. 46° Of course, if this is the case, it would still not necessarily
speak directly to sovereign immunity issues because injunctive relief is
available anyway.461 However, the ratification debates certainly do not
foreclose the federal courts' power to hear damage actions against the states;
462
to the contrary, they suggest a general willingness to allow federal courts to
force compliance with the Constitution and, similarly, to ignore the Eleventh
Amendment. Specifically, it was understood that Section 1 of the amendment
empowered courts to enforce Article IV's Comity Clause against the states,
notwithstanding any potential Eleventh Amendment barriers.4 3 Moreover, the
Amendment's supporters several times decried federal courts' prior inability to
protect individual rights against state incursions; 464 only a self-executing
Fourteenth Amendment that authorized damages actions could fully resolve
that concern. Indeed, even the Fourteenth Amendment's opponents understood
that if it were ratified it would subject state action to federal court review.465
As Professor Meltzer argues, we must remember that the framers of the
original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment were
practical men seeking to create a workable government and to protect
459. Of course, because these legal technicalities were far from the forefront of the framers'
mind, these assumptions carry less weight than they might were they articulated clearly during
the congressional debates.
460. Nowak, supra note 454, at 1455.
461. Though Exparte Young was not decided until 1908, the officer suit was the dominant
mode of adjudicating takings claims in the mid-nineteenth century. See generally Brauneis,
supra note 8 (discussing the extension of the scope of just compensation protection). The
officer suit, as an end run around sovereign immunity, was then nothing novel. Exparte Young
was novel in the sense that it permitted the officer suit for a violation of federal, rather than
state, law and for a constitutional, rather than a common law, violation. Meltzer, supra note
168, at 2556. Given the deep roots of the officer suit, however, it is best seen as adapting the
available remedies and cementing them in Supreme Court precedent.
462. Nowak, supra note 454, at 1458.
463. Id. at 1456 n.208.
464. Id. at 1455.
465. Id. at 1457; see also CONG. GLOBE, supra note 447, at 1064-65 (discussing the
powers Congress and the Federal Courts may arrogate to themselves if the Fourteenth
Amendment is ratified).
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individual liberties.466 Given that the Constitution lays out a basic structure but
leaves the particulars to be realized through experience,46 7 it is not surprising
that the methods of constitutional enforcement were left unspecified in both
1791 and 1866.468 So, though the officer suit began as the predominant mode
of constitutional enforcement, when this and other traditional remedies began to
fall short, "federal courts strained, even in the years shortly after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to reformulate them to ensure that relief was not
denied, even when doing so departed from pre-existing state or general law
rules."'469 In Belknap v. Schild,470 for instance, the Court found that, though
injunctive relief was inappropriate in a patent infringement suit, damages were
still potentially available on remand. The Court found that "no ground for
equitable relief, by injunction, by account of profits, or otherwise, [had been]
shown, [so] the proper remedy of the plaintiff against the defendants for such
damages is by action at law."
471
Indeed, consistent with this surprisingly flexible approach to remedies, the
early Court was quite candid about the significance of the officer suit fiction;
Chief Justice Marshall admitted in Osborn v. United States Bank472 that the
officer action runs "substantially, though not in form, against the State."
473
Accordingly, the Court was willing to vindicate individual rights, even if doing
so interfered with the workings of government. In the Virginia Coupon
Cases,474 the Court reinstated the state legislature's repeal of mandamus and
trespass actions against revenue officers after the legislature had effectively
abrogated the mandamus remedy so that plaintiffs would only be entitled to the
remedy of a refund.475 Specifically, the Court held in Poindexter v.
466. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2555.
467. E.g., FEDERALIST No. 37 (Madison), supra note 218, at 220-27.
468. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2555.
469. Id.; see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 91-111 (discussing ways in which
federal courts, in diversity actions raising constitutional claims, departed from state law so as to
permit effective remediation).
470. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
471. Id. at 26. But see id. at 18 (stating that "no injunction can be issued against officers of
a State, to restrain or control the use of property already in the possession of the State, or money
in its treasury when the suit is commenced").
472. Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
473. Id. at 846.
474. The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884).
475. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 306 (1884) (holding that the federal
legislation "in all its parts, as to creditors affected by it and not consenting to it, must be
pronounced null and void"); see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 120, 125 (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision to direct "the state court to make available to the taxpayer the trespass
remedy against the officer").
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476Greenhow that the state could not repeal the previously available tort action
against the officer.477 As Professor Woolhandler argues, the Court thus
suggested that a common law remedy for trespass was constitutionally
compelled. 478 In this light, the Court's tax refund cases, beginning with Ward
v. Love County479 in 1920, might be understood as other examples of the Court
reaching beyond traditionally available constitutional remedies to ensure that
relief against an encroaching government would not be denied. So too might
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. O'Connor,4 s° in which the Court held
that a tax payment had been under duress and that a refund action was therefore
available. 481 These departures still issued a remedy against the officer, as
opposed to the government itself, but they suggest a greater judicial flexibility
than one might initially assume.
United States v. Lee articulates even more forcefully the notion that legal
technicalities like sovereign immunity must not interfere with the protection of
rights.482 There the Court argued, in a takings case, that judicial tribunals were
the sole protectors for the safety of citizens whose rights had been invaded by
the government. 483 This was especially so in the property context:
When [the citizen], in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has
established his right to property, there is no reason why deference to any
person, natural or artificial, not even the United States, should prevent him
from using the means which the law gives him for the protection and
enforcement of that right.4 4
And in General Oil Co. v. Crain,485 the Court suggested that if the Eleventh
Amendment barred a suit in federal court, then relief must be available through
the state courts because a contrary rule would impermissibly close both federal
476. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
477. Id. at 302-03.
478. Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 121. For a very interesting discussion of the
remedies available in state and federal courts for both diversity and federal question cases, see
generally id.
479. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); see also supra Part IlI.A.2 (discussing due
process tax refund cases).
480. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
481. Id. at 286-87; see also Woolhandler, supra note 396, at 133-38 (discussing remedies
made available in various tax cases).
482. See supra text accompanying notes 185, 200, 232-50, 439-40 (discussing the
implications of United States v. Lee).
483. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-20 (1882); see also supra text accompanying
notes 232-238 (discussing the sovereign immunity argument asserted in United States v. Lee).
484. Lee, 106 U.S. at 208-09.
485. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
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and state courts to a constitutional claim.486 More recently, it has asserted that
"it is... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
487
As this brief discussion illustrates, even though the historical practice of
limited constitutional remedies is real, so too is there history, even in the
nineteenth century, of a strong, if not unyielding, presumption that there should
be individually effective remedies for constitutional violations.488 Moreover,
there has been "a more general, but also more unyielding, structural principle
that constitutional remedies must be adequate to keep government generally
within the bounds of law., 489 Of course, these presumptions can give way to
practical imperatives, but the historical picture is incomplete without
recognizing courts' general goals of protecting individual rights and limiting
governmental overreaching. In this way, a Court that has approached immunity
issues primarily with a formalist eye490 has sometimes permitted the twin
pragmatic necessities-protecting individual rights and guarding against
governmental overreaching-to override rigid doctrinal thinking.
One must concede that the Court's willingness to craft new remedies had
its limits and that, in many (though not all) instances, the officer suit was itself
the newly created remedy. To this extent, it more frequently represented the
ceiling rather than the floor of permissible remedies. However, even if the
486. See id. at 226 (discussing the possibility that no court would be available to hear suits
against state officers). The Crain Court noted that:
If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the 11 th
Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it
is contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court,
it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many
provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at
state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation.
Id. Curiously, Alden invokes Crain for the proposition that where Ex parte Young allows a
federal court action against a state official to enjoin a constitutional violation, a state court must
permit the same remedy. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747-48 (1999) ("[S]overeign
immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and...
certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted
if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land."); see also supra Part V.B.2
(discussing whether state sovereign immunity applies symmetrically in state and federal court).
487. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Officers, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (quoting Bell).
488. Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2559.
489. Id.
490. See Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of
the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1479 (2003) (describing Eleventh
Amendment case law as highly formalist).
63 WASH. & LEE L REV. 493 (2006)
more persuasive historical argument is that officer suits were the predominant
(and, arguably, lone) form of relief against unconstitutional action in the mid-
nineteenth century,491 the dominance of that practice should be less persuasive
to a constitutional adjudicator today given the historical context. Significantly,
our system of claims against the government shifted from a legislative to a
judicial model in the eighty years following the Civil War. That shift radically
altered the means by which individuals sought redress from a government that
had violated their rights, and the tradition of the officer suit cannot be properly
assimilated into our current constitutional understanding without accounting for
the nature of that shift.
Though the judiciary was not wholly absent from the Founders' minds and
though some of our early writings recognized that the judiciary would play a
crucial role in protecting people from government's excesses,492 the "legislative
model" of claims determination was the dominant one at the founding.493
Courts in fact recognized that claims against the government were the province
of the legislature, not the judiciary. We are used to thinking of the Judiciary
Act as Congress's first major action in determining how the young country
would settle claims, but even earlier, the First Congress, in 1789, invested the
Treasury Department with the authority to review claims against the
government. 494 Interestingly, even at the time, there were murmurs that this
function perhaps belonged best in the judiciary; James Madison himself
thought this function "part[ook] of a Judiciary quality, '495 and sought to permit
a right to review in the Supreme Court to insure impartiality. 496 Congress
rejected the idea, "preferring to maintain control over claims without judicial
interference. '497  This little episode and, indeed, the subsequent story of
491. See, e.g., John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2521 (1998) (noting that officer suits were the predominant form
of relief for unconstitutional acts but, also, arguing that Section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment
nullifies state law conflicting with constitutional provisions but does not give rise to affirmative
remedy such as injunction or damages); see also Meltzer, supra note 168, at 2549-65
(discussing Harrison's thesis).
492. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing the framers' expectations
for the judicial system).
493. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 637; see also Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1446 (1998) (arguing that in early eighteenth century, consensus was that the legislature
was the appropriate authority to determine obligations of government).
494. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 637.
495. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 611-14 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
496. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 638.
497. Id.
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Chisholm and the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment4 98 demonstrate that
these tensions have been with us since the beginning.
For decades, Congress's right to exercise this power was
uncontroversial. 499 As Professor Shimomura argues, given the judiciary's
silence, this legislative function seems better understood as an extension from
colonial history than a deduction of logic from the Constitution.500 Its historical
roots, however, could not quell brewing dissatisfaction with the system. By the
Civil War era, Congress had recognized that it simply could not keep up with
the ever-increasing number of claims. The model that thus developed was a
hybrid, in which Congress and the federal judiciary shared responsibility for
hearing and determining claims against the federal government. 50 1 This model
lasted until about World War I, when it too began to break down.50 2 By World
War H, the hybrid model itself was all but dead, and Congress turned over to
the Article Il judiciary responsibility over most legal claims against the United
States.503 Thus, since the Supreme Court's decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
the Court of Claims's status as an Article I1 court has been unchallenged. 5°4
The triumph of the "judicial model" of claims determination
50 5
demonstrates that our modem government structure recognizes courts'
preeminent role in vindicating individuals' legal claims against the government.
To be sure, there is no straight linear progression to be traced in which the
Court consistently makes available more remedies each generation. But nor is
the Brennan Court anomalous in creatively using its remedial powers to
vindicate constitutional rights that might otherwise go unprotected. Of course,
even Glidden itself recognized that the Court of Claims's jurisdiction could not
waive sovereign immunity by its own force.506 But the judiciary's place in
498. Cf. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409,409-10 (1792) (discussing the fact that the
Supreme Court did not need to rule on the Hayburn Case because the legislature provided
another method of relief).
499. See, e.g., Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409, 413-14 (1839) (holding that
Congress has the power to enact a statute providing for payment of money directly to heirs of
claimants).
500. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 646.
501. ld. at 670.
502. Id. at 678. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 581 (1933)
(determining that salaries of Court of Claims judges were permissible because the Court of
Claims was an Article I court and therefore not protected by Article 11 salary protection).
503. Shimomura, supra note 177, at 682.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 414-20 (discussing sovereign immunity and the
Court of Claims).
505. See Shimomura, supra note 177, at 687-90 (discussing "'A Judicial Model' of Article
III").
506. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,564 (1962) (plurality opinion) (reiterating
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settling claims against the government is now firmly established, and the
Supreme Court has recognized Article IR as a basis for all claims against the
government.50 7  Moreover, the Court has now recognized, in limited
circumstances, that sovereign immunity is not an impenetrable barrier to suits
against the government for money.508
The story of this evolution is even more significant for interpretive
purposes than the original practice it superseded. In Federalist No. 37,
Madison recognized that it would take time to elucidate the Constitution's
meaning. As he explained, "[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meanings can be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications. "509 Jefferson voiced similar sentiments, writing to Madison that
"the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; that the dead have neither powers
nor rights over it."510 The Founders, then, seem not to have envisioned a
Constitution etched in stone but rather expected constitutional meaning to adapt
after more considered "discussions and adjudications. " ' The triumph of the
judicial model demonstrates the gradual recognition that courts are better suited
than legislatures to adjudicate individual legal claims against the government.
that a government may not be sued without its consent).
507. See id. (noting that Article I's extension of authority over controversies to which the
United States is a party does not depend on whether the United States is a plaintiff or
defendant).
508. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (noting that sovereign immunity
does not completely bar state tax refund claims); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar federal jurisdiction "to review issues of federal law in suits brought against states in state
court"); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "dictates a remedy" for takings
despite principles of sovereign immunity); see also Pfander, supra note 219, at 972 ("[W]here
the Constitution requires the government... to make victims.., of constitutional violations
whole, remedial obligations apply whether or not the government has adopted an effective
waiver of sovereign immunity."). Of course, it would be circular to cite the First English
footnote for the proposition that it is correct. But to the extent historical practice commands
attention, First English, among other cases, suggests a general willingness on the part of the
Court to apply appropriate remedies, even in the face of a potential sovereign immunity hurdle.
509. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, (James Madison), supra note 218, at 226.
510. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRrnNGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted);
see also ELY, supra note 179, at 11 (noting that Jefferson suggested the Constitution naturally
expire every nineteen years).
511. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARv. L. REv. 885,948 (1985) (arguing that framers did not think originalism appropriate as an
interpretive strategy for the Constitution).
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Of course, none of this history definitively settles our larger question about
the interaction of the Takings Clause and state sovereign immunity. But the
triumph of the judicial model of claim adjudication coupled with Federalist No.
37's evolutionary vision of constitutional interpretation undermines the vigor of
originalist arguments insisting that the king cannot be sued. It similarly calls
into question the applicability of the nineteenth century assumption that an
individual could never sue the government for damages without its consent so
that the officer suit was the only means of obtaining redress for constitutional
violations. This assumption was, of course, dominant then, but the limits of
that assumption were unlikely to be questioned given the legislature's role in
claims adjudication. Though sovereign immunity was-and still is-part of
our legal fabric, the historical argument in its favor is weakened by the fact that
nineteenth century courts rarely heard legal claims against the government.
Given that the whole model for adjudicating these claims has radically
changed over the past two hundred years, the historical roots of sovereign
immunity-themselves controversial, as Justice Souter and others have pointed
out-carry less persuasive force.512 As noted above, original understanding
sometimes ought to be "translated" into a modem context . 3 Such a translation
here should recognize that the very notion of immunity-and the corresponding
notion that the officer suit frequently constituted the lone means of appropriate
relief-became dominant in an era when it was feasible for the legislature to
consider all claims for damages in private bills. Because that is no longer
feasible, Congress has delegated that responsibility to the courts. Of course, the
history of permissible remedies should be part of our understanding, but in
translating the history to the contemporary setting, we should not limit
ourselves to a remedy that was predominant before our cause of action even
existed. Put differently, if the entire method for seeking redress for a taking has
changed-and if the historical trend has generally favored the Marbury
principle-then surely sovereign immunity too plays a different role in the
system.
To this extent, a contemporary translation of historical practices is a way
to reconcile competing stories, not a means of subverting consistent historical
practice. The limited remedy of the officer suit on the one hand, and the
argument that the judiciary has generally sought to impose remedies that will
512. See Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v.
Louisiana, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 1260, 1262 (1990) (arguing that legal circumstances have
changed so much since 1890 that adherence to Hans' strict rule of sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment is not justified).
513. See Lessig, supra note 423, at 1263-68 (arguing that "translation"---as Lessig uses the
tenn--"accommodate[s] changes in context so as to preserve meaning across contexts").
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vindicate important rights on the other, represent competing notions of courts'
role in our constitutional system. History, from this perspective, cannot
vindicate one theory over the other; rather it reflects different ages' efforts to
reconcile these competing tensions. Notwithstanding the originalists'
insistence, history does not settle this score decisively in favor of the Eleventh
Amendment. If anything, its complexities and ambiguities demonstrate not
only the loose historical foundation upon which the Court's Eleventh
Amendment theory rests, but also the danger of applying that theory to the
instant problem.
VII. Conclusion
It is time to tally score. On textualism, takings is a clear winner over state
sovereign immunity. While I must concede that the Takings Clause does not
specifically mention temporary takings, First English and its progeny are
earnest interpretations of the Just Compensation Clause. Without protection for
temporary takings, it would be too easy for government to "borrow" property
and return it eventually without offering any compensation. Temporary takings
doctrine, therefore, closes a loophole and helps the Takings Clause operate. By
way of contrast, state sovereign immunity doctrine is decidedly-and
unabashedly-unmoored from the text of the Eleventh Amendment. Takings
might not rout state sovereign immunity on textualism, but the victory is sound.
Structural arguments are more complicated, and more normatively based,
but again the Takings Clause emerges victorious. A "just compensation
exception" to Eleventh Amendment doctrine would carve but a small piece out
of current state sovereign immunity law, leaving the remainder, including the
Seminole Tribe line of abrogation cases, unimpeded. The contrary holding
would leave the property owner mostly unprotected against temporary takings
by the state. And though we must be careful not to delegate too much power to
the courts, the promise that rights be protected by remedies coupled with the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests that we should not take lightly explicit
constitutional protections and remedies.
Policy and historical considerations are closer calls. As noted above, an
Eleventh Amendment bar to takings suits against the states would not be a
policy disaster, though it poses yet another hurdle for the takings plaintiff.5 4
But automatic abrogation also would not be a disaster. The policy arguments,
then, seem mostly equivocal, and as we shall see in a moment, given the
514. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing alternative remedies).
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abstractness and subjectivity of the inquiry, they ought not play too important a
role.515
As for history, given the sparse material on the origins of the Takings
Clause and the controversy over the scope of the Eleventh Amendment in
relation to Chisholm, it is hard to rely with confidence on original intent.
Nineteenth century practices, to be fair, tended to favor sovereign immunity,
but history is never static, so these understandings changed. Takings clauses
started to be used as causes of action; courts, rather than legislatures, began to
hear claims against the government and became more concerned with
protecting the individual from government encroachment. Though novel, in
ways these developments seem more faithful to original understanding. Given
these complications, it is easy to see why scholars and judges cannot agree
either on the content of these histories or on their relevance.
The question posed to the historical inquiries might well be asked of all
the methodologies: Exactly how are we to reconcile a great deal of complicated
and conflicting information? If text, structure, and "evolutionist" history weigh
in favor of takings and originalist history weighs (albeit slightly) in favor of
sovereign immunity, what is the constitutional jurist to do?
In American jurisprudence over the past few decades, it has been common
to sidestep doctrinal conflicts and make potentially competing doctrines fit with
one another. These cases have tended to focus on one doctrine or to find that a
potentially conflicting doctrine has in fact not been implicated. 516  This
approach, of course, has the aura of objectivity and avoids damage to already
existing lines of law. Indeed, as we have seen, the instant problem offers a
515. See infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text (discussing the "funnel of
abstraction"). Courts' core institutional competence is also not policy decisions.
516. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2004)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment was not implicated because undue hardship determination in
Bankruptcy Court did not constitute a suit against the state for purposes of Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,923-25 (1997) (finding that the
Tenth Amendment prohibits "commandeering" of state officials under the Commerce Clause,
and therefore the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses are not applicable); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-80 (1992) (giving scant consideration to arguably
competing constitutional provisions, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, in relying on the
Tenth Amendment to hold that Congress cannot force state legislatures to enact federal
regulatory plans under the Commerce Clause); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81
(1992) (relying on First Amendment exclusively when case arguably also implicated
Reconstruction Amendments); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-71 (1974) (drawing
prospective-retrospective line for Young actions without balancing surrounding legal
arguments); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124, 151-60 (1992) (arguing that Supreme Court decision in
R.A. V. should have considered the Reconstruction Amendments in addition to First Amendment
doctrine).
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supposed solution of this kind: the Fourteenth Amendment makes temporary
takings doctrine applicable to the states, and though constitutional provisions
are generally not self-executing, the unique nature of the Takings Clause, when
applied against the states, trumps whatever immunity might usually bar such an
action. The Fourteenth Amendment naturally supersedes the Eleventh
Amendment, and so the immunity bar is hurdled.517
Though this interpretation is probably correct, it is not the entire story.
Instead, it is a post-hoc rationalization of a more complicated inquiry that
should consider the text, structure, and history behind the competing doctrines.
It is understandable why judges and, for that matter, scholars sometimes shy
away from the more explicit balancing that this Article presents. First, the
inquiry is hard to focus; the questions are so numerous and intricate that it is
not always easy to know when to stop digging and start assessing. Second,
judicial weighing necessarily involves subjectivity out of vogue in American
jurisprudence. Third, even if we can come up with a reasonable ledger of pros
and cons, that ledger will not help us determine if there is a hierarchy among
the various inquiries. Fourth, the common law roots of our legal system
pressure judges to decide all cases by finding the relevant precedent.518 Fifth, a
careful inquiry takes time and many pages. But, notwithstanding these
concerns, courts, usually silently, do perform this kind of balancing in certain
cases. Instead of pretending to reconcile the irreconcilable, courts should be
more straightforward about the real factors shaping their decisions.
There are two primary ways of balancing the principles here. The first is
to ask which principle-temporary takings or state sovereign immunity-is
more important in context. When plaintiffs sue state governments to recover
for past takings, should sovereign immunity be able to bar the action? The
answer here seems easy. To sum up, temporary takings are no "different in
517. Note that Professor Seamon offers a different way of reconciling the two doctrines.
He takes state sovereign immunity as a bedrock principle and finds no chinks in its armor that
will necessarily fail against a takings claim. See Seamon, supra note 8, at 1080-1101 (arguing
that unconsenting states are generally immune from takings suits in both federal and state
courts). Relying on century-old case law, he then argues that due process sometimes requires
state courts to provide rights of action for takings claimants against the states. See id. at 1101-
17 (arguing that due process trumps state sovereign immunity when a state does not provide a
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision" for just compensation). Thus, sovereign immunity
doctrine is not damaged but rather made to fit with turn-of-the-century due process cases.
518. See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States:
Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 633, 636-37 (2004) (noting that, in
constitutional adjudication, common law judges, in contrast to civil law judges, are constrained
much more by precedent in their interpretive choices). This reliance on stare decisis is usually
straight forward and appropriate-except in a case such as this one.
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kind from permanent takings. 5 1 9 Because sovereign immunity does not bar
regular takings suits-and because there is no argument that it should-it
seems strange to extend that immunity to temporary takings. Accordingly, state
sovereign immunity should not bar the vindication of this important right.
A related, but different, means of balancing is to ask which principle we
are more confident is correct.5 20 American law commonly treats propositions of
law as either correct or incorrect; as Professor Lawson eloquently explains, "the
law does not even consider applying to legal propositions any of the varied
principles that govern the proof of factual propositions."5 2' But, as we have
seen, propositions of law can be called into question, and not just because a
change in the make-up of the Supreme Court could alter a doctrine. A doctrine
like state sovereign immunity does have some significant historical roots and a
practical justification. But it also seems contrary to many of our fundamental
legal principles, and the history, at best, is controversial. Temporary takings
doctrine, by way of contrast, though less rooted in historical practice, is
generally accepted as uncontroversial (though the boundaries of what
constitutes a taking are, of course, debatable). Presenting the problem this way,
we pit a strong doctrine against a weak doctrine. American courts do not
resolve problems this way, frequently for good reason. If law exists, it should
not generally be treated as less definite because it is controversial. But in a case
like this, where doctrines conflict and one must yield, it seems not only
acceptable but desirable that we should account for the fact that one doctrine is
more likely correct than the other. As Professor Lawson asks rhetorically:
"Why is it important that courts always be able to give definitive interpretations
of the law? The law certainly does not require that decisionmakers always be
able to reach definitive conclusions aboutfacts... and the system nonetheless
works quite well.
5 22
To carry out this second type of balancing-to weigh our confidence in
competing laws--one might use what Professor Eskridge and others have
called "the funnel of abstraction," an approach common in statutory
interpretation but less often employed explicitly in constitutional law.
523
519. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
520. Obviously, these two methods can blend into each other and frequently will, as here,
point in the same direction.
521. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859, 895 (1992).
522. Id. at 896.
523. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 139, at 804-05 (describing "funnel of abstraction"). The
funnel is presented as a descriptive theory of statutory interpretation that explains how judges go
about deciding statutory cases, id. at 805, but because it gives more weight to the concrete
inquiries that limit the range of arguments, it could also be said to be a normative presentation
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Recognizing that different inquiries in statutory interpretation can point to
different results, scholars have arranged the inquiries from most concrete to
most abstract.524 Though each inquiry figures into the equation, the more
525concrete ones deserve more weight in the determination of the final answer.
Thus, statutory text, the most concrete inquiry, receives the greatest weight,
followed by specific and general legislative history, legislative purpose,
statutory evolution, and current policy.526 A similar approach to constitutional
interpretation would consider constitutional text; specific and general
constitutional history (in this case, both the specific original intent behind the
Takings Clause, Eleventh Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment and the
more general assumptions underlying our constitutional framework); the
purpose behind the relevant provisions and the Constitution generally; the
evolution of our constitutional understanding; and current policy concerns.527
This funnel does not find a precise niche for structural arguments, but they can
be thought of as both textual, because a structuralist approach might be
mandated by the Constitution itself,5 28 and purposive, because our
constitutional values were arranged into a lean document from which we must
discern meaning.529




527. Professor Fallon offers a similar hierarchy of modes of constitutional interpretation,
prioritizing text and then, in order, original intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987) (developing a "typology of constitutional
argument"). Some have attempted to argue that, so long as one legitimate "modality" of
argument is employed, the constitutional jurist need not select between approaches. See PHnuP
BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-30 (1991) (discussing the "modalities" of
constitutional argument and asserting that the modalities should not be used to justify particular
ideologies of constitutional interpretation). While the challenge of selecting among "modalities"
is very real, to deny the existence of interpretative hierarchy seems to ignore the fact that some
inquiries are more subjective than others (though, admittedly, no inquiry is wholly objective)
and that judges, recognizing this, frequently debate the relative legitimacy of different
interpretative approaches. See Michael C. Doff, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1787-90 (1997)
("Supreme Court opinions abound with self conscious justifications of the modalities .... To
describe constitutional law accurately thus requires an account ofjustification."). See generally
Tribe, supra note 8, at 85-89 (discussing approaches to constitutional analyses when competing
modes of interpretation collide and summarizing Fallon, Bobbitt, and Dorf).
528. See, e.g., Young, supra note 129, at 1625-30 & 1675 n.333 (arguing that the
Guarantee Clause, "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the use of the word "state"
throughout the Constitution are textual mandates for structural arguments).
529. More so than in statutory interpretation, the different inquiries bleed into each other,
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Indeed, the nature of structural constitutional arguments and the leanness
of the Constitution itself suggest that the constitutional adjudicator need not
follow the funnel as closely as the interpreter of statutes. Because our
Constitution is so short, much of its meaning is not contained in the literal text;
many of our most important constitutional principles are the product of judicial
interpretation. We must therefore acknowledge that, at least in some instances,
the Constitution's text, unlike a statutory text, is often not decisive 530 and,
accordingly, that the funnel exists more as a guide than a directive. In fact, in
different constitutional cases, different factors turn out to be decisive. From
this perspective, if there is any "hierarchy," as Professor Fallon insists, 531 it is a
loose one.
Though the funnel's hierarchy is only marginally helpful to the
constitutional adjudicator, the process of forcing the adjudicator to think
through the different modes of argumentation is crucial. It is this kind of
inquiry that will help identify which doctrine is more fundamental, both
generally and in the context of the given doctrinal conflict. This balancing is
532
far more common in foreign courts than in ours. In most cases, our
as our understanding of constitutional structure and purpose, for instance, is necessarily colored
by our reading of the text, history, and evolution. In this way, no interpreter will be wholly
neutral, as each will be influenced by his or her own hermeneutical biases. As Professor Ely
pointed out, it is no earth-shattering insight that judges, whether consciously or unconsciously,
"slip their personal values into their [judicial] reasonings." ELY, supra note 179, at 44. The
inherent fallibility of judges might be reason to let the legislature decide whether or not to
abrogate immunity. But that is a cop out. If it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to
say what the law is, then the judiciary must decide whether congressional abrogation is required.
530. There are exceptions of course. The Constitution's requirement that the President of
the United States be at least thirty-five years of age, for instance, is a strict textual requirement
that invites no judicial gloss. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("[N]either shall any Person be
eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the Age of Thirty-five Years ....").
531. See Fallon, supra note 527, at 1243-48 (arguing for hierarchy of "modalities").
532. The South African Constitution, for instance, contains one clause seeking the
promotion of human dignity and another recognizing the constraints of economic realities. See
S. Ant. CONST. ch. 2, § 39 (requiring courts interpreting South African constitution to "promote
the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom"); id. § 36 (permitting courts interpreting South African Bill of Rights to take into
account "all relevant factors" when considering limitations of rights). It thus balances
competing constitutional principles against each other. See MATTHEW CHASKALSON Er AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SouTH AFRICA §§ 12-13(c) (5th ed. 1999) (noting balancing in this
area of South African constitutional law). A comprehensive comparative study exceeds the
scope of this Article, but it is uncontroversial that many other court systems also employ open
balancing, particularly when examining the scope of constitutional rights. See Donald L.
Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the United States
and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 188-89 (2001) (noting that whereas Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms instructs Canadian courts to balance competing interests,
United States Constitution encourages adherence to absolute principles and eschews such
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precedent-driven common law system works well. But as many other legal
systems around the world have acknowledged, some sort of balancing is
necessary when two doctrines do not mesh. A funnel-like approach is a good
way to line up the factors, even if we choose not to be constrained by a rigid
hierarchy of "modalities." Indeed, though out of fashion in American
jurisprudence, this kind of balancing offers a rigorous methodology for
arbitrating irreconcilable collisions of this sort. As one commentator has
explained:
Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions,
and promises a particularized, rational concept of how he arrives at them--
more particularized and more rational at least than the familiar parade of
hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes, and selective history. Moreover,
this approach should make it more difficult for judges to rest on their
predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason. It should
also make their accounts more rationally auditable. 533
There is, of court, as Ely warned, the danger that the balancing test will
"become intertwined with ideological predispositions of those doing the
balancing. 5 34 But where doctrine cannot solve the problem, it is inevitable that
balancing); Michael D. Bimhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European
Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 175, 192 (2004) (noting that emerging constitutional and human
rights jurisprudence, embedded in Article 10 of European Convention of Human Rights, does
not shy away from explicit balancing); Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of
Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism,
82 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1712-13 (2004) (noting activist trend in European constitutional courts
that embraces open ended inquiries like balancing); William E. Forbath & Lawrence Sager,
Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1653, 1654
(2004) (noting that European constitutional courts tend to address problems more directly--and
be more "active"-than United States courts, in part, because as constitutional courts, they have
nothing else to do); Kevin W. Goering et al., Why U.S. Law Should Have Been Considered in
the Rwanda Media Convictions, COMM. LAW., Spring 2004, at 10, 11 (2004) ("Whereas
European courts (and others) balance constitutional... freedoms against one another, the
United States begins with enumerated and absolute prohibitions and then proceeds by allowing
exceptions in certain discrete situations."); Lorenzo Zucca, Book Review, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 247,247 (2004) (reviewing ROBERT ALEXY, ATHEORY OFCONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS (Julian
Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002 (1986)) (noting that balancing constitutional rights is
method used in European courts).
533. Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821,825-26 (1962).
534. John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501
(1975); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Term 1991: Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 97 (1992) (explaining that historical swings
demonstrate that "substantive theories of rules as conservative and standards as liberal--or vice
versa-are wrong").
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judges' predispositions will at least color-if not entirely shape-their
decisions. If anything, balancing in a scenario such as this helps judges avoid
deciding a case without at least testing their convictions. It also forces judges
to try to place the doctrines at issue in the broader legal landscape, so as not to
lose the forest for the trees.
After completing this balancing and lining up all the factors, the instant
case, though doctrinally intricate, is in the end less controversial than it initially
appeared.535 Though many of the inquiries are complicated, most suggest that
takings should trump state sovereign immunity. And while the originalist
might disagree, even that is not certain. It then seems that the dicta in the First
English footnote had it right.
It should not be too surprising that the various inquiries here point towards
the same answer, because there is substantial overlap among them.536 As the
foregoing analysis has sought to demonstrate, text, structure, history, policy,
and norms are not purely discrete categories but artificial organizing principles.
To this extent, most arguments from a given approach will borrow at least
somewhat from another methodology. And one's interpretive biases in one
area will likely affect one's interpretations in another.537 There is a disquieting
subjectivity to this admission, but that does not mean that the judicial enterprise
cannot be taken seriously. Indeed, although judges' interpretations of a given
problem will necessarily be colored by their interpretive biases, most can and
will take the interpretive process seriously, seeking the right answer in each of
the various modes of inquiry. Thus, while the inquiries are likely to bleed into
each other, the mere effort to keep them discrete will help judges treat each one
seriously. Quite often, this will be enough, for the answer will become
obvious.
535. This is perhaps unsurprising. As Professor Fallon posits in his "constructivist
coherence theory," various categories of constitutional argument, though distinct, are
sufficiently interconnected so that it usually is possible for a constitutional interpreter to reach
"constructivist coherence" in which the various factors are not inconsistent with a single result.
Fallon, supra note 527, at 1191-94. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that just
because the various factors point in the same direction does not mean that the question was an
easy one on first impression.
536. See supra note 16 (noting that the categories of textual, structural, and historical
arguments are not rigid).
537. Professor Eskridge and others have referred to this phenomenon as the hermeneutical
circle. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609,
650 (1990) (discussing Gadamer's Truth and Method and Gadamer's use of "hermeneutical
circle"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 351-52 (1990) (explaining the hermeneutical circle idea that
no interpretive thread can be viewed in isolation so that each interpretive thread will be
evaluated in relation to other threads).
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The instant conflict is such a case; unlike some constitutional dilemmas,
resolving this one does not greatly risk the imposition of judges' values on an
unwilling democracy.53 8 Rather, with a doctrinal collision, one must admit that
both lines of precedent exist for a reason and try to pick the solution that
honestly recognizes the problem while doing the least collective damage. Of
course, it would be na've to assume that judges' initial weighing within each
category will not be suspect to personal values, but as Ely, Bickel, and others
have long recognized, this is inevitable.
This case has no easy doctrinal solution; in fact, it has no doctrinal
"solution" at all because the governing case law is irreconcilable. Many
important and fascinating legal questions are about thinking small-about
wrestling with the finer points of statutes and case law and coming up with the
answer that the sources command. In this case, however, thinking small does
not resolve the problem. It is important to see how we got where we are, and it
can be useful to ask if precedent leans one way or the other. But to resolve a
case like this, courts must think about their very role in our democracy.
The danger, of course, is that this is countermajoritarian and places more
power in the hands of judges. A case like this is different, however, because it
not only involves the Constitution but competing constitutional provisions. If
constitutional rights are to be truly constitutional-and are to demand
protection regardless of majority whim-then the judiciary must play some role
in arbitrating these conflicts. 519 Notwithstanding perfectly legitimate concerns
about the countermajoritarian problem, it is inevitable that these questions will
come before courts, and it is essential that courts themselves decide them. The
Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, exist partially to protect
individuals from the excesses of government, and when those protected rights
are challenged, it would be contrary to the Constitution's text, structure, and
purpose to throw them right back to the legislature. But that is what the Court
would do were it to require congressional abrogation of takings claims against
the states.
538. See ELY, supra note 179, at 71 (noting that Professor Bickel recognized that "[i]t
wouldn't do ... for the justices simply to impose their own values").
539. As Madison explained:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 218, at 331.
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The states as sovereign entities are surely central in our constitutional plan,
but to hold their sovereignty as more essential than the individual rights they
were created to safeguard is to prioritize the means before the ends. This is not
to say that these questions are easy, and surely there is value in retaining-or,
as it were, reviving-a healthy federalism. There is a real danger of subjecting
state treasuries to the avarice of pecuniary minded citizens, and it would be
simplistic not to admit that protecting these state treasuries is, in a way, also
protecting citizens' individual rights. But when we step back and ask how
better to protect individual rights-permitting a suit claiming a constitutional
violation or barring such a suit to preserve a state's dignity-the former is
clearly more convincing. This answer, of course, assumes that individual rights
are our core constitutional value, but given the Founders' own appeal to this
value in defense of the new government's federalist structure, this assumption
seems consistent with our Constitution's history and structure. That our
government leaves much to process is incontrovertible, but the ultimate
decision to enshrine some individual rights in the text itself takes certain issues
out of that process. This is to put the discussion at a high level of abstraction,
to be sure, but the question must be asked: What is a constitutional right if its
protection must be ensured first by the legislature?
For most rights, the answer to that question is complicated because our
judiciary does not have the power to award any remedy it wishes. The tension
between individual rights and the protection of the legislature's budget runs
deep. But the Takings Clause is different because, unlike most other
provisions, it promises a specific remedy.540 Nothing in the Eleventh
Amendment purports to trump this.54' Indeed, text, structure, and, I would
540. What might be troubling for liberals in this analysis is that it prioritizes property over
other rights that might seem more fundamental. Why should individuals with takings claims be
entitled to remedies not available to those who suffer physical abuse at the hands of the
government? The easy answer here is that the Constitution, by conferring upon property rights
an anomalous constitutionally compelled remedy, makes this decision for us. Judges wary of
constraining regulation too much might scale back what constitutes a taking, but once triggered,
the clause demands a particular remedy. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1825-26
("[T]he just compensation clause mandat[es] government compensation for takings of
property.").
541. A more controversial argument would be that all individual constitutional rights
should trump state sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity would still apply for statutory
rights and state law but would avoid potential constitutional conflict by steering clear of those
particular rights. Indeed, to the extent that current immunity doctrine rests on highly contested
accounts of a preconstitutional common law, it seems wrong that it can block suits against states
involving constitutional rights. The Court's recognition that Mr. Bivens deserved a damages
remedy, then, is a normatively powerful argument in favor of automatic abrogation of state
sovereign immunity of other constitutional rights. As a legal matter, this is an even harder issue
than my narrower takings hypothetical, but it is not hopeless. After all, the Court in Alden did
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argue, history all suggest that the Takings Clause should trump state sovereign
immunity. But, admitting that these inquiries, individually and collectively, are
difficult, there comes a point when the jurist must step back from a thorny issue
and ask which answer is more closely tethered to our deepest constitutional
values. From that perspective, placing aside all the complexities, this is an easy
case.
note that there was something different when an "obligation arises from the Constitution itself."
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999)
